Files
aml/pkg/api/monitor_test.go
zeekayandHanzo Dev 1b7a28d31f planes: one assembly, one identity for an offer, and a bound nobody can spend twice
The defining failure of the last review was not in a plane. It was that there
were TWO wirings: cmd/amld assembled a Handler by hand and the tests assembled a
different one, so the record fingerprint could be a struct field the suite
exercised and no column stored — every retry a permanent 409 in production while
every test passed. api.Wire is now the only assembly. It creates every
collection, opens every shelf, makes every join and registers what has to run on
a cadence; cmd/amld supplies only what an installation answers differently, the
tests call the same function, and internal/source.NoLiteral reads cmd/amld to
refuse a second copy. Handler completeness is checked by reflection, because a
hand-written field list would be the third copy.

A retry is not a second transaction. pkg/receipt resolves the identity of an
OFFER once, at the top of ingest, before anything is read or written, and returns
the prior answer byte for byte — so the ledger, the aggregates, the history, the
alerts and the case plane all agree on one transaction instead of the ledger
holding one record while the aggregates hold three. Two different facts under one
reference is 409 and never 503. Because the answer is kept AFTER the work, a
process that dies in between leaves no receipt, so every plane past it also
recognises the transaction for itself: history does not append a second row,
alerts keep the first judgement, and a judged transaction opens no second case.

A bound over a COUNT of caller-sized values is not a bound. types.MaxIdent bounds
every identifier at the door, which is what turns the counts downstream into
figures in bytes; dictionary.MaxName does the same for a payload key, and
dictionary.Ceiling is the product a test WEIGHS a full accumulator against. The
field catalog's accumulator moves into roster, which admits and never removes, so
per-tenant bounds multiply by ONE number an operator can hold against a pod.

engine.Evaluator now keeps no compiled rules at all. A candidate's text arrives on
the wire at /v1/aml/rules/test, so a compiled-rule table there was keyed by a
string a caller wrote, sized by how many distinct ones a caller sends, with no cap
and no removal, in the memory every institution's ingest runs in — an OOM from one
authenticated caller, which on this deployment is every control off at once. A
rule's compiled form is a value with an owner: the installed library, or one
replay. Nothing shared, nothing to grow. Found here, not reported.

Handler.history is the one function that materialises a whole retained history, so
it now REQUIRES a *topology.Grant, and a Grant comes from Budget.Admit and nowhere
else. An ungated whole-history read is something a caller has to write on purpose
rather than something a new door can forget. The rule replay and the activation
rate fold take the same one budget the model studies take.

Reaching a bound is allowed; reaching it quietly is not. GET /v1/aml/load is the
one door for "is anything of mine quietly degraded": the tenant's aggregates
against its own ceiling in bytes with a grade, whether it has a behavioural model
at all, the field catalog's pressure, and the process's counts of institutions
held and refused. It names no other institution.

Closing R1-R8 from the review plus R11, the two recurring classes, and the silent
degradation the load door answers. Twenty-four mutations, twenty-four killed.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-08-02 11:32:15 -07:00

