zeekayandHanzo Dev 5690eaeb5d brand: an unstated issuer must refuse, not skip the check ...

golang-jwt validates `iss` only when an expectation is stated (validator.go, `if
v.expectedIss != ""`), so a brand row carrying no issuer would not weaken the
per-Host pin — it would delete it, and every brand's tokens would authenticate on
that host. Stated expectation or no tenant.

The shared-keyset fixture now says why it is the honest one: the live issuers serve
the SAME set, and zoolabs.id publishes cert-lux beside cert-zoo, so a Lux token's
signature does verify against Zoo's keys and the pin is the whole defence.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>

2026-07-29 21:37:11 -07:00

..

anomaly.go

merge the detection library and the screening rewrite into one engine

2026-07-29 11:49:08 -07:00

brand.go

brand: the host says which brand, and the token has to come from it

2026-07-29 21:29:00 -07:00

catalog.go

api: publish the detection catalog with its gaps

2026-07-29 11:56:58 -07:00

iam_test.go

brand: an unstated issuer must refuse, not skip the check

2026-07-29 21:37:11 -07:00

iam.go

brand: an unstated issuer must refuse, not skip the check

2026-07-29 21:37:11 -07:00

identity_test.go

merge the detection library and the screening rewrite into one engine

2026-07-29 11:49:08 -07:00

readiness.go

merge the detection library and the screening rewrite into one engine

2026-07-29 11:49:08 -07:00

records_test.go

retention: keep the ledger where a restart cannot reach it

2026-07-29 16:39:23 -07:00

records.go

aml: anomaly scoring, retention, tokenisation, replay, reference data

2026-07-29 11:04:33 -07:00

routes.go

api: write the transaction to history, so aggregates can see it

2026-07-29 12:06:03 -07:00

screening_input_test.go

api: do not screen a customer identifier as a name

2026-07-29 12:03:32 -07:00