Files
zeekay b8b1ec619b docs(fhe): purge Fhenix/Zama brands from threshold-fhe-compliance + lux-fhe-smart-contracts
Continuation of the 87a0cee sweep — covers the two remaining FHE
papers that still cited Zama and/or Fhenix as comparators.

threshold-fhe-compliance/09-related-work.tex + 99-conclusion.tex:
  drops the "Fhenix and Zama implement FHE on EVM chains but use a
  single decryption key" comparison; rewrites positively around the
  Lux M-of-N Shamir-over-Zq threshold decryption in
  lux/fhe/pkg/threshold/. Bibliography drops fhenix2024 + zama2024;
  adds lux-fhe-smart-contracts + lux-fhe-runtime cross-cites.

lux-fhe-smart-contracts/09-related-work.tex + 99-conclusion.tex:
  full rewrite of the related-work section — drops the Zama fhEVM /
  Inco Network / TFHE-rs comparison paragraphs in favor of a "FHE on
  the EVM" + "Threshold decryption" + "FHE compilers" structure that
  names only the Lux components (lux/precompile/fhe, lux/fhe,
  luxcpp/gpu, lux-private/gpu-kernels, planned Refractor compiler).
  Bibliography: drops zama2023fhevm + inco2024; replaces with
  lux-fhe-go + lux-precompile-fhe.

Lux FHEVM (capital F) remains as the canonical Lux product name —
distinct from Zama's lowercase fhEVM brand. \label{sec:fhevm} and
existing bibkey lux-fhevm are LaTeX/citation infrastructure and are
unaffected.

Pairs with the parallel liquidity/papers + zoo/papers sweeps.
2026-06-10 22:35:36 -07:00

67 lines
2.3 KiB
TeX

\section{Conclusion}
\label{sec:conclusion}
%% =====================================================================
Threshold FHE resolves the fundamental tension between privacy and
regulatory access in financial infrastructure. The operator processes
encrypted data without observing it. The regulator can compel
decryption when legally authorized. No single party---not the operator,
not any individual committee member, not even the regulator acting
alone (unless configured with $t$ shares)---can unilaterally access
plaintext. The construction is deployed on the Lux F-Chain with
seven concrete applications and mechanized proofs in Lean~4.
\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{chillotti2020tfhe}
I.~Chillotti, N.~Gama, M.~Georgieva, M.~Izabach\`{e}ne.
\emph{TFHE: Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus}.
J. Cryptology, 33(1):34--91, 2020.
\bibitem{shamir1979}
A.~Shamir.
\emph{How to Share a Secret}.
Communications of the ACM, 22(11):612--613, 1979.
\bibitem{asharov2012}
G.~Asharov, A.~Jain, A.~L\'{o}pez-Alt, E.~Tromer, V.~Vaikuntanathan, D.~Wichs.
\emph{Multiparty Computation with Low Communication, Computation and Interaction via Threshold FHE}.
EUROCRYPT 2012.
\bibitem{boneh2018}
D.~Boneh, R.~Gennaro, S.~Goldfeder, A.~Jain, S.~Kim, P.~Rasmussen, A.~Sahai.
\emph{Threshold Cryptosystems From Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption}.
CRYPTO 2018.
\bibitem{mouchet2021}
C.~Mouchet, J.~Bossuat, J.-P.~Hubaux, C.~Troncoso.
\emph{Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption from Ring-Learning-with-Errors}.
PETS 2021.
\bibitem{lux-fhe-smart-contracts}
Lux Industries.
\emph{Lux FHE Smart Contracts: Confidential EVM via Native Precompiles}.
\texttt{lux/papers/lux-fhe-smart-contracts}, 2026.
\bibitem{lux-fhe-runtime}
Lux Industries.
\emph{Lux FHE Runtime: Dual Go / C++ Runtime over \texttt{luxfi/lattice}}.
\texttt{lux/papers/lux-fhe-runtime}, 2026.
\bibitem{cggi2020}
I.~Chillotti, N.~Gama, M.~Georgieva, M.~Izabach\`{e}ne.
\emph{Programmable Bootstrapping Enables Efficient Homomorphic Inference of Deep Neural Networks}.
IACR ePrint 2021/091.
\bibitem{pedersen1991}
T.~Pedersen.
\emph{Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing}.
CRYPTO 1991.
\bibitem{spdz2012}
I.~Damg\r{a}rd, V.~Pastro, N.~Smart, S.~Zakarias.
\emph{Multiparty Computation from Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption}.
CRYPTO 2012.
\end{thebibliography}