papers/lux-restaking/sections/06-avs-marketplace.tex

\section{AVS Marketplace}

\label{sec:marketplace}
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\subsection{AVS Registration}

An AVS registers by deploying three contracts:

\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.5em]
  \item \textbf{SlashingModule} ($\Phi_s$): Defines slashing conditions and proof format.
  \item \textbf{TaskManager} ($\mathcal{T}_s$): Issues tasks to operators and tracks responses.
  \item \textbf{RewardDistributor} ($\mathcal{R}_s$): Manages reward tokens and distribution logic.
\end{enumerate}

The AVS additionally specifies:
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.5em]
  \item \texttt{MinSecurityDeposit}: minimum LUX (or USD-equivalent) per operator;
  \item \texttt{MinOperatorCount}: minimum number of opted-in operators;
  \item \texttt{MinTotalSecurity}: minimum aggregate $\Pi(s)$;
  \item \texttt{RewardToken}: address of the reward token contract (may be native LUX);
  \item \texttt{RewardEpochRate}: tokens distributed per epoch per unit security.
\end{itemize}

\subsection{Discovery and Matching}

The LRP marketplace exposes an on-chain registry indexed by:
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.5em]
  \item Category (oracle, data availability, keeper, bridge, sequencer, etc.);
  \item Security tier (Bronze $< \$10$M, Silver $\$10$--$\$100$M, Gold $> \$100$M);
  \item Reward token and APY estimate;
  \item Operator reputation score.
\end{itemize}

Operators query the registry off-chain, evaluate risk-adjusted yield, and submit opt-in
transactions. The matching process is fully permissionless---no AVS may reject an operator
who meets its published minimum criteria.

\subsection{Reputation Scoring}

Each operator $v$ carries a reputation score $\rho_v \in [0, 1000]$ initialized at 500
upon first registration. The score evolves as:
\begin{align}
  \rho_v &\leftarrow \rho_v + \delta_{\text{uptime}} \cdot U_v - \delta_{\text{slash}} \cdot S_v,
\end{align}
where $U_v$ is the operator's epoch uptime rate, $S_v \in \{0,1\}$ indicates a slash event
in the epoch, $\delta_{\text{uptime}} = 1$, and $\delta_{\text{slash}} = 50$.

AVSs may impose a minimum reputation threshold $\rho_{\min}$ below which operators are
automatically ejected. This creates a competitive quality signal without centralized
gatekeeping.

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