mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/consensus.git
synced 2026-09-24 00:26:58 +00:00
Add protocol/quasar/pulsar -- the consensus-side adapter that wires the
luxfi/pulsar threshold ML-DSA primitives into Quasar as a cert profile.
Consensus consumes Pulsar; Pulsar never consumes consensus.
Decomplected ownership (the load-bearing boundary):
Consensus owns ORCHESTRATION: validator-set membership, committee
sampling, session binding, canonical nonce selection, QC aggregation,
signer bitmap, ConsensusCert assembly, retries, fallback, slashing
inputs.
Pulsar owns CRYPTO: the two-round shape (Round1 binds the nonce,
Round2 emits a proof-carrying z partial), z aggregation mod q, the
public hint recovery (FindHint over w' = A*z - c*t1*2^d), and the
final FIPS 204 ML-DSA signature.
PulsarRoundSigner implements luxfi/pulsar's RoundSigner interface:
Round1 selects the canonical NonceCert via pulsar.CanonicalNonceIndex
over the session and refuses any non-canonical nonce
(anti-grind: a coordinator cannot pick w1, hence the
challenge, by choosing among boundary-clear certs after
seeing the message).
Round2 emits one signer's z Partial; pulsar.VerifyZPartial enforces
the public bindings + the registered ZK correctness check.
Finalize selects the canonical signer subset
(pulsar.CanonicalSignerSet), aggregates z
(pulsar.MergeAggregates), and assembles the two-certificate
ConsensusCert accountability artifact (signer bitmap +
transcript root).
The final FIPS 204 signature byte production is secret-bearing (needs
the module matrix A, t1, the challenge, and the per-coefficient hint),
all package-private to luxfi/pulsar, so it stays there: Finalize
delegates to a pluggable SignatureCore. The core is fail-closed until
luxfi/pulsar ships a reviewed Boundary-Cleared / Carry-Elimination
signer (pulsar.ProductionBCCSigningReady); until then Finalize returns
a structurally-complete ConsensusCert with an EMPTY Signature and
ErrProfileNotReady, and the orchestrator falls back to Corona. No
secret residual is ever opened on this path.
Session binding (session.go): the 32-byte session id is a
domain-separated cSHAKE256 over chain_id, epoch, height, round,
block_hash, validator_set_root, joint_pk_id, dkg_transcript_root,
committee_id, signer_set_root, nonce_pool_root, protocol_version --
every field fixed-width for canonical (non-grindable) encoding. Validate
refuses a session with an all-zero security-relevant root (cross-round
replay guard).
NonceCert generation is a BACKGROUND validator subprotocol filling a
NonceCertPool (pool.go) -- never inline on the block hot path. An empty
pool yields ErrNonceCertPoolEmpty (fall back to Corona), never an inline
nonce.
The profile registers by the package convention (like wave_signer.go's
RoundSigner): a self-contained pulsar.RoundSigner whose ConsensusCert
Signature bytes feed the existing QuasarCert.Pulsar slot and verify via
the polaris.go verifyPulsarLeg / pulsarwire.VerifyBytes path already
wired. No change to polaris.go (cert assembly is a separate concern).
go.mod: replace github.com/luxfi/pulsar => ../luxfi/pulsar. The
RoundSigner / NonceCert / CertProfile API lands on the
fix/threshold-mldsa-hint-leak branch and is not in any published tag
(cached v1.1.1 predates it). Remove the replace once a tag carrying the
API ships.
Tests (protocol/quasar/pulsar, all green): contract implementation,
Round1->Round2->Finalize fail-closed fallback, stub-core success wiring,
empty-pool fallback, non-canonical-nonce rejection, full session-id
field binding, session validation. go build ./... green; existing
protocol/quasar suite unchanged and green.
