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https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
9504b4c3ef
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
40 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
40 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
\section{System Model}
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\label{sec:model}
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%% +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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\subsection{Entities}
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\begin{definition}[MPC Signer Set]
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A set $\mathcal{S} = \{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n\}$ of $n$ nodes, each holding a share of a distributed secret key generated through distributed key generation (DKG) with no trusted dealer. A threshold $t \leq n$ defines the minimum number of honest nodes required to produce a valid signature. Default: $n = 3, t = 2$. On-chain verification uses a single \emph{MPC group address}---the aggregate public key derived from the DKG. Individual signer identities exist for accountability and identifiable abort but are not exposed on-chain: $\texttt{ecrecover}(\text{digest}, \sigma) = \texttt{mpcGroupAddress}$.
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\end{definition}
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\begin{definition}[OmnichainRouter]
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An immutable (non-upgradeable, non-proxied) smart contract deployed on each connected chain that:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item Verifies MPC threshold signatures for mint/release operations
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\item Maintains per-source-chain nonce bitmaps for replay prevention
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\item Distributes bridge fees to sovereign stakeholders
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\item Auto-pauses when backing ratio falls below 98.5\%
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\end{enumerate}
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\end{definition}
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\begin{definition}[Sovereign Governor]
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The native chain's DAO timelock address $G_C$ for chain $C$. Controls economic parameters:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item Bridge fee rate: $0 \leq f_b \leq 100$ bps (hard-capped, immutable maximum)
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\item Stakeholder share: $0 \leq f_s \leq 10{,}000$ bps
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\item Token registration and daily mint limits
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\item Shariah compliance mode activation
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\end{itemize}
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$G_C$ \emph{cannot}: mint tokens, modify nonce bitmaps, bypass collateralization checks, or shorten timelock durations.
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\end{definition}
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\subsection{Threat Model}
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We assume a computationally bounded adversary $\mathcal{A}$ who may compromise up to $t - 1$ MPC signer nodes, control the governor address on any single chain, observe and reorder transactions on any chain, and deny service to individual relay nodes.
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We assume $\mathcal{A}$ \emph{cannot} simultaneously compromise $\geq t$ MPC signer nodes, break the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) or the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), or rewrite confirmed blocks on any connected chain (finality assumption).
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%% +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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