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zeekayandHanzo Dev
70f6883235
A July commit removed eight papers on the premise "no license — DEX/non-custodial only". That premise is wrong: Lux operates an ATS, a broker-dealer, a transfer agent and a bank, and this material is resold at lux.financial. The merge that brought main in preserved the removal because the commit stated a reason, which is how a stale reason outlives the fact it rested on. Back, at the versions main carried — main never received the removal, so its copies are the later ones: the ATS architecture, the security-token standard, smart order routing, institutional custody, MPC custody, post-quantum securities, the SSB partnership and the CoinBridge brief. 83 files. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
50 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
50 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
\section{Why Securities Must Act Now}
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\label{sec:urgency}
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%% =====================================================================
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\subsection{The 30-Year Argument}
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A corporate bond issued in 2026 with a 30-year maturity expires in
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2056. The private key that signed the issuance transaction, the
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signatures on every ownership transfer, and the key encapsulation
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protecting confidential terms---all must remain secure until 2056.
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Conservative estimates place CRQC availability at 2035--2045. This
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means a bond issued today with ECDSA signatures will have its
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ownership history become forgeable during its lifetime.
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\subsection{Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later}
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Nation-state adversaries are known to record encrypted communications
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and signed transactions for future quantum decryption. For securities:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item Recorded ECDSA signatures can be forged retroactively once
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the public key is recovered from the signature.
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\item Recorded ML-KEM ciphertexts (if not PQ-protected) can be
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decrypted, revealing confidential deal terms.
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\item Recorded key exchange transcripts (ECDH) can be replayed to
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recover session keys.
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\end{itemize}
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Post-quantum cryptography deployed today protects against harvest-now
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attacks, even if CRQCs are decades away.
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\subsection{Regulatory Imperative}
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\begin{itemize}[nosep]
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\item \textbf{NIST.} Post-quantum standards finalized August 2024.
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Federal agencies must begin migration.
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\item \textbf{NSA CNSA 2.0.} National Security Systems must support
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post-quantum algorithms by 2025 and exclusively use them by
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2033.
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\item \textbf{CISA.} Issued guidance for critical infrastructure
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to inventory cryptographic dependencies and plan migration.
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\item \textbf{SEC.} Rule 17a-4 record-keeping integrity depends
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on unforgeable signatures. If ECDSA is broken, the records
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are compromised.
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\end{itemize}
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%% =====================================================================
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