410 lines
14 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/dictionary"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/engine"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/lists"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/reference"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/suppress"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/types"
"github.com/luxfi/aml/pkg/watch"
)
// The ingest path meets the five planes here, and this is where that meeting is
// checked end to end: a rule fires, an activation is written, a declared
// suppression changes the answer the caller gets, and the field catalog sees the
// payload.
//
// The planes' own tests establish that each one is correct. This one establishes
// that ingest is WIRED to them — the failure it exists to catch is five correct
// planes that nothing calls.
// monitored is the deployment. It is an alias of plane, kept because the tests
// that use it are about ingest meeting the planes rather than about ingest
// alone — and there is one assembly, so there is nothing for it to add.
func monitored(t *testing.T, rules ...types.Rule) *Handler {
t.Helper()
return plane(t, rules...)
}
// payment is the wire shape the ingest route takes: the transaction at the top
// level, with the customer beside it.
func payment(id string, usd float64) map[string]any {
return map[string]any{
"id": id, "user_id": "u1", "account_id": "acct-1",
"currency": "USD", "notional": usd, "timestamp": time.Now().UTC(),
"entity": map[string]any{"id": "u1", "name": "Acme Trading"},
}
}
// TestIngestRecordsWhatTheRulesDid.
func TestIngestRecordsWhatTheRulesDid(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
ctx := context.Background()
rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-1", 25_000))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out types.EvalResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Action != types.ActionReport {
t.Fatalf("the rule asked for report, got %q", out.Action)
}
feed, err := h.Planes.Watch.Feed(ctx, acme, &watch.FeedIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(feed.Activations) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the rule fired and nothing recorded it: %+v", feed.Activations)
}
a := feed.Activations[0]
if a.Rule != "ctr" || a.Tx != "tx-1" || a.Subject.Value != "acct-1" || a.Subject.Kind != "account" {
t.Fatalf("the activation does not describe what happened: %+v", a)
}
if a.Action != types.ActionReport || a.Response != types.ActionReport {
t.Fatalf("with nothing declared, the response is what the rule asked for: %+v", a)
}
// And the payload reached the catalog.
cat, err := h.Planes.Dictionary.Catalog(ctx, acme, &dictionary.CatalogIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if cat.Payloads != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the field catalog did not see the payload: %d", cat.Payloads)
}
}
// TestADeclaredSuppressionChangesTheAnswer is the whole of what suppression does,
// exercised where a customer would feel it.
func TestADeclaredSuppressionChangesTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
ctx := context.Background()
if _, err := h.Planes.Suppress.Suppress(ctx, acme, &suppress.SuppressIn{
Rule: "ctr", Kind: "account", Value: "acct-1",
Reason: "treasury sweep, agreed with the MLRO 2026-02", By: "a.mensah",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-2", 25_000))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out types.EvalResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Action != types.ActionAllow {
t.Fatalf("a covered detection must not reach the caller as a report: %q", out.Action)
}
// The alert itself is still evidence and is still there.
if len(out.AlertIDs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("suppression must not destroy the alert: %+v", out.AlertIDs)
}
feed, err := h.Planes.Watch.Feed(ctx, acme, &watch.FeedIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(feed.Activations) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("a suppressed detection is recorded, not dropped: %+v", feed.Activations)
}
a := feed.Activations[0]
if !a.Suppressed || a.Cause != watch.CauseSuppressed || a.By == "" {
t.Fatalf("the activation must name the suppression that covered it: %+v", a)
}
if a.Action != types.ActionReport {
t.Fatalf("what the rule asked for is still on the row: %+v", a)
}
}
// TestADeclaredRungRaisesTheAnswer.
func TestADeclaredRungRaisesTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
ctx := context.Background()
if _, err := h.Planes.Watch.Declare(ctx, acme, &watch.DeclareIn{
Rule: "ctr", Kind: "account", Count: 2, Within: watch.Span(time.Hour), To: types.ActionBlock,
Reason: "two reportable transactions in an hour on one account", By: "a.mensah",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-3", 25_000)); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-4", 25_000))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out types.EvalResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Action != types.ActionBlock {
t.Fatalf("the declared escalation did not reach the caller: %q", out.Action)
}
}
// TestARuleReadsTheTenantsOwnDenyList — the list plane reaching the rule
// vocabulary, through the engine's own evaluator.
func TestARuleReadsTheTenantsOwnDenyList(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
ctx := context.Background()
if _, err := h.Planes.Lists.Declare(ctx, acme, &lists.DeclareIn{
Name: "ip-deny", Kind: lists.Deny, Class: lists.IP, By: "a.mensah",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := h.Planes.Lists.Add(ctx, acme, &lists.AddIn{
Name: "ip-deny", By: "a.mensah",
Values: []lists.Value{{Value: "198.51.100.7", Reason: "credential stuffing source"}},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// A rule over the list, admitted through the engine's own vocabulary check —
// which is what refuses the rule outright if the provider is not wired.
h.Engine = engine.New(engine.Providers{
Rate: reference.Rates{USDPer: map[string]float64{}},
Lists: h.Planes.Lists,
Zone: time.UTC,
})
if err := h.Engine.SetRules([]types.Rule{{
ID: "denied-address", Name: "Address on the deny list",
DSL: `Tx.IPAddress != "" && Listed("ip-deny", Tx.IPAddress)`,
Severity: types.SeverityHigh, Weight: 0.4, Action: types.ActionBlock, Enabled: true,
}}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the deny-list rule must install where the list plane is wired: %v", err)
}
body := payment("tx-5", 100)
body["ip_address"] = "198.51.100.7"
rec := ingest(t, h, body)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out types.EvalResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Action != types.ActionBlock {
t.Fatalf("a payment from a listed address must be blocked, got %q", out.Action)
}
// And an address nobody listed passes.
clean := payment("tx-6", 100)
clean["ip_address"] = "203.0.113.9"
rec = ingest(t, h, clean)
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Action != types.ActionAllow {
t.Fatalf("an address nobody listed must pass, got %q", out.Action)
}
}
// TestARetriedTransactionIsCountedOnce.
//
// Ingest records a transaction, then its alerts, then their activations. Anything
