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42 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
42 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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\label{sec:introduction}
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In every major proof-of-stake blockchain, validators hold full signing keys. A
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validator's BLS or ECDSA private key is a single scalar stored in memory, on disk,
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or in an HSM. If that key is compromised---through software vulnerability, insider
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threat, physical access, or side-channel attack---the adversary can sign arbitrary
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messages as that validator. In BFT consensus systems with $n = 3f + 1$ validators,
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compromising $f + 1$ keys gives the adversary control of finality.
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This is a fundamental design flaw, not an operational risk. The problem is not that
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validators are careless with keys; the problem is that a single scalar \emph{exists}
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as a complete signing key.
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Threshold cryptography eliminates this class of vulnerability by distributing each
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validator's signing capability across $n$ shares such that any $t$ shares can
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collaboratively produce a signature, but fewer than $t$ shares reveal nothing about
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the key. The master key never exists at any single location---not during key
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generation, not during signing, not during resharing.
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\subsection{Contributions}
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\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=2em]
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\item A dealerless DKG protocol based on Pedersen commitments with verifiable
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share distribution (Section~\ref{sec:dkg}).
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\item CGGMP21 threshold ECDSA for secp256k1 transaction signing, with identifiable
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abort and concrete latency benchmarks (Section~\ref{sec:cggmp21}).
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\item FROST threshold signing for Ed25519, BLS12-381, and BIP-340 Taproot
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(Section~\ref{sec:frost}).
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\item Key resharing protocol enabling validator set changes without key
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reconstruction (Section~\ref{sec:resharing}).
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\item Slashing-safe fault attribution compatible with threshold signing
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(Section~\ref{sec:slashing}).
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\item Production benchmarks for MPC signing latency vs.\ threshold size
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(Section~\ref{sec:benchmarks}).
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\end{enumerate}
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%% ========================================================================
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%% 2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
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%% ========================================================================
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