Files
zeekay 52b8ef654b consensus(quasar): Z-lane rollup proof is strict-PQ STARK/FRI (P3Q), not Groth16
Rename the Z-Chain parallel-witness rollup proof system from
classical Groth16/bn254 (pairing-based, quantum-breakable) to the
post-quantum STARK/FRI path (P3Q: Plonky3 fork, cSHAKE256 Merkle over
Goldilocks, FRI; no KZG, no pairings, no trusted setup).

This is a comment/identifier rename only: QuasarCert.MLDSARollup is
opaque bytes and the consensus module has no proof-system dependency,
so the cert composition + ZWitnessProducer interface are unchanged.
The verifier and prover live in chains/zkvm.

- witness_producer.go: ZWitnessProducer doc + MLDSAGroth16->MLDSAStark;
  DisabledZWitnessProducer doc (STARK prover, AIR constraint count).
- types.go / polaris.go: MLDSARollup leg doc 'STARK/Groth16'->
  'strict-PQ STARK/FRI (P3Q)'; wire-layout comment.
- engine/pq/consensus.go: FinalityEvent.MLDSARollup doc.
- pkg/wire/candidate.go: PolicyQuantum/PolicyPZ/WitnessZ docs.

QuasarCert composition gate test (TestQuasarCert_ComposesAllThreeSchemes)
still passes. No wire-format change.
2026-06-19 12:23:02 -07:00

585 lines
18 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package wire
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"time"
)
// =============================================================================
// CORE INVARIANT: Everything is a Candidate
// =============================================================================
// CandidateID is a 32-byte content-addressed identifier.
// candidate_id = H(domain || payload_bytes)
// This ensures "same decision" is objectively the same ID regardless of proposer.
type CandidateID [32]byte
// EmptyCandidateID is the zero candidate ID
var EmptyCandidateID CandidateID
// Candidate represents anything being sequenced: blocks, transactions,
// AI decisions, state transitions, etc.
//
// Core invariant: ID = H(Domain || Payload)
type Candidate struct {
// ID is the content-addressed identifier (computed from Domain + Payload)
ID CandidateID `json:"id"`
// ParentID links to the previous candidate (optional for DAG/genesis)
ParentID CandidateID `json:"parent_id,omitempty"`
// Height is the sequence number / slot / round
Height uint64 `json:"height"`
// Domain identifies the context (chain_id, network_id, "ai-mesh", etc.)
Domain []byte `json:"domain"`
// Payload is the actual content being ordered
// For blocks: serialized transactions
// For AI: decision bundle / synthesis text
Payload []byte `json:"payload"`
// DARef is where the full payload bytes live (for DA layer)
// Can be: local path, IPFS CID, blob hash, Lux warp ref, etc.
DARef string `json:"da_ref,omitempty"`
// Meta contains additional metadata
Meta CandidateMeta `json:"meta"`
}
// CandidateMeta holds optional metadata
type CandidateMeta struct {
// ProposerID is who proposed this candidate
ProposerID VoterID `json:"proposer_id,omitempty"`
// TimestampMs is when the candidate was created
TimestampMs int64 `json:"timestamp_ms"`
// ChainID for multi-chain contexts
ChainID []byte `json:"chain_id,omitempty"`
// Extra is for domain-specific extensions
Extra []byte `json:"extra,omitempty"`
}
// NewCandidate creates a candidate with computed ID
func NewCandidate(domain, payload []byte, parent CandidateID, height uint64) *Candidate {
c := &Candidate{
ParentID: parent,
Height: height,
Domain: domain,
Payload: payload,
Meta: CandidateMeta{
TimestampMs: time.Now().UnixMilli(),
},
}
c.ID = c.ComputeID()
return c
}
// ComputeID calculates the content-addressed ID: H(domain || payload)
func (c *Candidate) ComputeID() CandidateID {
h := sha256.New()
h.Write(c.Domain)
h.Write(c.Payload)
var id CandidateID
copy(id[:], h.Sum(nil))
return id
}
// Verify checks that the ID matches the content
func (c *Candidate) Verify() bool {
return c.ID == c.ComputeID()
}
