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papers/threshold-fhe-compliance/threshold-fhe-compliance.tex
zeekay f4ee7a0525 Publish under the org, not a person
Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under
each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the
work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and
research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories
already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined.

Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay
named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads,
PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to
whoever the cited paper names.

Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use
elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning.
2026-09-01 08:58:10 -07:00

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TeX

\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
\title{Threshold FHE for Regulatory Compliance:\\Operator-Blind Computation with Forced Decryption}
\author{
Lux Research\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
\textit{Lux Industries, Inc.}\\
\texttt{[email protected]}
}
\date{2024}
\begin{document}
\luxcoverpage
\begin{abstract}
We present a threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme for regulated
financial infrastructure in which an operator evaluates arbitrary boolean
circuits on encrypted data without observing plaintext, while a regulator
holding $t$ of $n$ key shares retains the ability to force decryption for
lawful inspection. The construction combines TFHE gate evaluation (AND, OR,
NOT, NAND, MUX over LWE ciphertexts on the torus $\mathbb{T}$) with
Shamir-based threshold decryption: the FHE secret key $\mathbf{s}$ is split
into $n$ shares such that any $t$ shares reconstruct the partial decryption
vector, while any $t-1$ shares are information-theoretically independent
of $\mathbf{s}$. We prove three properties: (1)~\emph{operator blindness}---the
compute node that evaluates homomorphic circuits learns nothing about the
plaintext inputs or outputs; (2)~\emph{threshold decryptability}---any
coalition of $t$ share-holders can decrypt any ciphertext produced by
the system; (3)~\emph{privacy below threshold}---any coalition of fewer
than $t$ share-holders gains no information beyond the public parameters.
We instantiate the scheme on the Lux F-Chain using seven concrete
applications (private balance, encrypted transfer, sealed-bid auction,
private voting, encrypted ML inference, dark pool matching, compliance
screening) and report benchmarks from the \texttt{luxfi/fhe} library:
12ms per bootstrapped gate, 47ms per encrypted order match, and 230ms
per encrypted compliance check at NIST Level~1 (128-bit) security.
\end{abstract}
\tableofcontents
\newpage
%% =====================================================================
\input{sections/01-introduction}
\input{sections/02-preliminaries}
\input{sections/03-formal-construction}
\input{sections/04-security-proofs}
\input{sections/05-compliance-architecture}
\input{sections/06-concrete-instantiations}
\input{sections/07-performance}
\input{sections/08-formal-verification}
\input{sections/09-related-work}
\input{sections/99-conclusion}
\end{document}