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zeekayandGitHub
6e46d242f6
* dexvm: bind swap-settle authority+payout to authenticated escrow owner (CRITICAL escrow-theft fix) The swap rail delegated per-taker refund-liveness + relay authority to the unauthenticated RelayOrderTx sender with NO C-side owner binding, letting any fee-paying tx name a victim's collateral ref and settle the locked collateral to the attacker out of the shared seam reserve (cross-depositor theft). Fix (load-bearing, derives authority from the already-authenticated cross-chain object owner — the platformvm import/export model): - state/state.go: escrow value is now owner(20)|asset(32)|amount(8); the owner leads. PutEscrow/GetEscrow carry it. - atomic.go executeImport: persist the AUTHENTICATED importedOwner (read back from the consumed C->D shared-memory object) into the escrow. - vm.go settleFromFills: a settle is authorized ONLY by the escrow's recorded owner (errSettleUnauthorized otherwise), and BOTH proceeds+refund legs export to that owner, never to the relay tx sender. - txs/tx.go: RelayOrderTx.Verify now does present-gated secp256k1 authentication of From (Sign/SigningBytes/verifyFrom), wiring the dangling ErrInvalidSignature. From bears NO authority (authority is the escrow owner), so an unsigned relay is admissible and cannot escalate; a present-but-invalid signature is rejected. Regression: redteam_escrow_owner_test.go proves the attacker is credited 0 even with a valid own-key signature (defense in depth: escrow-owner bind holds independent of the signature). Fixed a pre-existing off-by-one in TestRED_FractionalFill (export asset offset). All dexvm tests pass (default + -tags redteam, CGO_ENABLED=0 pure-Go). Gated on red re-verify; NOT promoted to testnet/mainnet. * aivm: A-Chain quorum-settlement engine (provider stake/slash, beacon selection, commit-reveal, settlement, receipt export, import committed C intent). LP-5300. NOTE: branched on swap-rail base; rebase to main on merge. --------- Co-authored-by: zeekay <[email protected]>
46 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
46 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package aivm
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// quorum.go is the tally: group the revealed output_hashes and find the
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// plurality. The quorum RULE (is the plurality >= threshold) and the payout /
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// slash consequences live in settlement.go; this file is only the counting,
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// kept separate so the agreement function is a pure, total, deterministic
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// primitive.
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import "github.com/luxfi/geth/common"
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// plurality returns the most-common hash and its count. Deterministic tie-break:
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// among hashes tied for the max count the big-endian-smallest hash wins, so
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// every validator computes the identical result. (A tie cannot reach a strict-
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// majority threshold anyway, but the tie-break keeps the function total.)
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func plurality(hashes []common.Hash) (common.Hash, uint32) {
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counts := make(map[common.Hash]uint32, len(hashes))
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for _, h := range hashes {
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counts[h]++
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}
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var best common.Hash
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var bestN uint32
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for h, c := range counts {
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if c > bestN || (c == bestN && bytesLess(h, best)) {
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best, bestN = h, c
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}
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}
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return best, bestN
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}
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// tally reads the per-task revealer array and returns the revealers (in reveal
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// order) with their revealed output_hashes. Bounded by N.
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func tally(st QuorumState, taskID common.Hash) (revealers []common.Address, hashes []common.Hash) {
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rc := revealCount(st, taskID)
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revealers = make([]common.Address, rc)
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hashes = make([]common.Hash, rc)
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for i := uint32(0); i < rc; i++ {
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op := common.BytesToAddress(st.GetState(slotHashIdx(nsRevealList, taskID, i)).Bytes())
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revealers[i] = op
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hashes[i] = st.GetState(slotHashAddr(nsReveal, taskID, op))
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}
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return revealers, hashes
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}
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