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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  zeekayandHanzo Dev
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1b7a28d31f |
planes: one assembly, one identity for an offer, and a bound nobody can spend twice
The defining failure of the last review was not in a plane. It was that there were TWO wirings: cmd/amld assembled a Handler by hand and the tests assembled a different one, so the record fingerprint could be a struct field the suite exercised and no column stored — every retry a permanent 409 in production while every test passed. api.Wire is now the only assembly. It creates every collection, opens every shelf, makes every join and registers what has to run on a cadence; cmd/amld supplies only what an installation answers differently, the tests call the same function, and internal/source.NoLiteral reads cmd/amld to refuse a second copy. Handler completeness is checked by reflection, because a hand-written field list would be the third copy. A retry is not a second transaction. pkg/receipt resolves the identity of an OFFER once, at the top of ingest, before anything is read or written, and returns the prior answer byte for byte — so the ledger, the aggregates, the history, the alerts and the case plane all agree on one transaction instead of the ledger holding one record while the aggregates hold three. Two different facts under one reference is 409 and never 503. Because the answer is kept AFTER the work, a process that dies in between leaves no receipt, so every plane past it also recognises the transaction for itself: history does not append a second row, alerts keep the first judgement, and a judged transaction opens no second case. A bound over a COUNT of caller-sized values is not a bound. types.MaxIdent bounds every identifier at the door, which is what turns the counts downstream into figures in bytes; dictionary.MaxName does the same for a payload key, and dictionary.Ceiling is the product a test WEIGHS a full accumulator against. The field catalog's accumulator moves into roster, which admits and never removes, so per-tenant bounds multiply by ONE number an operator can hold against a pod. engine.Evaluator now keeps no compiled rules at all. A candidate's text arrives on the wire at /v1/aml/rules/test, so a compiled-rule table there was keyed by a string a caller wrote, sized by how many distinct ones a caller sends, with no cap and no removal, in the memory every institution's ingest runs in — an OOM from one authenticated caller, which on this deployment is every control off at once. A rule's compiled form is a value with an owner: the installed library, or one replay. Nothing shared, nothing to grow. Found here, not reported. Handler.history is the one function that materialises a whole retained history, so it now REQUIRES a *topology.Grant, and a Grant comes from Budget.Admit and nowhere else. An ungated whole-history read is something a caller has to write on purpose rather than something a new door can forget. The rule replay and the activation rate fold take the same one budget the model studies take. Reaching a bound is allowed; reaching it quietly is not. GET /v1/aml/load is the one door for "is anything of mine quietly degraded": the tenant's aggregates against its own ceiling in bytes with a grade, whether it has a behavioural model at all, the field catalog's pressure, and the process's counts of institutions held and refused. It names no other institution. Closing R1-R8 from the review plus R11, the two recurring classes, and the silent degradation the load door answers. Twenty-four mutations, twenty-four killed. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]> |
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
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3c041ed331 |
merge the detection library and the screening rewrite into one engine
Two branches had independently rebuilt the same two packages, which is one
implementation too many. This resolves them into one.
Their side is the base for detection and screening, because it is better:
- Rules name evidence, and SetRules refuses a set whose evidence this
deployment cannot supply — so the eleven stub helpers that silently disabled
thirteen rules cannot exist. A rule that cannot fire is worse than an absent
one, because it still appears in the catalog a regulator reads.
- One screening store, filled by the refresh and read by the endpoints. Two of
them is why sanctions search answered "no match" for every name while
designations were being loaded somewhere else.
- Parsers for all four publishers against their real files, recovering what the
single-parser path could not read at all: OFAC's digital-currency addresses,
weak aliases held apart from screening candidates, and OFSI's row-per-name
layout collapsed to subjects.
- Name matching over runes, not bytes. Two distinct Han names scored 0.867
byte-wise, above the 0.85 threshold, and 0.700 correctly.
- Deviation from the median and MAD rather than the mean, because a monitoring
baseline contains the outliers it is used to hunt.
- A rule vocabulary with providers behind every term, in place of expressions
reaching into a struct.
Kept from this side, because their branch did not have it:
- The tenant comes from an authenticated identity, not from a request header.
- A rule that could not run carries no weight. Their action() already capped a
failing rule at review, which is right, but the hit still entered the score
at full weight — so a broken rule saturated every transaction's score and the
queue stopped ranking. Faults are now excluded from the aggregate while still
raising their own alert and still forcing review.
- Per-source readiness: which list, how many designations, how long ago, and
the reason if the last attempt failed. Their store answers whether screening
can be relied on at all; this answers what is behind it, which is what an
operator can act on.
- Behavioural scoring, retention, tokenisation, replay and reference data.
Conversion now refuses an unknown currency instead of passing the amount
through. Passing it through understates every currency worth more than a dollar,
so a payment three times over a reporting limit tested as sitting under it.
