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M threshold-signs a security crossing the way it signs a fungible transfer, and B carries the attestation to the destination register. Same leaderless ceremony, same authorisation, same group key travelling with the result so B verifies without asking M anything. What differs is the message, and therefore the digest. What B does here is narrower than what it does for a fungible asset. The fungible path releases by minting: a confirmed lock authorises N units to an account and nothing else has to be true. Whether a SECURITY may exist on the destination at all is the destination register's question — is this holder verified, do their claims satisfy the token, does a holding period follow the paper across — and the token asks it in the block that lands the position. B never decides a security may land. It decides the attestation is genuine and says what it claims to say. SecurityRequest is separate from BridgeRequest rather than a flag on it. The two are released by different calls onto the destination, and a mint against a register nobody asked is exactly the failure this path exists to prevent; one type that could be either leaves that difference to a branch somebody has to remember to write. Two fields the destination cannot look up for itself travel with the crossing — the holder's ONCHAINID on the source register, and when they first received there. Without the second, an arriving position anchors its clock to now, and a holding period a crossing resets is one a crossing washes off. A short identity is refused rather than read as an absence: treating it as absent lets a truncated field pass for "this holder had none". An absent one travels as zero, which is honest. Quantity is a uint256. A billion shares at eighteen decimals is an ordinary size for a register and does not fit the uint64 the fungible path carries; a truncated quantity is a position that arrives smaller than it left, so it is refused rather than truncated. Signer ids convert to strings at the boundary so a verifier on the far side needs nothing of M's type graph. The crossing type itself is aliased from internal/bridgeattest rather than copied — attest_bridge.go keeps its own copy of BridgeTransfer, and two definitions kept in step by hand is a way for a digest to drift across a boundary whose whole value is that it cannot.