// =============================================================================
// ATTESTATIONS: Who agrees
// =============================================================================
// Vote represents an attestation on a candidate
type Vote struct {
// CandidateID is what's being voted on
CandidateID CandidateID `json:"candidate_id"`
// VoterID is who is voting
VoterID VoterID `json:"voter_id"`
// Round is the voting round (for multi-round protocols)
Round uint64 `json:"round"`
// Preference is the vote direction (true=accept, false=reject)
Preference bool `json:"preference"`
// Signature is scheme-tagged: first byte indicates scheme
// 0x00 = none, 0x01 = Ed25519, 0x02 = BLS, 0x03 = Corona, 0x04 = Quasar
Signature []byte `json:"signature,omitempty"`
// TimestampMs for ordering
TimestampMs int64 `json:"timestamp_ms"`
}
// Signature scheme tags
const (
SigNone byte = 0x00
SigEd25519 byte = 0x01
SigBLS byte = 0x02
SigCorona byte = 0x03
SigQuasar byte = 0x04 // BLS + Corona (Quasar protocol)
)
// NewVote creates a vote with current timestamp
func NewVote(candidateID CandidateID, voterID VoterID, round uint64, preference bool) *Vote {
return &Vote{
CandidateID: candidateID,
VoterID: voterID,
Round: round,
Preference: preference,
TimestampMs: time.Now().UnixMilli(),
}
}
// SignatureScheme returns the signature scheme tag
func (v *Vote) SignatureScheme() byte {
if len(v.Signature) == 0 {
return SigNone
}
return v.Signature[0]
}
// =============================================================================
// CERTIFICATES: Proof of agreement
// =============================================================================
// PolicyID identifies the finality policy used
type PolicyID uint16
const (
// PolicyNone - no finality required (K=1 self-sequencing)
PolicyNone PolicyID = 0
// PolicyQuorum - threshold signature (3/5, 2/3, etc.).
// Witness set: {P}. P-Chain BLS only, the default.
PolicyQuorum PolicyID = 1
// PolicySampleConvergence - metastable sampling (large N)
PolicySampleConvergence PolicyID = 2
// PolicyL1Inclusion - external chain inclusion (OP Stack)
PolicyL1Inclusion PolicyID = 3
// PolicyQuantum - parallel-witness PQ finality, witness set {P, Q, Z}.
// Maximum security level: P-Chain BLS + Q-Chain Corona + Z-Chain MLDSAStark.
// All three witnesses run in parallel.
PolicyQuantum PolicyID = 4
// PolicyPQ - parallel-witness finality, witness set {P, Q}.
// P-Chain BLS + Q-Chain Corona threshold. No Z-Chain rollup.
PolicyPQ PolicyID = 5
// PolicyPZ - parallel-witness finality, witness set {P, Z}.
// P-Chain BLS + Z-Chain MLDSAStark rollup. No Q-Chain ceremony.
PolicyPZ PolicyID = 6
)
// =============================================================================
// PARALLEL-WITNESS FINALITY MODEL (LP-020 Quasar)
// =============================================================================
//
// Lux finality is layered, parallel witnesses. P-Chain BLS is always required.
// Q-Chain (Corona threshold) and Z-Chain (MLDSAStark rollup) are
// independently toggleable parallel witnesses producing additional finality
// artifacts at the same round-rate as P. Adding witnesses does not increase
// per-block latency, only parallel verification cost.
// =============================================================================
// FinalityWitnesses is a bitset selecting which parallel finality witnesses
// must sign each round. WitnessP is always required.
type FinalityWitnesses uint8
const (
// WitnessP - P-Chain BLS aggregate. Always required.
WitnessP FinalityWitnesses = 1 << 0
// WitnessQ - Q-Chain Corona threshold (Module-LWE, eprint 2024/1113).
WitnessQ FinalityWitnesses = 1 << 1
// WitnessZ - Z-Chain MLDSAStark rollup (per-validator ML-DSA-65
// aggregated via a strict-PQ STARK/FRI proof, P3Q).
WitnessZ FinalityWitnesses = 1 << 2
)
// Witnesses returns the FinalityWitnesses bitset for a given PolicyID.
