Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
zeekay be7a3df4ae fix: gofmt -s across repo (CI format check) 2026-06-02 11:37:47 -07:00
zeekay ac01395be7 threshold: canonical wire codec for Signature, GroupKey, VerifyBytes
Closes the long-standing Red HIGH B2 gap that forced luxfi/threshold's
JSON-RPC dispatcher (pkg/thresholdd/corona.go, pulsar.go) to refuse
every Corona op because Signature and GroupKey lacked stable
cross-process wire formats.

Adds:

  Signature.MarshalBinary / UnmarshalBinary
  GroupKey.MarshalBinary  / UnmarshalBinary
  VerifyBytes(gkBytes, msg, sigBytes) bool

Layout is domain-separated (CORS magic for Signature, CORG for
GroupKey) so the dispatcher cannot confuse the two slots. Versioning
(2-byte v1) leaves room for byte-format evolution under explicit
opt-in. Bounded validation flows through corona/wire so a malformed
length cannot trigger an oversized allocation.

VerifyBytes is the stateless surface that pkg/thresholdd consumes:
bytes-in, bool-out, no per-process state, byte-equal re-marshaling on
the roundtrip. Cross-wire feeds (GroupKey magic in the Signature slot)
are explicitly rejected.

Tests cover happy path (sign -> marshal -> unmarshal -> verify, plus
byte-equal re-marshal), tampered sig and tampered message rejection,
malformed input rejection (empty, too-short, wrong magic, wrong
version), and cross-wire confusion rejection.

Cannot t.Parallel: threshold.GenerateKeys mutates the sign package
globals K and Threshold (threshold.go:123-124); parallel use of the
kernel races on those globals. The wire codec itself is pure.
2026-05-31 11:29:23 -07:00
zeekay 78efc403f2 gpu: opt corona threshold signing into lattice/ring GPU NTT dispatch
Add corona/gpu package — the single, decomplecting point where corona
opts into the lattice library's per-SubRing GPU NTT dispatcher.

Architecture (decomplected).

The lattice library already owns ALL build-tag plumbing for GPU NTT:
ring.SetGPUDispatchers (subring_ops.go) is the canonical hook; the
lattice/gpu package installs it under `cgo && gpu` build tags and
provides a real CPU fallback under !cgo or !gpu. Output is byte-equal
to ring.SubRing.NTT by lattice's own contract.

corona/gpu adds the corona-side bridge: UseAccelerator() flips a
global flag, NewParams() across corona consults the flag via
MaybeRegister and binds each created Ring's SubRings into the lattice
GPU registry. Single source of truth for the opt-in; no build tags
inside corona.

Threshold gating (honest).

Single-poly Metal NTT at corona's production N=256 is roughly 4-6x
SLOWER than pure-Go ring.SubRing.NTT (measured: BenchmarkPulsarSign_
5of7 force-GPU 7.1s vs CPU 1.1s; 14of21 force-GPU 23.5s vs CPU 5.9s).
The GPU win exists only in BATCHED dispatch (many polynomials per
kernel launch), which requires future engine-layer plumbing of
lattice/gpu.MontgomeryNTTContext.Forward(data, batch>=4) bypassing
the per-poly r.NTT() pinch point.

Therefore UseAccelerator() picks defaultThreshold=1024 — above
corona's N=256 — so the SubRing dispatch is armed but does not fire
on single-poly NTT. The registry remains primed for any future batch
caller (e.g. FHE bootstraps in thresholdvm sharing this library).

UseAcceleratorForce() (threshold=1) is provided strictly for the
correctness gate: every NTT call routes through the GPU so the
byte-equality test in threshold/threshold_gpu_test.go exercises the
GPU path end-to-end. Production callers use UseAccelerator() instead.

Byte-equality.

TestThresholdSign_CPU_vs_GPU_ByteIdentical runs the full 2-round
Pulsar signing protocol with GPU dispatch off and forced-on (same
deterministic dealer randomness, same message) and asserts byte-equal
sig.C / sig.Z / sig.Delta. Passes under CGO_ENABLED=0, CGO_ENABLED=1,
and CGO_ENABLED=1 -tags gpu. Existing TestDKG2_GPU_ByteEqual coverage
extends across n=3,5,7,11,21 (production shape).

Wiring.

NewParams() in sign-bound packages — threshold, dkg2, dkg, reshare —
calls corona/gpu.MaybeRegister(r) for the main Q ring. RXi and RNu
are power-of-two moduli; the NTT path is not taken on them.

Tests.

