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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algpseudocode}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\title{Non-Custodial Securities Custody\\via Threshold Signing}
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\author{
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Lux Research\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2023}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present a non-custodial custody architecture for digital securities
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in which no single party---not the exchange operator, not the user, not
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any custodian---can unilaterally move assets. The construction uses
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threshold signing with two complementary protocols: CGGMP21 (threshold
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ECDSA over secp256k1) for EVM-compatible chains and FROST (threshold
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Schnorr over Ed25519) for EdDSA chains. Each user's wallet is a
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$2$-of-$3$ threshold address with shares distributed across the user's
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device, the exchange operator (auto-co-signs after compliance checks),
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and a cold backup. We prove three security properties:
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(1)~\emph{non-custodial guarantee}---no single party can forge a
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signature; (2)~\emph{liveness}---any two of three parties can sign,
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so asset recovery is possible even if one party is lost;
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(3)~\emph{key rotation safety}---shares can be refreshed
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(reshared) without changing the on-chain address.
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We describe the HSM attestation layer in which every signing share
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is co-attested by a hardware security module, and prove that the
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HSM attestation composes with the threshold protocol without
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weakening the unforgeability guarantee. The construction is deployed
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on a regulated EVM L1 using the
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\texttt{luxfi/mpc} and \texttt{luxfi/threshold} libraries.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% =====================================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-threshold-signing-protocols}
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\input{sections/03-2-of-3-wallet-architecture}
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\input{sections/04-hsm-attestation}
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\input{sections/05-key-rotation}
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\input{sections/06-settlement-flow}
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\input{sections/07-integration-with-evm-precompiles}
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\input{sections/08-formal-verification}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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