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Scrub residual Ring-LWE mislabels of the Corona/Pulsar threshold
signature family per canonical decision-b (source: ringtail/sign/config.go
M=8,N=7, q=0x1000000004A01).
- Corona = Module-LWE (Ringtail-derived parameter set, A in R_q^{8x7}),
not Ring-LWE / not "Module-LWE at rank 1".
- Pulsar = Module-LWE (ML-DSA-65, FIPS-204 byte-equal).
- Corona+Pulsar differ by parameter regime/codebase, NOT hardness family:
intra-lattice parameter/implementation diversity, NOT family-disjoint.
- True family-disjoint defense = Magnetar (hash, SLH-DSA) / HQC (codes).
Reframed the false Corona(R-LWE)-vs-Pulsar(M-LWE) family-independence
across lp-219/lp-220/lp-222/lp-223 (P3Q kinds), lux-quasar-composition
(profile hardness table + composition corollary/proof), lux-magnetar-pq,
and the superseded triple-proof/quasar drafts (anonymous lattice
threshold lane = Corona). Legitimate FHE/TFHE Ring-LWE, NTT citations,
and neutral "rank-1" lattice facts left intact. PDFs rebuilt.
14 lines
651 B
TeX
14 lines
651 B
TeX
\section{Threat Model}
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We consider three classes of adversary:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item \textbf{Classical adversary}: Can corrupt up to $f < N/3$ validators. Cannot break BLS, ML-DSA, or Corona.
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\item \textbf{Quantum adversary}: Has access to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC). Can break BLS and ECDSA. Cannot break ML-DSA (NIST FIPS 204) or Corona (Module-LWE).
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\item \textbf{Future adversary}: One of ML-DSA or Corona has an unforeseen mathematical weakness. The other, combined with BLS, still provides security.
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\end{itemize}
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Triple-proof finality is secure against all three adversary classes simultaneously.
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