// after the first write that fails answers 503, and a client that retries a 503
// sends the whole transaction again — so every plane that ingest writes has to be
// able to see the same transaction twice and record it once. The activation plane
// is the one this track added, and a duplicated activation is worse than a
// duplicated row: it is counted in the streak, so a declared repetition policy
// fires on a repeat that never happened.
func TestARetriedTransactionIsCountedOnce(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
ctx := context.Background()
body := payment("tx-1", 25_000)
for range 3 {
if rec := ingest(t, h, body); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
}
feed, err := h.Planes.Watch.Feed(ctx, acme, &watch.FeedIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(feed.Activations) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("three offers of one transaction wrote %d activations: %+v", len(feed.Activations), feed.Activations)
}
rates, err := h.Planes.Watch.Rates(ctx, acme, &watch.RatesIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(rates.Rules) != 1 || rates.Rules[0].Fired != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the rates counted the retries: %+v", rates.Rules)
}
// And a different transaction is still a different activation, so the fix is
// not "record nothing twice".
if rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-2", 25_000)); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
feed, err = h.Planes.Watch.Feed(ctx, acme, &watch.FeedIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(feed.Activations) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("a second transaction did not produce a second activation: %+v", feed.Activations)
}
}
// TestARetriedTransactionDoesNotEscalateItself.
//
// The sharpest form: a rung raises the response on the second firing, so a
// duplicated activation makes the RETRY of a single transaction escalate itself —
// a payment blocked because the client retried a 503.
func TestARetriedTransactionDoesNotEscalateItself(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
if _, err := h.Planes.Watch.Declare(context.Background(), acme, &watch.DeclareIn{
Rule: "ctr", Kind: "account", Count: 2, Within: watch.Span(time.Hour), To: types.ActionBlock,
Reason: "two reportable transactions in an hour on one account", By: "a.mensah",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
body := payment("tx-1", 25_000)
var out types.EvalResult
for range 2 {
rec := ingest(t, h, body)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if out.Action == types.ActionBlock {
t.Fatal("retrying one transaction escalated it against itself")
}
// A genuinely second transaction still escalates, so the rung still works.
rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-2", 25_000))
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Action != types.ActionBlock {
t.Fatalf("the declared escalation stopped working: %q", out.Action)
}
}
// TestOneTenantsSuppressionsAreNeverAnothersIngest.
//
// The isolation invariant, at the seam this track changed. A tenant that has
// crowded one rule with suppressions degrades ITS OWN cover check and nothing
// else: another institution's ingest is unaffected, its cover check is complete,
// and neither reads the other's rows.
func TestOneTenantsSuppressionsAreNeverAnothersIngest(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
ctx := context.Background()
const rival = "hanzo/rival"
for i := range 6 {
if _, err := h.Planes.Suppress.Suppress(ctx, acme, &suppress.SuppressIn{
Rule: "ctr", Kind: "account", Value: "acct-" + string(rune('a'+i)),
Reason: "reviewed and agreed", By: "a.mensah",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// The other institution's own suppression still covers its own activation, and
// this institution's six do not appear anywhere in its answer.
if _, err := h.Planes.Suppress.Suppress(ctx, rival, &suppress.SuppressIn{
Rule: "ctr", Kind: "account", Value: "acct-1", Reason: "their own decision", By: "b.tran",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cover, err := h.Planes.Suppress.Cover(ctx, rival, &suppress.CoverIn{Rule: "ctr", Kind: "account", Value: "acct-1"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the other tenant's cover check failed: %v", err)
}
if !cover.Covered || cover.Partial {
t.Fatalf("the other tenant's answer was affected by this one's volume: %+v", cover)
}
ledger, err := h.Planes.Suppress.Ledger(ctx, rival, &suppress.LedgerIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(ledger.Suppressions) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the other tenant reads %d suppressions, want only its own", len(ledger.Suppressions))
}
// And this institution's ingest still works, which is the self-DoS half.
if rec := ingest(t, h, payment("tx-1", 25_000)); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
feed, err := h.Planes.Watch.Feed(ctx, rival, &watch.FeedIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(feed.Activations) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("one tenant's ingest wrote into another's activation plane: %+v", feed.Activations)
}
}
// TestARealConflictIsAConflictAndNotAnOutage.
//
// The other half of making a retry work: an id reused for a DIFFERENT
// transaction is refused, and the refusal says which kind it is. 503 means "the
// engine could not, try again" and a client that retries a permanent refusal
// retries forever — which is the loop that turns one caller's mistake into a
// queue of transactions that never clears.
func TestARealConflictIsAConflictAndNotAnOutage(t *testing.T) {
h := monitored(t)
first := payment("tx-1", 25_000)
if rec := ingest(t, h, first); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ingest = %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// Same id, a different amount. That is a different fact, and the ledger has
// one under this name already.
second := payment("tx-1", 90_000)
second["timestamp"] = first["timestamp"]
rec := ingest(t, h, second)
if rec.Code != http.StatusConflict {
t.Fatalf("a reused id with a different transaction = %d: %s, want 409", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// And the first record stands: a conflict refuses the second submission, it
// does not overwrite what was retained.
feed, err := h.Planes.Watch.Feed(context.Background(), acme, &watch.FeedIn{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(feed.Activations) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the conflicting submission left %d activations: %+v", len(feed.Activations), feed.Activations)
}
}
// TestIngestStampsNoClockOfItsOwn reads the source. A reception clock written
// onto the transaction is what made the retry above impossible to recognise, and
// it is one line to reintroduce.
func TestIngestStampsNoClockOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile("routes.go")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, banned := range []string{"tx.CreatedAt =", "tx.UpdatedAt ="} {
if strings.Contains(string(raw), banned) {
t.Fatalf("%s: ingest stamps its own clock into the retained fact again, so no retry can be recognised", banned)
}
}
}