Files
chains/zkvm/transaction.go
zeekay 6919ac8229 zkvm: a transaction's identity is its content, and one predicate decides
The proof cache was keyed on tx.ID as read off the wire, plus the proof
type, the proof and its public inputs — all four the sender's to choose.
Copy an accepted transaction's four onto a transaction spending entirely
different notes and the key matched; the hit returned nil from the cache,
ahead of verifyPublicInputs, which is the only thing tying those inputs to
what the transaction spends. Shielded value, backed by a proof that
attests to nothing about it.

The id is no longer on the wire. parseTransaction derives it, the cache is
keyed on ComputeID(), and a block's id folds in ComputeID() rather than
whatever id arrived — which also ends the block and vertex id malleability
that one flipped byte bought.

Every block and vertex id, and the first public input of every proof, now
open with sha256(ChainID ‖ NetworkID). It is not on the wire, so a block
from another chain has no parent here and its proofs do not verify, rather
than passing a check someone can forget to write.

Also on the consensus surface:

  Verify required height == parent+1 and nothing more, so a block whose
  parent was a long-accepted ancestor verified, and accepting it rewound
  the tip and left the height index naming an orphan to every peer that
  bootstraps from it. Verify now requires the parent to be the tip or a
  block above it, and Accept re-checks against the tip, which moves
  between the two.

  Vertex.Verify checked its transactions and nothing else — no parent, no
  height — so a vertex naming no parent at height 1<<40 verified, and
  accepting it set the store's height to 1<<40 and left the chain unable
  to propose again. Its decoder also ignored trailing bytes, so one
  logical vertex had unboundedly many encodings under one id, each of
  which the store writes to disk.

  BuildBlock skipped the ValidateBasic that Verify runs, so a transaction
  with an out-of-range Type — read straight off the wire — was assembled
  into every block and refused by every node including the proposer, and
  nothing evicted it. admit is now that one predicate, assembly drops what
  it cannot build, and a transaction names an expiry so a bounded pool
  drains.

  BuildBlock stamped an unclamped time.Now(), which is below a parent
  legally up to maxClockSkew ahead — a block its own Verify refuses.

  ParseBlock never tracked what it parsed and SetPreference discarded it,
  so a follower could verify the first block of a run and not the second.

  A genesis naming no timestamp was stamped with the wall clock, hashed
  into the genesis id: one genesis file, a different chain per node and
  per restart.

  VerifyBlockProof took a GPU path on accel.Available() — a second, inline
  copy of the Groth16 checks that consulted neither the cache nor the
  dummy-key refusal — so whether a block was accepted turned on whether
  the node had an accelerator.

Reads that failed were reported as absence: the spent set answered "not
spent" for a set it could not read, which is the whole double-spend gate;
the state root answered "empty" at boot AND on rollback, where it also
returned nil; the UTXO store answered "not found". Each now reports the
failure.

Deleted, none of it reachable: a node-side wallet holding plaintext
spending keys behind an HTTP endpoint, with a loadAddresses that returned
nil so the keys were unusable anyway; note construction and the package's
only panic; an FHE processor whose verifier tested len(proof) >= 128 and
whose "encryption" wrote the plaintext into the first eight bytes; a
zwitness carrying a TODO; a 256-level sparse Merkle tree that computed no
root and wrote its cache under a read lock; six endpoints answering "Not
implemented"; a Signature field nothing verified; and eight config knobs
nothing read. The endpoints that remain answer at the path the node mounts
them on, rather than behind a mux that dispatches on a path it never sees.

Coverage 58.9% -> 76.7% on a denominator 539 statements smaller.
2026-08-28 15:02:32 -07:00