// Returns 0 for non-witnessed policies (None, Sample, L1).
func (p PolicyID) Witnesses() FinalityWitnesses {
switch p {
case PolicyQuorum:
return WitnessP
case PolicyPQ:
return WitnessP | WitnessQ
case PolicyPZ:
return WitnessP | WitnessZ
case PolicyQuantum:
return WitnessP | WitnessQ | WitnessZ
default:
return 0
}
}
// PolicyForWitnesses returns the canonical PolicyID for a witness set.
// Valid sets: {P}, {P,Q}, {P,Z}, {P,Q,Z}. Returns PolicyNone if invalid
// (WitnessP missing, or unknown bits set).
func PolicyForWitnesses(w FinalityWitnesses) PolicyID {
if w&WitnessP == 0 {
return PolicyNone
}
switch w {
case WitnessP:
return PolicyQuorum
case WitnessP | WitnessQ:
return PolicyPQ
case WitnessP | WitnessZ:
return PolicyPZ
case WitnessP | WitnessQ | WitnessZ:
return PolicyQuantum
default:
return PolicyNone
}
}
// Has reports whether w includes every witness in required.
func (w FinalityWitnesses) Has(required FinalityWitnesses) bool {
return w&required == required
}
// Validate returns nil iff WitnessP is set and no unknown bits are present.
func (w FinalityWitnesses) Validate() error {
if w&WitnessP == 0 {
return ErrWitnessPRequired
}
if w & ^(WitnessP|WitnessQ|WitnessZ) != 0 {
return ErrWitnessUnknown
}
return nil
}
// ErrWitnessPRequired is returned when a witness set lacks the mandatory
// P-Chain BLS witness.
var ErrWitnessPRequired = errors.New("WitnessP required: P-Chain BLS is the always-on finality witness")
// ErrWitnessUnknown is returned when a witness set contains undefined bits.
var ErrWitnessUnknown = errors.New("witness set contains unknown bits")
// HashSuiteID identifies which hash family a Quasar finality certificate was
// produced under. It is a separate axis from PolicyID: Pulsar (SHA3_NIST)
// and Corona (BLAKE3-legacy) share PolicyPQ (5) but use different hash
// kernels. PolicyID alone is therefore insufficient to know which verifier to
// instantiate — the receiver must consult HashSuiteID.
//
// HashSuiteID is bound into the cert transcript (see TranscriptHash) so any
// post-signing mutation of the byte changes the digest the threshold
// signature covers; cross-suite confusion attacks fail on signature verify,
// not just on a string/byte-equality check.
//
// Closes HIP-0077 red-review F1: silent finality forks between hash-profile
// islands sharing the same PolicyID. Mirrors the Warp 2.0 envelope pattern
// (lux/warp/envelope.go HashSuiteID) at the consensus layer so the two
// envelopes don't drift.
//
// **Numbering is NIST-aligned.** SHA3_NIST is the normative entry (0x01),
// BLAKE3 is non-normative legacy (0x02), and SHAKE256 does not get its own
// ID because SHAKE256 is FIPS 202 and therefore part of SHA3_NIST.
// Numbering is open-ended; future hash families claim the next free ID
// and pin it in a config table-driven test. Never reuse a retired ID.
//
// Wire-side values must match config.HashSuiteID exactly (the producer
// surfaces config.HashSuiteID through RoundWitnesses; the cert assembler
// stamps the envelope with `wire.HashSuiteID(rw.HashSuiteID)`).
type HashSuiteID uint8
const (
// HashSuiteNone — no hash-family commitment. Used by BLS-only certs and
// by intermediate states that haven't been signed under any PQ kernel.
HashSuiteNone HashSuiteID = 0x00
// HashSuiteSHA3NIST — the normative SP 800-185 hash family: SHAKE256 +
// cSHAKE256 + KMAC256 + TupleHash256 (FIPS 202 + NIST SP 800-185).
// Pulsar / Quasar / raw ML-DSA-65 all sign under this suite.
HashSuiteSHA3NIST HashSuiteID = 0x01
// HashSuiteBLAKE3Legacy — Corona academic profile and Pulsar's pre-pin
// legacy suite. BLAKE3 is outside FIPS 202 and non-normative for any
// NIST submission; the byte exists so legacy / academic / federation-MPC
// deployments can still emit a verifiable cert.
