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111 lines
4.4 KiB
TeX
111 lines
4.4 KiB
TeX
\section{Sovereign Governance}
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\label{sec:governance}
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% ============================================================
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\subsection{Governance Instantiation}
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Each chain $\Chain_i$ that connects to Teleport deploys an OmnichainRouter instance $R_i$ with a designated governor $\Gov_i$. The governor is typically:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{Lux C-Chain}: LUX token DAO with 48-hour timelock. Fees flow to xLUX holders.
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\item \textbf{Zoo EVM}: ZOO token governance. Fees flow to ZOO stakers.
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\item \textbf{External L1/L2}: The chain's own governance mechanism, chosen at deployment.
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\end{itemize}
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\noindent
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The key insight is that $\Gov_i$ controls \emph{only} the economic parameters of $R_i$. It has no authority over $R_j$ for $j \neq i$, and no authority over the MPC signer set or immutable protocol logic.
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\subsection{Governor Capability Matrix}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\small
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\begin{tabular}{@{}p{3.8cm}cc@{}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Action} & \textbf{CAN} & \textbf{CANNOT} \\
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\midrule
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Set bridge fee (0--100 bps) & $\checkmark$ & \\
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Set daily mint limits & $\checkmark$ & \\
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Register new bridge tokens & $\checkmark$ & \\
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Enable Shariah mode & $\checkmark$ & \\
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Set yield strategy routing & $\checkmark$ & \\
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Change fee recipient (48h lock) & $\checkmark$ & \\
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Transfer governance (2-step) & $\checkmark$ & \\
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\midrule
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Mint bridge tokens & & $\times$ \\
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Modify nonce bitmaps & & $\times$ \\
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Set fee $> 100$ bps & & $\times$ \\
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Bypass signature verification & & $\times$ \\
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Upgrade contract bytecode & & $\times$ \\
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Override signer rotation & & $\times$ \\
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Access other chains' $R_j$ & & $\times$ \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Governor capability matrix. The ``CANNOT'' column represents hard-coded invariants enforced at the bytecode level, not merely policy.}
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\label{tab:capability}
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\end{table}
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\subsection{Fee Configuration}
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The governor sets the bridge fee rate $f_b$ and stakeholder share $f_s$:
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\begin{equation}
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0 \leq f_b \leq 100 \text{ bps}, \quad 0 \leq f_s \leq 10{,}000 \text{ bps}
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\end{equation}
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The hard cap $f_b \leq 100$ bps (1\%) is enforced at the bytecode level:
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\begin{lstlisting}[language=Solidity,caption=Fee cap enforcement]
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function setBridgeFee(uint256 newFeeBps)
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external onlyGovernor
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{
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require(
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newFeeBps <= MAX_FEE_BPS,
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"fee exceeds hard cap"
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);
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// MAX_FEE_BPS = 100, immutable
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bridgeFeeBps = newFeeBps;
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emit BridgeFeeUpdated(newFeeBps);
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}
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\end{lstlisting}
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\noindent
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The constant \texttt{MAX\_FEE\_BPS = 100} is defined at compile time and cannot be modified post-deployment, even by the governor.
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\subsection{Fee Distribution}
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For a bridge operation of amount $a$ on chain $\Chain_i$ with fee rate $f_b^{(i)}$ and stakeholder share $f_s^{(i)}$:
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\begin{align}
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\text{fee} &= a \cdot \frac{f_b^{(i)}}{10{,}000} \\
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\text{toStakeholders} &= \text{fee} \cdot \frac{f_s^{(i)}}{10{,}000} \\
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\text{toTreasury} &= \text{fee} - \text{toStakeholders}
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\end{align}
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Each chain instance independently determines where fees flow:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item On Lux C-Chain: stakeholder vault $=$ xLUX (LiquidLUX).
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\item On Zoo EVM: stakeholder vault $=$ ZOO staking contract.
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\item On white-label deployments: stakeholder vault $=$ deployer-designated address.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Signer Rotation Protection}
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MPC signer rotation is the highest-severity operation. The rotation delay is a configurable operational parameter (default 24h, governor-settable $\in [0, 7\text{d}]$), not a security invariant---the MPC threshold \emph{is} the trust model. A compromised governor cannot initiate rotation; only the current $t$-of-$n$ MPC set can.
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item Current $t$-of-$n$ MPC set signs the rotation proposal with the new MPC group address.
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\item Configurable delay begins (default 24h). Pending signers are published on-chain.
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\item During the delay, users may exit by burning bridge tokens for underlying assets.
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\item After the delay expires, any address may execute the rotation.
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\item Current signers may cancel during the delay period.
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\end{enumerate}
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\begin{property}[Exit Window]
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\label{prop:exit}
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For any signer rotation event at time $t_0$ with rotation delay $\delta$ (default 24h, max 7 days), every bridge token holder has the interval $[t_0, t_0 + \delta)$ to exit the system by burning bridge tokens and receiving the underlying asset at the current share price.
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\end{property}
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% ============================================================
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