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zeekay
abf99d05fc
Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
18 lines
1.5 KiB
TeX
18 lines
1.5 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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Proof-of-Stake consensus systems require careful economic design to align validator behavior with network security objectives \cite{saleh2021blockchain, kiayias2017ouroboros}. Validators must be incentivized to remain online, follow the protocol, and refrain from attacks, while the overall system must attract sufficient stake to resist Byzantine adversaries.
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The Lux Network's PoS system faces additional challenges due to its multi-appchain architecture. Validators may participate in multiple appchains simultaneously, creating complex interactions between reward sources, hardware costs, and opportunity costs. Delegators must choose among validators based on commission rates, uptime records, and appchain coverage, forming a competitive market for staking services.
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This paper makes the following contributions:
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\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
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\item A formal delegation model with bounded commissions, minimum stakes, and lock-up periods that achieves Sybil resistance and stake decentralization.
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\item A three-tier slashing mechanism with graduated penalties calibrated to the severity and detectability of misbehavior.
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\item A reward distribution algorithm supporting multi-appchain validators with compounded returns.
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\item Game-theoretic proofs that honest validation is incentive-compatible and that the commission market has a unique competitive equilibrium.
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\item Simulation results demonstrating convergence to target decentralization metrics.
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\end{enumerate}
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