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zeekayandHanzo Dev af808b25ad validator: node-bound proof of possession, one key per node
The forged certificate that reached crates.io was killed at verification, but a
red review showed the hole had only moved to registration: a key was admitted on
key_validate alone, which proves a point is on the curve and nothing about who
holds its secret, and duplicate keys were merged into one validator carrying many
node ids — so a floor written to require many distinct signers was cleared by one
holder registering one key under several ids.

This is the Go oracle for the standard ruled in luxfi/conformance: it defines the
bytes Rust and C++ reproduce.

validator/pop is the primitive. A registrant signs its own identity followed by
its own key — node(20, ids.NodeID) ‖ pubkey(48, compressed G1), 68 bytes, no
separator — under the proof-of-possession domain BLS_POP_..._POP_, distinct from
the vote's ..._NUL_ so a vote is never a proof and a proof never a vote. The node
is bound because the pubkey-only IETF proof travels with the key: bound to
nothing, it re-registers under any identity. 20 bytes because a Lux validator's
identity IS its NodeID; the 32-byte consensus Id names blocks, not nodes, and has
no canonical inverse, so widening would invent a second name for one node.

validator/registration is the admission rule, written once: encoding, then
possession, then uniqueness, then weight — a pairing on non-points is undefined,
and weight counted before uniqueness is weight counted twice. A set is admitted
whole or refused whole, because a set that silently drops a signer no longer
describes its own weight. FlattenValidatorSet's merge of duplicate keys is retired
here: it was the only thing that made many-nodes-one-key representable, and after
the uniqueness rule that state does not exist to normalize. Order and
PublicKeyBytes still match the upstream flatten exactly, so a proven set and a
flattened-distinct set are the same set.

engine/chain keys the cert store on the DECISION — the signed canonical identity
— not the transport envelope id, which no signature covers: two envelopes of one
decision were two store entries for one finality fact, and a verified cert could
be filed under a block it never attested. Keyed by decision, a cert is found by
anything that finalized that decision, and Put is idempotent per decision.

The pubkey-only P-chain proof (luxfi/node AddValidatorTx) is NOT touched here:
moving it node-bound is a network upgrade, every validator re-proves, and it is
activation-gated as the deliberate last step. Anywhere a validator set that
shares a key across node ids is admitted today, this now refuses it — that is the
intended behaviour, and the coordination point with the P-chain step.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-09-01 08:10:24 -07:00

116 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package chain
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
)
// descentAt builds a node that finalized [from, from+n) and can serve every one
// of those heights: a height index, a cert per block, and the blocks themselves.
func descentAt(from uint64, n int) (*Runtime, []ids.ID) {
vm := &mockVM{blocks: map[ids.ID]*mockBlock{}}
e := &Transitive{
certByDecision: map[ids.ID][]byte{},
recoveredAt: map[uint64]ids.ID{},
}
ids_ := make([]ids.ID, 0, n)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
h := from + uint64(i)
id := ids.GenerateTestID()
vm.blocks[id] = &mockBlock{id: id, height: h, bytes: []byte{byte(h)}}
e.certByDecision[id] = []byte{'c', byte(h)}
e.recoveredAt[h] = id
ids_ = append(ids_, id)
}
return &Runtime{Transitive: e, config: NetworkConfig{VM: vm}}, ids_
}
// TestDescentIsContiguous is the property the type exists to guarantee: entry i
// is the block at Base+i, with its own cert. A caller can therefore trust
// position without re-deriving it, which is what a behind node could not do when
// recovery was addressed by block id.
func TestDescentIsContiguous(t *testing.T) {
rt, want := descentAt(100, 5)
run, err := rt.From(context.Background(), 100, 5)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("From: %v", err)
}
if run.Base != 100 || len(run.Chain) != 5 {
t.Fatalf("run = base %d len %d, want base 100 len 5", run.Base, len(run.Chain))
}
for i, c := range run.Chain {
h := byte(100 + i)
if len(c.Block) != 1 || c.Block[0] != h {
t.Fatalf("entry %d is block %v, want the block at height %d", i, c.Block, h)
}
if len(c.Cert) != 2 || c.Cert[1] != h {
t.Fatalf("entry %d carries cert %v, want the cert for height %d", i, c.Cert, h)
}
}
if run.Next() != 105 {
t.Fatalf("Next = %d, want 105", run.Next())
}
_ = want
}
// TestDescentStopsAtTheFirstHoleRatherThanSkippingIt is the whole reason Run has
// no per-entry height. A node that finalized 100..102 and 104 must serve three
// entries and stop, not four with 104 sitting where 103 belongs -- a caller
// counting what it received would read that as progress and skip a height
// forever, which is precisely the failure this file exists to end.
func TestDescentStopsAtTheFirstHoleRatherThanSkippingIt(t *testing.T) {
rt, _ := descentAt(100, 3)
// 104 is finalized; 103 is not.
orphan := ids.GenerateTestID()
rt.config.VM.(*mockVM).blocks[orphan] = &mockBlock{id: orphan, height: 104, bytes: []byte{104}}
rt.Transitive.certByDecision[orphan] = []byte{'c', 104}
rt.Transitive.recoveredAt[104] = orphan
run, err := rt.From(context.Background(), 100, 10)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("From: %v", err)
}
if len(run.Chain) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("served %d entries, want 3 — the run must END at the hole, not span it", len(run.Chain))
}
if run.Next() != 103 {
t.Fatalf("Next = %d, want 103 — the caller must resume AT the hole", run.Next())
}
}
// TestDescentWithoutTheCertServesNothingAtThatHeight: a block whose cert this
// node cannot produce is not servable, because the pair is what the peer needs.
// Serving the block alone would hand over something unacceptable and look like
// progress.
func TestDescentWithoutTheCertServesNothingAtThatHeight(t *testing.T) {
rt, idsAt := descentAt(100, 3)
delete(rt.Transitive.certByDecision, idsAt[1]) // height 101 loses its cert
run, err := rt.From(context.Background(), 100, 10)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("From: %v", err)
}
if len(run.Chain) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("served %d entries, want 1 — a block without its cert is not a Certified", len(run.Chain))
}
}
// TestDescentAtAnUnknownPositionIsACleanMiss: the caller must be able to tell
// "I cannot serve that" from "that height does not exist", so it asks another
// peer instead of concluding it is caught up.
func TestDescentAtAnUnknownPositionIsACleanMiss(t *testing.T) {
rt, _ := descentAt(100, 3)
_, err := rt.From(context.Background(), 500, 10)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoDescent) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrNoDescent", err)
}
}