HashSuiteBLAKE3Legacy HashSuiteID = 0x02
)
// String returns the canonical lower-case name of the hash suite.
func (h HashSuiteID) String() string {
switch h {
case HashSuiteNone:
return "none"
case HashSuiteSHA3NIST:
return "sha3-nist"
case HashSuiteBLAKE3Legacy:
return "blake3-legacy"
default:
return "hash-suite(unknown)"
}
}
// SigSchemeID identifies which threshold signature scheme produced the
// threshold-layer signature in this certificate. Orthogonal to PolicyID
// and HashSuiteID; bound into the transcript so a flipped byte breaks
// signature verification.
//
// Numbering blocks: 0x00 None / 0x10..0x1F classical (BLS) / 0x20..0x2F
// Corona / 0x30..0x3F Pulsar.R / 0x40..0x4F Pulsar.M (low nibble pins
// the parameter set).
//
// Wire-side values must match config.SigSchemeID exactly.
type SigSchemeID uint8
const (
SigSchemeNone SigSchemeID = 0x00
SigSchemeBLS12381 SigSchemeID = 0x10
SigSchemeNasua SigSchemeID = 0x20
SigSchemePulsarR SigSchemeID = 0x30
SigSchemePulsar44 SigSchemeID = 0x41
SigSchemePulsar65 SigSchemeID = 0x42 // production default
SigSchemePulsar87 SigSchemeID = 0x43
)
// String returns the canonical wire name of the signature scheme.
func (s SigSchemeID) String() string {
switch s {
case SigSchemeNone:
return "none"
case SigSchemeBLS12381:
return "bls12-381"
case SigSchemeNasua:
return "nasua"
case SigSchemePulsarR:
return "pulsar-r"
case SigSchemePulsar44:
return "pulsar-m-44"
case SigSchemePulsar65:
return "pulsar-m-65"
case SigSchemePulsar87:
return "pulsar-m-87"
default:
return "sig-scheme(unknown)"
}
}
// Certificate is the proof of finalized agreement
type Certificate struct {
// CandidateID is what was finalized
CandidateID CandidateID `json:"candidate_id"`
// Height at finalization
Height uint64 `json:"height"`
// PolicyID identifies how finality was achieved
PolicyID PolicyID `json:"policy_id"`
// HashSuiteID identifies which hash family this cert was produced under.
// Bound into TranscriptHash so post-sign mutation breaks signature
// verification — see HIP-0077 F1 fix and TranscriptHash below. Zero is
// the explicit "no hash-family commitment" value (PolicyQuorum / BLS-only
// certs); non-zero modes MUST set this to match the producing PQMode.
HashSuiteID HashSuiteID `json:"hash_suite_id"`
// Proof is policy-specific (scheme-tagged bytes)
// For Quorum: aggregated signature + signer bitmap
// For L1Inclusion: merkle proof + block hash
// For SampleConvergence: confidence score + sample proofs
Proof []byte `json:"proof"`
// Signers is a bitmap or list of who attested
Signers []byte `json:"signers,omitempty"`
// TimestampMs when certificate was created
TimestampMs int64 `json:"timestamp_ms"`
}
// NewCertificate creates a certificate. HashSuiteID defaults to HashSuiteNone;
// callers using PolicyPQ / PolicyPZ / PolicyQuantum MUST set it explicitly to
// match the producing PQMode (config.PQMode.HashSuiteID()).
func NewCertificate(candidateID CandidateID, height uint64, policy PolicyID, proof []byte) *Certificate {
return &Certificate{
CandidateID: candidateID,
Height: height,
PolicyID: policy,
Proof: proof,
TimestampMs: time.Now().UnixMilli(),
}
}
// NewCertificateWithSuite creates a certificate with an explicit HashSuiteID.
// Use this from PQ producers to bind the suite into the cert at construction
// time; callers using BLS-only PolicyQuorum can pass HashSuiteNone or use the
// HashSuiteID-free NewCertificate.
func NewCertificateWithSuite(candidateID CandidateID, height uint64, policy PolicyID, suite HashSuiteID, proof []byte) *Certificate {
return &Certificate{
CandidateID: candidateID,
Height: height,
PolicyID: policy,
HashSuiteID: suite,
Proof: proof,
TimestampMs: time.Now().UnixMilli(),
}
}
// TranscriptHash returns the 32-byte digest that bound this certificate at
// signing time. The hash binds every envelope field that fixes the cert's
// meaning — including HashSuiteID — so that flipping the suite byte after
// signing changes the digest the threshold signature covers and the
// signature fails to verify.
