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zeekay
abf99d05fc
Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories. Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers. Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
42 lines
1.8 KiB
TeX
42 lines
1.8 KiB
TeX
\section{Relay Network Design}
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\label{sec:relay}
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\subsection{Incentive Structure}
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Relayers earn fees for successful message delivery:
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\begin{equation}
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\text{RelayFee}(\mathcal{M}) = F_{\text{base}} + |\mathsf{payload}| \cdot F_{\text{byte}} + \mathcal{M}.\mathsf{gasLimit} \cdot P_{\text{gas}}^{\text{dst}}
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\end{equation}
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where $F_{\text{base}} = 0.001$ LUX, $F_{\text{byte}} = 10^{-7}$ LUX/byte, and $P_{\text{gas}}^{\text{dst}}$ is the destination gas price. The fee is escrowed on the source chain at message emission and released to the first relayer that delivers a valid proof on the destination.
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\subsection{Relayer Competition}
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Multiple relayers may attempt to deliver the same message. The first valid submission succeeds; subsequent attempts revert with nonce mismatch. This first-come-first-served market incentivizes fast relay without coordination.
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\begin{algorithm}[H]
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\caption{Relayer Selection via Competition}
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\label{alg:relayer}
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\For{each relayer $r$ monitoring source appchain}
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\State Collect signatures until quorum $\geq 2W/3$
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\State $\Pi \gets \mathsf{Aggregate}(\{\sigma_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{Q}})$
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\State Submit $(\mathcal{M}, \Pi)$ to destination
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\If{nonce matches (first delivery)}
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\State Collect relay fee $F$
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\Else
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\State Transaction reverts (already delivered)
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\EndIf
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\EndFor
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\end{algorithmic}
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\end{algorithm}
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\subsection{Relayer Staking and Reputation}
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To prevent spam, relayers stake a minimum bond of 100 LUX. Successful deliveries increase a relayer's reputation score $\rho_r \in [0, 1]$:
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\begin{equation}
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\rho_r^{(t+1)} = 0.99 \cdot \rho_r^{(t)} + 0.01 \cdot \mathbb{1}[\text{successful delivery at } t]
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\end{equation}
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High-reputation relayers receive priority in the gossip network, reducing their signature collection latency.
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