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Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
50 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX
50 lines
2.5 KiB
TeX
\section{Adaptive Fee-Burning Protocol}
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\label{sec:fees}
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\subsection{Transaction Fee Structure}
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Lux Network uses a two-component fee model inspired by EIP-1559 \cite{roughgarden2020eip1559} but extended for multi-chain environments:
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\begin{equation}
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\text{Fee}(\text{tx}) = \text{BaseFee}_t \cdot \text{GasUsed}(\text{tx}) + \text{PriorityFee}(\text{tx})
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\end{equation}
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The base fee adjusts per block according to utilization:
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\begin{equation}\label{eq:basefee}
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\text{BaseFee}_{t+1} = \text{BaseFee}_t \cdot \left(1 + \frac{1}{8} \cdot \frac{G_t - G^*}{G^*}\right)
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\end{equation}
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where $G_t$ is the gas used in block $t$ and $G^* = 15{,}000{,}000$ is the target gas per block.
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\subsection{Burn Rate Function}
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The burn rate $\phi_t$ determines the fraction of base fees burned versus distributed to validators:
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\begin{equation}\label{eq:burn}
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\phi_t = \phi_{\min} + (\phi_{\max} - \phi_{\min}) \cdot \min\left(1, \frac{G_t}{G_{\text{cap}}}\right)
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\end{equation}
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where $\phi_{\min} = 0.50$, $\phi_{\max} = 0.90$, and $G_{\text{cap}} = 30{,}000{,}000$. Under light load, 50\% of base fees are burned. Under maximum load, 90\% are burned. The total burn in epoch $t$ is:
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\begin{equation}
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B_t = \sum_{\text{blocks } b \in t} \phi_b \cdot \text{BaseFee}_b \cdot G_b
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\end{equation}
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Priority fees are never burned; they go entirely to the block proposer as a tip for transaction ordering.
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\begin{proposition}[Deflationary Threshold]
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The network becomes net deflationary when the average block utilization exceeds $\bar{G} > G^* \cdot R_t / (\phi_{\min} \cdot \text{BaseFee}_t \cdot N_b)$, where $N_b$ is the number of blocks per epoch.
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\end{proposition}
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\subsection{Multi-Chain Fee Aggregation}
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Each appchain $k$ contributes to the primary network burn through an appchain fee tax $\tau_k$:
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\begin{equation}
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B_t^{\text{total}} = B_t^{\text{primary}} + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \tau_k \cdot F_k^t
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\end{equation}
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where $F_k^t$ is the total fee revenue on appchain $k$ in epoch $t$. The tax rate $\tau_k$ depends on the appchain's economic relationship with the primary network (see Section~\ref{sec:appchain}).
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\subsection{Fee Burn Stabilization}
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To prevent excessive deflation that could harm network usability, we introduce a floor on circulating supply:
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\begin{equation}
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B_t^{\text{effective}} = \min\left(B_t^{\text{total}}, \max\left(0, S_t - S_{\text{floor}}\right)\right)
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\end{equation}
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where $S_{\text{floor}} = 0.5 \cdot S_0 = 250{,}000{,}000$ LUX. Once circulating supply reaches the floor, burning ceases and all fees are redistributed to validators.
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