Files
papers/lux-zchain/sections/09-security-analysis.tex
zeekay abf99d05fc papers: reorganize into per-paper dirs, add Antje Worring as co-author
Restructured from flat .tex/.pdf files into per-paper subdirectories.
Added Antje Worring as co-author on all papers.
Synced PDFs to pdfs/ for download site.
2026-04-18 21:50:07 -07:00

28 lines
976 B
TeX

\section{Security Analysis}
\subsection{Privacy Guarantees}
\begin{theorem}[Transaction Privacy]
Under the DDH assumption and random oracle model, an adversary viewing only $L1$ commitments cannot distinguish between two transactions with different amounts/recipients with advantage greater than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.
\end{theorem}
\textbf{Proof Sketch}: Commitments are computationally hiding under DDH. zkSNARK zero-knowledge property ensures proofs leak no information beyond validity. \qed
\subsection{Anonymity Set Size}
\textbf{Shielded Pool Size} (as of Q4 2024):
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
\item Total commitments: 1.2M
\item Daily active commitments: 15k
\item Effective anonymity set: $\approx 10^5$ per transaction
\end{itemize}
Compared to:
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
\item Zcash shielded pool: 2.8M (but only 15\% adoption)
\item Monero ring size: 16 (small anonymity set)
\item Tornado Cash: 50k (pre-sanctions)
\end{itemize}