//
// Layout (big-endian, length-prefixed where variable):
//
// "CertTranscript/v1" || domain-sep
// candidate_id (32 B)
// height (uint64 BE, 8 B)
// policy_id (uint16 BE, 2 B)
// hash_suite (uint8, 1 B)
// proof_len (uint32 BE, 4 B) || proof
// signers_len (uint32 BE, 4 B) || signers
//
// TimestampMs is deliberately excluded: it is informational metadata, not
// part of the agreement that the signature covers.
func (c *Certificate) TranscriptHash() [32]byte {
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte("CertTranscript/v1"))
h.Write(c.CandidateID[:])
var u64 [8]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], c.Height)
h.Write(u64[:])
var u16 [2]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(u16[:], uint16(c.PolicyID))
h.Write(u16[:])
h.Write([]byte{byte(c.HashSuiteID)})
var u32 [4]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(u32[:], uint32(len(c.Proof)))
h.Write(u32[:])
h.Write(c.Proof)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(u32[:], uint32(len(c.Signers)))
h.Write(u32[:])
h.Write(c.Signers)
var out [32]byte
copy(out[:], h.Sum(nil))
return out
}
// =============================================================================
// TWO-PHASE AGREEMENT: Soft → Hard
// =============================================================================
// Phase represents the agreement phase
type Phase uint8
const (
// PhaseSoft is fast, optimistic finality
// Can be: metastable sampling, leader quorum, sequencer head
PhaseSoft Phase = 1
// PhaseHard is slow, strong finality
// Can be: threshold certificate, L1 inclusion, PQ threshold
PhaseHard Phase = 2
)
// AgreementState tracks two-phase agreement
type AgreementState struct {
CandidateID CandidateID `json:"candidate_id"`
// Soft finality
SoftFinalized bool `json:"soft_finalized"`
SoftCert *Certificate `json:"soft_cert,omitempty"`
// Hard finality
HardFinalized bool `json:"hard_finalized"`
HardCert *Certificate `json:"hard_cert,omitempty"`
}
// =============================================================================
// VOTER IDENTITY
// =============================================================================
// Single canonical derivation: VoterID = H(domain || data)
// Domain separator ensures VoterID == NodeID when using same domain.
// =============================================================================
// NodeIDDomain is the canonical domain separator (matches node repo)
const NodeIDDomain = "SignerNodeID/v1"
// VoterID is a 32-byte voter identifier
type VoterID [32]byte
// EmptyVoterID is the zero voter ID
var EmptyVoterID VoterID
// DeriveVoterID is the single canonical derivation function.
// VoterID = H(domain || data)
//
// For validators: DeriveVoterID(NodeIDDomain, mldsaPublicKey)
// For AI agents: DeriveVoterID("agent", []byte(agentName))
func DeriveVoterID(domain string, data []byte) VoterID {
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte(domain))
h.Write(data)
var v VoterID
copy(v[:], h.Sum(nil))
return v
}
// VoterIDFromPublicKey derives VoterID from any public key using NodeIDDomain.
// This ensures VoterID == NodeID for the same public key.
func VoterIDFromPublicKey(publicKey []byte) VoterID {
return DeriveVoterID(NodeIDDomain, publicKey)
}
// ItemID is a content-addressed item identifier.
type ItemID = CandidateID
// DeriveItemID derives an ItemID from arbitrary data
func DeriveItemID(data []byte) ItemID {
return sha256.Sum256(data)
}
// =============================================================================
// SERIALIZATION HELPERS
// =============================================================================
// Bytes serializes a CandidateID to bytes
func (id CandidateID) Bytes() []byte {
return id[:]
}
// Bytes serializes a VoterID to bytes
func (id VoterID) Bytes() []byte {
return id[:]
}
// Uint64ToBytes converts uint64 to big-endian bytes
func Uint64ToBytes(n uint64) []byte {
b := make([]byte, 8)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b, n)
return b
}
// BytesToUint64 converts big-endian bytes to uint64
func BytesToUint64(b []byte) uint64 {
if len(b) < 8 {
return 0
}
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b)
}