114 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
114 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
|
|
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
|
|
|
|
// session.go -- the consensus-side session binding for a Pulsar round.
|
|
//
|
|
// PulsarSession captures every field that pins one threshold-sign ceremony to
|
|
// exactly one consensus round, so a signature produced for (epoch, height,
|
|
// round, block) can never be replayed into a different round, committee, or
|
|
// joint key. The 32-byte session_id is the domain-separated hash of all
|
|
// fields; every signer recomputes it and refuses to sign a mismatched session.
|
|
|
|
package pulsar
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"encoding/binary"
|
|
|
|
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// sessionDomain domain-separates the Pulsar session-id hash from every other
|
|
// hash in the system (FIPS 204 mu, the nonce-cert payload root, the round
|
|
// digest, etc.). cSHAKE customization plus an in-band protocol tag give two
|
|
// independent separation layers.
|
|
const (
|
|
sessionCustomization = "QUASAR-PULSAR-SESSION-v1"
|
|
sessionProtocolTag = "Quasar/Pulsar/Session/v1"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// PulsarSession is the consensus binding for one Pulsar threshold-sign round.
|
|
// Every field is consensus-owned; none is secret. The zero value is invalid
|
|
// (Validate rejects all-zero security-relevant roots) so a caller cannot
|
|
// silently sign an unbound session.
|
|
type PulsarSession struct {
|
|
ChainID [32]byte // chain this round finalizes on
|
|
Epoch uint64 // DKG / committee epoch
|
|
Height uint64 // block height
|
|
Round uint64 // intra-height round / view
|
|
BlockHash [32]byte // the block (item) being certified
|
|
ValidatorSetRoot [32]byte // commitment to the active validator set
|
|
JointPKID [32]byte // identifier of the committee joint ML-DSA key
|
|
DKGTranscriptRoot [32]byte // commitment to the DKG transcript that made the key
|
|
CommitteeID [32]byte // identifier of the sampled committee
|
|
SignerSetRoot [32]byte // commitment to the eligible signer set
|
|
NoncePoolRoot [32]byte // Merkle root of the background NonceCert pool
|
|
ProtocolVersion uint32 // wire/protocol version
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SessionID derives the 32-byte session identifier by hashing every binding
|
|
// field under a domain-separated cSHAKE256. Each variable-position field is
|
|
// fixed-width (arrays) or length-free fixed integers, so the concatenation is
|
|
// unambiguous (canonical encoding -- no field-boundary grinding).
|
|
//
|
|
// Field order is fixed and MUST match the task's session_id definition:
|
|
//
|
|
// H(chain_id ‖ epoch ‖ height ‖ round ‖ block_hash ‖ validator_set_root ‖
|
|
// joint_pk_id ‖ dkg_transcript_root ‖ committee_id ‖ signer_set_root ‖
|
|
// nonce_pool_root ‖ protocol_version)
|
|
func (s *PulsarSession) SessionID() [32]byte {
|
|
h := sha3.NewCShake256(nil, []byte(sessionCustomization))
|
|
_, _ = h.Write([]byte(sessionProtocolTag))
|
|
|
|
var u8 [8]byte
|
|
var u4 [4]byte
|
|
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.ChainID[:])
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u8[:], s.Epoch)
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(u8[:])
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u8[:], s.Height)
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(u8[:])
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u8[:], s.Round)
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(u8[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.BlockHash[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.ValidatorSetRoot[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.JointPKID[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.DKGTranscriptRoot[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.CommitteeID[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.SignerSetRoot[:])
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(s.NoncePoolRoot[:])
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(u4[:], s.ProtocolVersion)
|
|
_, _ = h.Write(u4[:])
|
|
|
|
var out [32]byte
|
|
_, _ = h.Read(out[:])
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate refuses a session whose security-relevant roots are all zero. A
|
|
// zero root means an unbound field (e.g. a missing DKG transcript or
|
|
// validator-set commitment); signing under it would let an adversary reuse the
|
|
// signature across rounds. ProtocolVersion and the numeric height/round/epoch
|
|
// are allowed to be zero (genesis, view 0).
|
|
func (s *PulsarSession) Validate() error {
|
|
zero := [32]byte{}
|
|
switch {
|
|
case s.ChainID == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.BlockHash == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.ValidatorSetRoot == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.JointPKID == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.DKGTranscriptRoot == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.CommitteeID == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.SignerSetRoot == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
case s.NoncePoolRoot == zero:
|
|
return ErrSessionFieldUnset
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|