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https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
178febad68
Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
71 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX
71 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\subsection{Threat Model}
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\paragraph{Adversary Capabilities}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Byzantine Faults}: Up to $t-1$ parties may deviate arbitrarily
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\item \textbf{Network Control}: Adversary controls message scheduling (but not content)
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\item \textbf{Static Corruption}: Party corruption before protocol execution
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\item \textbf{Adaptive Corruption}: Party corruption during execution (restricted)
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\end{itemize}
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\paragraph{Security Goals}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Unforgeability}: No coalition of size $\leq t$ can forge signatures
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\item \textbf{Robustness}: Honest parties output valid signatures despite Byzantine faults
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\item \textbf{Identifiable Abort}: Malicious parties detected and excluded
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Protocol Security}
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\begin{theorem}[CMP Security]
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The CMP protocol achieves $(t,n)$-threshold unforgeability under the ECDSA security assumption, the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption for Paillier, and security of zero-knowledge proofs in the random oracle model.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{theorem}[FROST Security]
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FROST achieves existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model, with robustness against up to $t-1$ malicious parties.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{theorem}[LSS Security]
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The LSS dynamic resharing protocol maintains $(t,n)$-threshold security across generations, with share forward security: compromised old shares cannot forge signatures after resharing.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{theorem}[Pulsar Security]
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Pulsar achieves existential unforgeability under the Module-LWE hardness assumption with parameters providing quantum security levels 1, 3, or 5 per NIST standards.
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\end{theorem}
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\subsection{Implementation Security}
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\paragraph{Constant-Time Arithmetic} All cryptographic operations use constant-time implementations (saferith library) to prevent timing attacks.
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\paragraph{Side-Channel Resistance}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item No secret-dependent branches
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\item No secret-dependent memory access patterns
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\item Blinding of intermediate values
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\end{itemize}
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\paragraph{Zero-Knowledge Proofs} All protocols use ZK proofs at critical steps:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item $\Pi_{\textsf{mod}}$: Paillier modulus is product of two primes
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\item $\Pi_{\textsf{prm}}$: Correct Paillier parameter generation
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\item $\Pi_{\textsf{sch}}$: Schnorr proof of knowledge
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\item $\Pi_{\textsf{affg}}$: Affine operation with group commitment
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\item $\Pi_{\textsf{log}}$: Discrete logarithm equality
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Security Audit Findings}
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Third-party security audit (2024) identified and resolved:
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{Nonce Generation}: Enhanced to hedged deterministic nonces
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\item \textbf{Range Proofs}: Tightened bounds in ZK proofs
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\item \textbf{Session Binding}: Strengthened session ID to prevent replay attacks
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\item \textbf{Abort Handling}: Improved abort identification in CMP
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\end{enumerate}
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All high and medium severity issues resolved. Low severity recommendations implemented.
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