One ordering table for actions (types.ActionRank), one EvalAll signature, one
screening store, one readiness surface. 15 packages, tests and race clean.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
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d8812d66f1 |
engine: a rule that could not run is a fault, not a match
An ordinary $100 payment came back with six alerts and a saturated score, so the effective false-positive rate was 100% and the score ranked nothing. The mechanism was one line of policy. A rule whose evaluation errored was recorded as a hit with Match=true, on the reasoning that a broken rule should not silently let a transaction through. The safety instinct is right; the encoding conflated two different findings. "This transaction exhibits this typology" is evidence about the transaction. "This rule did not run" is a fault in the system, which says nothing about the transaction — and because a rule that fails once fails on every transaction, recording it as a match alerts on all of them. Evaluate now separates them. A matching rule produces a typology alert that carries its score. Rules that could not be evaluated produce one alert naming them, with no score, because a rule that did not run is not evidence of risk. The transaction is still not cleared: the fault forces review, since a transaction assessed by only part of the rule set has not been assessed. Tests cover the reported case directly — six unevaluable rules against a benign payment, expecting one fault alert, zero score, and a refusal to allow — plus a benign transaction under a working rule set alerting not at all, and a fault alongside a real match where only the match scores. Five mutants, including restoring the original Match=true, all killed. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]> |
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
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c1372cb0cc |
aml: anomaly scoring, retention, tokenisation, replay, reference data
Five gaps that a monitoring product cannot be sold without. anomaly scores whether a transaction is unusual for the entity that made it, which is the statutory question — consistency with the customer's own profile — and one no fixed threshold can express. It complements the rule library rather than replacing it: rules encode typologies someone has already named, and are blind to anything nobody has written down. The design is deliberately attributable: a score can name the features that drove it, which is what a supervisor asks for and what a neural scorer cannot answer. retention keeps records for their statutory period and destroys them when it runs out, including the retained assessment whether or not it produced a report. token protects direct identifiers at rest while keeping the engine able to correlate: one key schedule, a deterministic org-scoped pseudonym to index on and a sealed record for reads that are entitled to it, so a record can be found by party without holding the party's name in the clear. replay runs a rule over real history and reports what it would have done before anyone activates it — the same question as "how many alerts would this raise", which is what makes a rule change reviewable rather than a live experiment. reference holds the published data a rule needs but cannot derive: currency conversion and jurisdiction risk listings, each carrying the date it was current at, each refusing to answer rather than guess. Passing an unknown currency through unchanged moves every threshold by the exchange rate — the structuring rule compared raw notional, so 9,500 units of a minor currency read as a near-threshold cash amount. A jurisdiction list that answers "not listed" because it was never loaded is indistinguishable from a clean world. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]> |
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
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e6f58397ab |
sanctions: parse all four published list families
Each parser was written against the published file, not against a description of it. Verified counts: OFAC 19,175 (matching the Record_Count the file declares), UN 1,011, EU 6,017, OFSI 5,135. What the previous single parser lost, and why each matters: OFAC publishes 963 digital currency addresses across 19 networks in idList. Dropping idList meant a payment to a designated blockchain address could not be detected by any means. OFAC marks 4,383 of its 24,546 aliases weak and the UN and OFSI mark theirs Low; flattening them to plain strings matched fragments at full confidence. OFAC flags which of several dates of birth is the main one, and for 37 subjects it is not the first — taking the first dropped the tie-break for exactly the subjects that need one. UN, EU and OFSI were parsed with the OFAC parser on the stated grounds that the formats are similar. They are not: the roots are CONSOLIDATED_LIST, export and a CSV. All three failed every night, logged a line, and continued. OFSI publishes one row per name and joins them by group; 19,761 rows are 5,135 subjects. It also puts the header on line two behind a preamble, orders the name columns Name 6 first, and writes partial dates as 00/00/1994. A parse that yields fewer records than the publisher declares is refused rather than loaded, because a partial sanctions list clears designated subjects. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]> |
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
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07e69e3ee2 |
luxfi/aml — real-time AML/CFT transaction monitoring
A Go AML engine: a configurable rules DSL over expr-lang with weight-of-evidence scoring, sanctions screening against OFAC/UN/EU/HMT, case management, and scored alerting. Single binary, embedded SQLite per org, embedded UI. Surface (all /v1, org-scoped): /v1/aml/transactions ingest and score /v1/aml/rules /rules/test the rules DSL and its dry-run /v1/aml/sanctions/search list screening /v1/aml/cases investigation workflow /v1/aml/health Build: make build produces one static binary with the UI embedded (embedui tag); bare Go tooling needs no Node. Third-party license and notice texts are generated from the module graph the linker actually walks and ship beside every artifact. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]> |