245 lines
7.3 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package zkvm
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
)
// Note construction — deriving a nullifier, committing to a note, encrypting
// one to a recipient — is a WALLET's work and lived here, along with the only
// panic in the package. A validator holds no spending keys and builds no
// notes: it checks proofs and the spent set. What it needs of a note is the
// commitment and the nullifier the transaction already carries.
// MaxTxSize bounds a transaction on the way in, so a peer cannot make this
// node hold what it would never build.
const MaxTxSize = 1 << 20
// TransactionType represents the type of transaction
type TransactionType uint8
const (
TransactionTypeTransfer TransactionType = iota
TransactionTypeMint
TransactionTypeBurn
TransactionTypeShield // Convert transparent to shielded
TransactionTypeUnshield // Convert shielded to transparent
)
// Transaction represents a confidential transaction
type Transaction struct {
ID ids.ID `json:"id"`
Type TransactionType `json:"type"`
Version uint8 `json:"version"`
// Transparent inputs/outputs (for shield/unshield)
TransparentInputs []*TransparentInput `json:"transparentInputs,omitempty"`
TransparentOutputs []*TransparentOutput `json:"transparentOutputs,omitempty"`
// Shielded components
Nullifiers [][]byte `json:"nullifiers"` // Spent note nullifiers
Outputs []*ShieldedOutput `json:"outputs"` // New shielded outputs
// Zero-knowledge proof
Proof *ZKProof `json:"proof"`
// Transaction metadata
Fee uint64 `json:"fee"`
Expiry uint64 `json:"expiry"` // Block height
Memo []byte `json:"memo,omitempty"` // Encrypted memo
}
// TransparentInput represents an unshielded input
type TransparentInput struct {
TxID ids.ID `json:"txId"`
OutputIdx uint32 `json:"outputIdx"`
Amount uint64 `json:"amount"`
Address []byte `json:"address"`
}
// TransparentOutput represents an unshielded output
type TransparentOutput struct {
Amount uint64 `json:"amount"`
Address []byte `json:"address"`
AssetID ids.ID `json:"assetId"`
}
// ShieldedOutput represents a confidential output
type ShieldedOutput struct {
// Commitment to the note (amount and address)
Commitment []byte `json:"commitment"`
// Encrypted note ciphertext
EncryptedNote []byte `json:"encryptedNote"`
// Ephemeral public key for note encryption
EphemeralPubKey []byte `json:"ephemeralPubKey"`
// Output proof (rangeproof for amount)
OutputProof []byte `json:"outputProof"`
}
// ZKProof represents a zero-knowledge proof
type ZKProof struct {
ProofType string `json:"proofType"` // groth16, plonk, etc.
ProofData []byte `json:"proofData"`
PublicInputs [][]byte `json:"publicInputs"`
}
// ComputeID is the transaction's identity: a hash over everything the
// transaction means. It is NOT carried on the wire — parseTransaction derives
// it — because an identity a peer supplies is an identity a peer chooses, and
// the proof cache is keyed on it: copy an accepted transaction's id, proof and
// public inputs onto a transaction spending different notes and the cache
// answers nil before anything binds the proof to what it spends.
//
// Every variable-length field is written with its length first and every list
// with its count. Concatenated raw, a byte could move from the end of one field
// to the start of the next without the hash noticing — ["ab","c"] and ["a","bc"]
// are the same bytes — and two transactions sharing an identity is what
// consensus decides between blocks with.
func (tx *Transaction) ComputeID() ids.ID {
h := sha256.New()
num := func(v uint64) { binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, v) }
blob := func(b []byte) { num(uint64(len(b))); h.Write(b) }
count := func(n int) { num(uint64(n)) }
present := func(yes bool) {
if yes {
h.Write([]byte{1})
return
}
h.Write([]byte{0})
}
h.Write([]byte{byte(tx.Type), tx.Version})
count(len(tx.TransparentInputs))
for _, in := range tx.TransparentInputs {
h.Write(in.TxID[:])
num(uint64(in.OutputIdx))
num(in.Amount)
blob(in.Address)
}
count(len(tx.TransparentOutputs))
for _, out := range tx.TransparentOutputs {
num(out.Amount)
h.Write(out.AssetID[:])
blob(out.Address)
}
count(len(tx.Nullifiers))
for _, nullifier := range tx.Nullifiers {
blob(nullifier)
}
count(len(tx.Outputs))
for _, output := range tx.Outputs {
blob(output.Commitment)
blob(output.EncryptedNote)
blob(output.EphemeralPubKey)
blob(output.OutputProof)
}
present(tx.Proof != nil)
if tx.Proof != nil {
blob([]byte(tx.Proof.ProofType))
blob(tx.Proof.ProofData)
count(len(tx.Proof.PublicInputs))
for _, input := range tx.Proof.PublicInputs {
blob(input)
}
}
num(tx.Fee)
num(tx.Expiry)
blob(tx.Memo)
return ids.ID(h.Sum(nil))
}
// GetNullifiers returns all nullifiers in the transaction
func (tx *Transaction) GetNullifiers() [][]byte {
return tx.Nullifiers
}
// GetOutputCommitments returns all output commitments
func (tx *Transaction) GetOutputCommitments() [][]byte {
commitments := make([][]byte, len(tx.Outputs))
for i, output := range tx.Outputs {
commitments[i] = output.Commitment
}
return commitments
}
// ValidateBasic performs basic validation
func (tx *Transaction) ValidateBasic() error {
// Check transaction type
if tx.Type > TransactionTypeUnshield {
return errInvalidTransactionType
}
// Check nullifiers and outputs
if len(tx.Nullifiers) == 0 && len(tx.TransparentInputs) == 0 {
return errNoInputs
}
if len(tx.Outputs) == 0 && len(tx.TransparentOutputs) == 0 {
return errNoOutputs
}
// Check proof
if tx.Proof == nil {
return errMissingProof
}
// A transaction names the height it stops being valid at. Without one it
// sits in a bounded pool forever: it can never enter a block, nothing
// evicts it, and once the pool is full of them every honest arrival paying
// the same floor is refused.
if tx.Expiry == 0 {
return errNoExpiry
}
// Type-specific validation
switch tx.Type {
case TransactionTypeTransfer:
// Must have shielded inputs and outputs
if len(tx.Nullifiers) == 0 || len(tx.Outputs) == 0 {
return errInvalidTransferTransaction
}
case TransactionTypeShield:
// Must have transparent inputs and shielded outputs
if len(tx.TransparentInputs) == 0 || len(tx.Outputs) == 0 {
return errInvalidShieldTransaction
}
case TransactionTypeUnshield:
// Must have shielded inputs and transparent outputs
if len(tx.Nullifiers) == 0 || len(tx.TransparentOutputs) == 0 {
return errInvalidUnshieldTransaction
}
}
return nil
}
var (
errInvalidTransactionType = errors.New("invalid transaction type")
errNoInputs = errors.New("transaction has no inputs")
errNoOutputs = errors.New("transaction has no outputs")
errMissingProof = errors.New("transaction missing proof")
errNoExpiry = errors.New("transaction names no expiry height")
errExpired = errors.New("transaction has expired")
errInvalidTransferTransaction = errors.New("invalid transfer transaction")
errInvalidShieldTransaction = errors.New("invalid shield transaction")
errInvalidUnshieldTransaction = errors.New("invalid unshield transaction")
)