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Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
28 lines
1.3 KiB
TeX
28 lines
1.3 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\label{sec:security}
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\subsection{Correctness}
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\begin{theorem}[Sync Correctness]
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If the state sync protocol completes without error, the local state trie has root hash equal to the target $R$.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}
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Each chunk is verified via a range proof against $R$ (Algorithm~\ref{alg:verify_range}). The chunk set covers the entire key space $[0, 2^{256})$ without gaps (by construction in Algorithm~\ref{alg:plan}). Assembling all verified chunks produces a trie whose root hash is $R$ by the collision resistance of Keccak-256.
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{Completeness}
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\begin{theorem}[No Missing State]
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A malicious peer cannot cause the syncing node to accept an incomplete state (with missing accounts or storage slots).
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}
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Range proofs verify completeness within each chunk's key range. The chunk planning algorithm ensures the union of all chunk ranges equals $[0, 2^{256})$. Any missing leaf would cause a range proof verification failure, which triggers retry from a different peer.
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{Byzantine Peer Tolerance}
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The protocol tolerates any number of Byzantine peers as long as at least one honest peer with the target state is available. Byzantine peers can delay sync (by providing invalid data that must be retried) but cannot cause acceptance of incorrect state.
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