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Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
45 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
45 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
\section{Related Work}
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\label{sec:related}
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%% ===================================================================
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\subsection{UCAN (Fission)}
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User Controlled Authorization Networks (UCANs) \cite{ucan-fission} implement
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capability-based authorization using chained JWTs. Each UCAN token contains
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an issuer, audience, and set of attenuated capabilities. The trust kernel
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shares the capability delegation model but differs in three ways:
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(1)~capabilities are registered on-chain rather than embedded in bearer tokens,
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preventing capability replay after revocation;
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(2)~delegation chains are verified by the chain's validator set rather than
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by the relying party alone;
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(3)~key rotation is enforced by policy rather than requiring token reissuance.
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\subsection{Ceramic Anchors}
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Ceramic Network \cite{ceramic-anchors} anchors document state on Ethereum,
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providing a tamper-evident log for mutable documents. The trust kernel
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generalizes this pattern: where Ceramic anchors document CIDs, the trust
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kernel anchors \emph{trust decisions} (key lifecycle, governance votes,
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signatures). This enables audit trails for operations that have no associated
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document (e.g., a capability revocation or a threshold vote rejection).
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\subsection{Keybase}
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Keybase \cite{keybase} maintained a global key directory with Merkle tree
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anchoring to Bitcoin. The K-Chain provides equivalent functionality---a
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global key registry with on-chain anchoring---but extends it with:
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(1)~policy-enforced rotation,
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(2)~ML-KEM wrapping for post-quantum safety,
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(3)~capability-scoped key usage rather than all-or-nothing key trust.
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\subsection{Signal Protocol Key Management}
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The Signal Protocol \cite{signal-protocol} uses the X3DH key agreement and
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Double Ratchet for forward secrecy. The trust kernel does not replace
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end-to-end encryption protocols but provides the \emph{root of trust} for
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key discovery. Where Signal relies on a centralized key server, the trust
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kernel provides a decentralized, auditable key registry with verifiable
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rotation history.
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%% ===================================================================
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