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64 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
64 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
\section{Receipt Anchoring}
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\label{sec:receipts}
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%% ===================================================================
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Every trust-relevant state transition in the Lux trust kernel produces a
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\emph{receipt}: a compact, self-contained proof that the transition occurred.
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\begin{definition}[Trust Receipt]\label{def:receipt}
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A trust receipt $\mathcal{R}$ is a tuple:
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\[
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\mathcal{R} = (\mathsf{chain}, \mathsf{block}, \mathsf{txHash},
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\mathsf{type}, \mathsf{subject}, \mathsf{digest},
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\mathsf{sig})
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\]
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where $\mathsf{chain} \in \{\text{K}, \text{T}, \text{M}, \text{I}\}$ identifies
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the originating chain, $\mathsf{block}$ and $\mathsf{txHash}$ identify the
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transaction, $\mathsf{type}$ is the receipt type (Table~\ref{tab:receipts}),
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$\mathsf{subject}$ is the affected DID, $\mathsf{digest}$ is the SHA-256 hash
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of the receipt payload, and $\mathsf{sig}$ is a BLS aggregate signature from the
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chain's validator set.
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\end{definition}
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\begin{table}[h]
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\centering
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\caption{Trust receipt types by originating chain.}
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\label{tab:receipts}
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\begin{tabular}{llp{6cm}}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Chain} & \textbf{Receipt Type} & \textbf{Meaning} \\
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\midrule
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K & \textsc{KeyRegistered} & New key record created \\
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K & \textsc{KeyRotated} & Key rotated to successor \\
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K & \textsc{CapGranted} & Capability delegated \\
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K & \textsc{CapRevoked} & Capability revoked \\
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T & \textsc{QuorumApproved} & Threshold vote passed \\
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T & \textsc{QuorumRejected} & Threshold vote failed \\
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M & \textsc{SignatureProduced} & Threshold signature emitted \\
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I & \textsc{DIDRegistered} & DID document created \\
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I & \textsc{CredentialIssued} & Credential hash anchored \\
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I & \textsc{CredentialRevoked} & Credential revoked \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\end{table}
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\subsection{Capsule Audit Trails}
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A capsule maintains a local log of operations (encrypt, decrypt, share, revoke).
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For each operation, the capsule computes a digest and submits it as an
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\textsc{AnchorTx} to the appropriate chain. The chain includes the digest in a
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receipt. The capsule stores the receipt locally alongside the operation log entry.
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\begin{theorem}[Audit Completeness]\label{thm:audit}
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If a capsule faithfully anchors every operation and the trust kernel satisfies
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BFT safety (Section~\ref{sec:security}), then for any operation $o$ in the
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capsule's log, there exists a finalized receipt $\mathcal{R}$ on-chain such that
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$\mathcal{R}.\mathsf{digest} = H(o)$.
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\end{theorem}
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The on-chain receipt stores only the digest---never the operation payload. An
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auditor can verify completeness by comparing the capsule's local log against the
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receipt chain, without the chain ever learning the contents of the operations.
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%% ===================================================================
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