Files
deb599d614 quasar: add the Pulsar threshold ML-DSA certificate profile (#12)
Add protocol/quasar/pulsar -- the consensus-side adapter that wires
luxfi/pulsar's threshold ML-DSA RoundSigner into Quasar as a certificate
profile. Consensus consumes Pulsar; Pulsar never consumes consensus.

Decomplected ownership (the load-bearing boundary):

  Consensus owns ORCHESTRATION: validator-set membership, committee
  sampling, session binding, canonical nonce selection, QC aggregation,
  signer bitmap, ConsensusCert assembly, retries, fallback, slashing.

  Pulsar owns CRYPTO: the two-round shape (Round1 binds the nonce,
  Round2 emits a proof-carrying z partial), z aggregation mod q, public
  hint recovery (FindHint over w' = A*z - c*t1*2^d), and the FIPS 204
  ML-DSA signature.

PulsarRoundSigner implements pulsar.RoundSigner (Round1/Round2/Finalize).
The secret-bearing FIPS 204 assembly stays package-private to luxfi/pulsar
and is injected as a pluggable core; until a reviewed Boundary-Cleared /
Carry-Elimination signer ships (pulsar.ProductionBCCSigningReady), Finalize
fails closed -- it returns a structurally-complete ConsensusCert with an
EMPTY signature and ErrProfileNotReady, and the orchestrator falls back to
Corona. No secret residual is ever opened on this path.

This forward-ports the profile onto the v1.35 release line. It consumes the
pulsar v1.9.0 pkg/pulsar package already pinned on this line -- no go.mod /
go.sum change, no dependency bump, and the new import adds zero transitive
sums. Purely additive: six new files, no existing file touched, so no
existing exported consensus symbol changes and no other consumer is affected.
The strict-PQ triple gate (engine.go generateCert: BLS + Corona + ML-DSA) is
untouched and still refuses to finalize without all three legs.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-07-07 17:43:43 -07:00

114 lines
4.3 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// session.go -- the consensus-side session binding for a Pulsar round.
//
// PulsarSession captures every field that pins one threshold-sign ceremony to
// exactly one consensus round, so a signature produced for (epoch, height,
// round, block) can never be replayed into a different round, committee, or
// joint key. The 32-byte session_id is the domain-separated hash of all
// fields; every signer recomputes it and refuses to sign a mismatched session.
package pulsar
import (
"encoding/binary"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// sessionDomain domain-separates the Pulsar session-id hash from every other
// hash in the system (FIPS 204 mu, the nonce-cert payload root, the round
// digest, etc.). cSHAKE customization plus an in-band protocol tag give two
// independent separation layers.
const (
sessionCustomization = "QUASAR-PULSAR-SESSION-v1"
sessionProtocolTag = "Quasar/Pulsar/Session/v1"
)
// PulsarSession is the consensus binding for one Pulsar threshold-sign round.
// Every field is consensus-owned; none is secret. The zero value is invalid
// (Validate rejects all-zero security-relevant roots) so a caller cannot
// silently sign an unbound session.
type PulsarSession struct {
ChainID [32]byte // chain this round finalizes on
Epoch uint64 // DKG / committee epoch
Height uint64 // block height
Round uint64 // intra-height round / view
BlockHash [32]byte // the block (item) being certified
ValidatorSetRoot [32]byte // commitment to the active validator set
JointPKID [32]byte // identifier of the committee joint ML-DSA key
DKGTranscriptRoot [32]byte // commitment to the DKG transcript that made the key
CommitteeID [32]byte // identifier of the sampled committee
SignerSetRoot [32]byte // commitment to the eligible signer set
NoncePoolRoot [32]byte // Merkle root of the background NonceCert pool
ProtocolVersion uint32 // wire/protocol version
}
// SessionID derives the 32-byte session identifier by hashing every binding
// field under a domain-separated cSHAKE256. Each variable-position field is
// fixed-width (arrays) or length-free fixed integers, so the concatenation is
// unambiguous (canonical encoding -- no field-boundary grinding).
//
// Field order is fixed and MUST match the task's session_id definition:
//
// H(chain_id ‖ epoch ‖ height ‖ round ‖ block_hash ‖ validator_set_root ‖
// joint_pk_id ‖ dkg_transcript_root ‖ committee_id ‖ signer_set_root ‖
// nonce_pool_root ‖ protocol_version)
func (s *PulsarSession) SessionID() [32]byte {
h := sha3.NewCShake256(nil, []byte(sessionCustomization))
_, _ = h.Write([]byte(sessionProtocolTag))
var u8 [8]byte
var u4 [4]byte
_, _ = h.Write(s.ChainID[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u8[:], s.Epoch)
_, _ = h.Write(u8[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u8[:], s.Height)
_, _ = h.Write(u8[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u8[:], s.Round)
_, _ = h.Write(u8[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.BlockHash[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.ValidatorSetRoot[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.JointPKID[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.DKGTranscriptRoot[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.CommitteeID[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.SignerSetRoot[:])
_, _ = h.Write(s.NoncePoolRoot[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(u4[:], s.ProtocolVersion)
_, _ = h.Write(u4[:])
var out [32]byte
_, _ = h.Read(out[:])
return out
}
// Validate refuses a session whose security-relevant roots are all zero. A
// zero root means an unbound field (e.g. a missing DKG transcript or
// validator-set commitment); signing under it would let an adversary reuse the
// signature across rounds. ProtocolVersion and the numeric height/round/epoch
// are allowed to be zero (genesis, view 0).
func (s *PulsarSession) Validate() error {
zero := [32]byte{}
switch {
case s.ChainID == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.BlockHash == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.ValidatorSetRoot == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.JointPKID == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.DKGTranscriptRoot == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.CommitteeID == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.SignerSetRoot == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
case s.NoncePoolRoot == zero:
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
}
return nil
}