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zeekayandHanzo Dev
178febad68
Every rendered "T-Chain" / "ThresholdVM" / "teleportvm" reference across the paper corpus is rewritten to the correct canonical chain by concern: threshold signing / MPC / bridge custody / key recovery -> M-Chain (MVM); FHE / encrypted compute / threshold decryption -> F-Chain (FVM); teleport / cross-chain messaging -> B-Chain (bridgevm); consensus Pulsar stays Q-Chain. Section lux-trust-kernel/03-t-chain-threshold-governance.tex renamed -> 03-f-chain-encrypted-policy.tex (with \input + xref fixes). Braided "T-Chain" sections split by concern (M vs F). Only lp-020's chain-separation rationale and the shared lux/chains/thresholdvm library path retain the name, to record the removal. All changed papers rebuilt (pdflatex, rc=0, no undefined refs). ยง09 of lux-dao-governance-framework reframed: fabricated "production deployment" metrics ($50M/$240k/$12M, survey %s, "as of Oct 2024") relabeled as illustrative design configurations with no invented replacements; reality noted (DAO treasury is a 1/1 Safe); conclusion echo + one "first production" overclaim softened. This commit also captures concurrent corpus workstreams on the same tree. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
73 lines
2.9 KiB
TeX
73 lines
2.9 KiB
TeX
\section{Slashing Protocol}
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\label{sec:slashing}
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\subsection{Misbehavior Classification}
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We define three tiers of misbehavior with corresponding detection mechanisms and penalties:
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\begin{table}[H]
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\centering
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\caption{Slashing conditions, penalties, and detection mechanisms.}
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\label{tab:slashing}
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\begin{tabular}{p{3cm}lrll}
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\toprule
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\textbf{Violation} & \textbf{Tier} & \textbf{Penalty} & \textbf{Jail Time} & \textbf{Detection} \\
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\midrule
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Downtime $> 48$h & Minor & 0.1\% & 7 days & Heartbeat \\
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Downtime $> 7$d & Minor & 0.5\% & 14 days & Heartbeat \\
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Equivocation & Major & 5.0\% & 30 days & Crypto proof \\
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Invalid state transition & Major & 10.0\% & 60 days & Fraud proof \\
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Coordinated attack & Critical & 33.0\% & Permanent & Multi-sig evidence \\
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\bottomrule
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\end{tabular}
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\end{table}
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\subsection{Slashing Execution}
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\begin{algorithm}[H]
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\caption{Slashing Execution Protocol}
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\label{alg:slashing}
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\Procedure{Slash}{validator $v_i$, violation type, evidence}
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\State Verify evidence cryptographically
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\State $p \gets \text{PenaltyRate}(\text{violation type})$
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\State $\text{slashAmount} \gets p \cdot s_i$
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\State Deduct from $v_i$'s self-stake first
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\If{$\text{slashAmount} > s_i^{\text{self}}$}
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\State Deduct remainder pro-rata from delegators
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\EndIf
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\State Burn 50\% of slashed amount
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\State Send 50\% to evidence submitter as bounty
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\State Jail $v_i$ for prescribed duration
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\If{$s_i^{\text{self}} < s^{\min}_{\text{val}}$ after slash}
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\State Force-exit $v_i$; begin unbonding for all delegators
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\EndIf
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\EndProcedure
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\end{algorithmic}
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\end{algorithm}
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\subsection{Equivocation Detection}
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\begin{definition}[Equivocation]
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Validator $v_i$ equivocates if it signs two conflicting blocks $B_1 \neq B_2$ at the same height $h$:
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\begin{equation}
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\text{Equivocation}(v_i, h) \iff \exists\, B_1, B_2 : B_1 \neq B_2 \wedge \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{pk}_i, B_1, \sigma_1) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{pk}_i, B_2, \sigma_2)
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\end{equation}
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\end{definition}
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Equivocation is cryptographically provable: anyone holding both signed blocks can submit them as evidence. The proof is non-interactive and verifiable on-chain.
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\subsection{Correlated Slashing}
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When multiple validators misbehave simultaneously, the penalty is amplified:
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\begin{definition}[Correlated Penalty]
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If $k$ validators are slashed within the same epoch, each receives an additional penalty:
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\begin{equation}\label{eq:correlated}
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p_{\text{correlated}} = p_{\text{base}} \cdot \min\left(3, 1 + \frac{\sum_{j \in \text{slashed}} w_j}{W/3}\right)
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\end{equation}
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\end{definition}
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This graduated penalty structure deters coordinated attacks: by Equation~(\ref{eq:correlated}) the multiplier is $\min(3, 1 + \tfrac{\sum w_j}{W/3})$, so a coordinated equivocation involving $1/3$ of stake costs $2 \times 5\% = 10\%$ per validator (and involving $2/3$ of stake costs the capped $3 \times 5\% = 15\%$), making the attack economically irrational.
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