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28 lines
976 B
TeX
28 lines
976 B
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\subsection{Privacy Guarantees}
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\begin{theorem}[Transaction Privacy]
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Under the DDH assumption and random oracle model, an adversary viewing only $L1$ commitments cannot distinguish between two transactions with different amounts/recipients with advantage greater than $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.
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\end{theorem}
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\textbf{Proof Sketch}: Commitments are computationally hiding under DDH. zkSNARK zero-knowledge property ensures proofs leak no information beyond validity. \qed
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\subsection{Anonymity Set Size}
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\textbf{Shielded Pool Size} (as of Q4 2024):
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
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\item Total commitments: 1.2M
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\item Daily active commitments: 15k
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\item Effective anonymity set: $\approx 10^5$ per transaction
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\end{itemize}
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Compared to:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
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\item Zcash shielded pool: 2.8M (but only 15\% adoption)
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\item Monero ring size: 16 (small anonymity set)
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\item Tornado Cash: 50k (pre-sanctions)
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\end{itemize}
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