Files
zeekay f4ee7a0525 Publish under the org, not a person
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under
each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the
work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and
research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories
already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined.

Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay
named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads,
PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to
whoever the cited paper names.

Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use
elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
2026-09-01 08:58:10 -07:00

65 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{listings}
\input{../shared/lstlang}
\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
\lstset{
basicstyle=\ttfamily\scriptsize,
breaklines=true,
frame=single,
numbers=left,
numberstyle=\tiny\color{gray},
keywordstyle=\color{blue!70!black}\bfseries,
commentstyle=\color{green!50!black}\itshape,
stringstyle=\color{red!60!black},
showstringspaces=false,
}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
\newtheorem{invariant}{Invariant}[section]
\title{Authenticated Cross-Chain\\Message Protocol}
\author{
Lux Research \\
Lux Industries, Inc.\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{2023}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
Bridges are the single largest attack surface in cryptocurrency, responsible for over \$2B in losses between 2020 and 2025. The root cause is consistent: the message layer between chains is either unauthenticated, weakly authenticated, or authenticated by a small trusted committee that can be compromised. We present an authenticated cross-chain message protocol that eliminates these failure modes. The protocol specifies a formal message envelope with 13 mandatory fields (version, type, srcChain, dstChain, router, asset, nonce, amount, recipient, expiry, originTxHash, payloadHash, domainSeparator), five classes of replay protection (cross-network, cross-chain, same-chain double-spend, nonce skip, stale message), MPC threshold attestation over the message hash, and eight mandatory verification checks on every receive path. We implement the protocol as the Teleport bridge on the Lux network, supporting deposit, burn, release, and backing attestation operations across 270+ chains. No message has been forged, replayed, or incorrectly processed in production.
\end{abstract}
\input{sections/01-introduction}
\input{sections/02-threat-model}
\input{sections/03-message-envelope}
\input{sections/04-domain-separator}
\input{sections/05-replay-protection}
\input{sections/06-mpc-attestation}
\input{sections/07-teleport-protocol-end-to-end-flow}
\input{sections/08-verification-rules}
\input{sections/09-gas-costs}
\input{sections/10-comparison-with-existing-bridges}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}