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50 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
50 lines
2.4 KiB
TeX
\section{Background}
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\subsection{Threshold Cryptography}
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A $(t,n)$-threshold signature scheme distributes signing authority among $n$ parties such that any subset of size $t+1$ can collaboratively generate valid signatures, while no coalition of $t$ or fewer parties can forge signatures or reconstruct the private key.
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\begin{definition}[Threshold Signature Scheme]
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A $(t,n)$-threshold signature scheme consists of:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{KeyGen}$(1^\lambda, t, n) \to (\textsf{pk}, \{\textsf{sk}_i\}_{i=1}^n)$: Distributed key generation producing public key $\textsf{pk}$ and private shares $\textsf{sk}_i$
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\item \textbf{Sign}$(m, S, \{\textsf{sk}_i\}_{i \in S}) \to \sigma$: Collaborative signing where $|S| \geq t+1$
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\item \textbf{Verify}$(m, \sigma, \textsf{pk}) \to \{0,1\}$: Standard signature verification
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\end{itemize}
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\end{definition}
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\subsection{Digital Signature Schemes}
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\paragraph{ECDSA} The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is used by Bitcoin, Ethereum, and XRPL. Signatures are $(r,s)$ pairs where:
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\begin{align*}
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r &= (k \cdot G)_x \bmod q \\
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s &= k^{-1}(H(m) + r \cdot x) \bmod q
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\end{align*}
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\paragraph{EdDSA} Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (Ed25519) is used by Solana, Cardano, TON, and NEAR. Signatures are $(R, s)$ where:
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\begin{align*}
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R &= r \cdot B \\
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s &= r + H(R, A, m) \cdot a
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\end{align*}
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\paragraph{Schnorr} Bitcoin Taproot (BIP-340) uses Schnorr signatures $(R, s)$ with:
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\begin{align*}
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s = k + H(R, P, m) \cdot x
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\end{align*}
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\subsection{Post-Quantum Cryptography}
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Quantum computers threaten all elliptic curve and factoring-based schemes via Shor's algorithm \cite{shor1997}. NIST's post-quantum standardization selected lattice-based schemes (ML-DSA, ML-KEM) for quantum resistance. Module-LWE hardness provides security assumptions for lattice cryptography.
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\subsection{Related Work}
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\paragraph{GG18/GG20} Gennaro-Goldfeder protocols \cite{gennaro2018,gennaro2020} introduced MPC-based ECDSA threshold signatures but lacked identifiable abort.
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\paragraph{CGGMP21} Canetti et al. \cite{canetti2021} (CMP protocol) added identifiable aborts, 4-round online signing, and proactive refresh.
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\paragraph{FROST} Komlo-Goldberg \cite{komlo2020} developed efficient 2-round threshold Schnorr signatures with pre-processing.
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\paragraph{Two-Party ECDSA} Doerner et al. \cite{doerner2018} optimized 2-of-2 ECDSA for constant-time performance.
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