Files
zeekay f4ee7a0525 Publish under the org, not a person
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under
each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the
work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and
research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories
already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined.

Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay
named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads,
PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to
whoever the cited paper names.

Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use
elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
2026-09-01 08:58:10 -07:00

79 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{tabularx}
\usepackage{mathtools}
\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
\title{\textbf{Threshold Cryptography\\for Validator Networks}}
\author{
Lux Research \\
\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{2023}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
We present a threshold cryptographic framework for blockchain validator networks in
which no individual validator holds a complete signing key. The framework employs
CGGMP21~\cite{canetti2021uc} for ECDSA threshold signing (secp256k1 compatible),
FROST~\cite{komlo2020frost} for EdDSA and BLS threshold signing, and a distributed
key generation (DKG) protocol that creates key shares without a trusted dealer. We
address the practical gap between threshold signature theory and production validator
infrastructure: key resharing for validator set changes without exposing the master
key, recovery from corrupted shares without key reconstruction, and slashing-compatible
fault attribution. We prove that a compromised validator in a $(t, n)$ threshold
configuration reveals zero information about the master key, provide concrete benchmarks
for MPC signing latency as a function of threshold size (4.2\,ms for $t=3$ of $n=5$,
18.7\,ms for $t=7$ of $n=10$), and describe the integration with the Lux consensus
engine for MPC-based block signing.
\textbf{Keywords}: threshold signatures, MPC, CGGMP21, FROST, DKG, validator security,
blockchain consensus
\end{abstract}
\tableofcontents
\newpage
%% ========================================================================
%% 1. INTRODUCTION
%% ========================================================================
\input{sections/01-introduction}
\input{sections/02-problem-single-key-validator-architectur}
\input{sections/03-distributed-key-generation}
\input{sections/04-cggmp21-threshold-ecdsa}
\input{sections/05-frost-threshold-schnorr-and-bls-signatur}
\input{sections/06-key-resharing-and-recovery}
\input{sections/07-slashing-safe-fault-attribution}
\input{sections/08-application-to-lux-validator-network}
\input{sections/09-benchmarks}
\input{sections/10-related-work}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}