Full corona test suite passes under both build modes:
  - CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./...    => all green
  - CGO_ENABLED=1 -tags gpu test   => all green
2026-05-21 13:41:15 -07:00
zeekay 90e96df805 Tier A full closure (v0.7.0): EC theories admit 0/0 + Lean bridges + Jasmin CT + dudect harness + e2e/fuzz
- proofs/easycrypt/: 13 EC files mirroring Pulsar layout, admit budget 0/0 statically pinned by scripts/checks/ec-admits.sh
- proofs/lean-easycrypt-bridge.md: 5-axiom Lean ↔ EC bridge (lagrange_inverse_eval, threshold_partial_response_identity, reconstruct_linear, shamir_correct, add_share_zeroR)
- jasmin/{lib,rlwe,threshold}/: round1/round2/combine .jazz with #ct annotations
- ct/dudect/: Verify + Combine harness (arm64 + x86_64 build tags)
- scripts/check-high-assurance.sh + scripts/checks/{ec-admits,ec-regressions,ec-refinement-scaffold,ec-compile,jasmin,extraction}.sh + check-lean-bridge.sh
- AXIOM-INVENTORY: residual axioms enumerated with closure pathways
- CRYPTOGRAPHER-SIGN-OFF: APPROVED WITH ROADMAP GATES; GATE-1+2+3a CLOSED; GATE-3b (dudect 10⁹ pinned CPU) + GATE-4 (external audit) + GATE-5 (Jasmin extraction filling out byte-walk) roadmap v0.8.0

Tier label: Tier A full closure scaffold landed; matches Pulsar v1.0.7 posture (admit 0/0 + Lean bridges + Jasmin + dudect harness wired). The submission-grade dudect run + external audit are v0.8.0 audit-track items.
2026-05-19 08:38:09 -07:00
zeekay 27692894fe threshold: add parallel VerifyBatch — N-signature throughput for consensus
Corona signatures are Ring-LWE (C, Z, Delta) ring-polynomial triples,
not FIPS 204 byte-equal (that's Pulsar's Module-LWE sibling). Single
Verify is the only place this package touches the sign.Verify
predicate; VerifyBatch composes it across N (groupKey, message,
signature) tuples in parallel via a GOMAXPROCS-bounded worker pool.

Public surface added:
  - VerifyBatch(gks, msgs, sigs) -> ([]bool, error)
  - VerifyBatchAll(gks, msgs, sigs) -> (bool, error)
  - ErrBatchSizeMismatch

Pure Go: NO CGO / accel dep. A future Metal/CUDA NTT-batch kernel
over the polynomial-arithmetic hotspot would live in luxfi/accel
behind the same byte interface; consumers wanting GPU dispatch call
accel directly against the wire bytes. This file is the portable
fallback everyone gets for free.

Tests (GOWORK=off go test ./threshold/ -run TestVerifyBatch):
  TestVerifyBatch_AllValid            (n=4, all valid)      PASS
  TestVerifyBatch_OneCorrupt          (message swap @1)     PASS
  TestVerifyBatch_StructuralMismatch  (slice len mismatch)  PASS
  TestVerifyBatch_Empty                                     PASS
Full ./threshold suite: ok 2.068s.
2026-05-15 01:42:48 -07:00
zeekay e0fdfe475b corona: symmetric domain separation — PULSAR-* tags -> CORONA-*
Leftover from Corona's "Pulsar-R" lineage. Pulsar (M-LWE) and Corona
(R-LWE) are independent constructions with separate hardness assumptions,
so their cSHAKE personalisation strings must be distinct.

Changes (Go, non-luxcpp):
  - hash tags: PULSAR-HC-v1 -> CORONA-HC-v1, etc. (HU, TRANSCRIPT, PRF, MAC, PAIRWISE)
  - profile IDs: "Pulsar-SHA3" -> "Corona-SHA3", "Pulsar-BLAKE3" -> "Corona-BLAKE3"
  - context strings: pulsar.dkg2.A.v1 -> corona.dkg2.A.v1, etc.
  - env vars: PULSAR_RESHARE_KAT_PATH -> CORONA_RESHARE_KAT_PATH, etc.
  - struct names: pulsarSHA3 -> coronaSHA3
  - KAT derive roots: sign_e2e_pulsar -> sign_e2e_corona

What's preserved (different scope):
  - luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/* path references in comments (separate repo,
    out of scope; the C++ side will rename in its own commit)
  - Cross-runtime KAT files on disk (will regenerate next CI run)

All 11 packages test green: dkg, dkg2, hash, keyera, networking,
primitives, reshare, sign, threshold, utils, wire.
2026-05-13 14:19:13 -07:00
zeekay 8c010dd8ef corona: rename module path github.com/luxfi/pulsar → github.com/luxfi/corona
Repo forks from luxfi/pulsar (R-LWE production threshold for Lux
consensus) to luxfi/corona under the family rename. Same Ring-LWE
code, same hash family (Pulsar-SHA3 / Pulsar-BLAKE3 -- wire-format
customization tags stay stable per MED-2). Only the Go module path
and internal imports change.

Lux family alignment:
  - Pulsar  = M-LWE / FIPS 204 / NIST MPTC N1 (was luxfi/pulsar-m)
  - Corona  = R-LWE / NIST MPTC S1            (this repo)
  - Corona = academic upstream + Lux DKG expansions
2026-05-11 14:55:26 -07:00
zeekay 666e6b8950 style: gofmt -s across cmd/ + reshare/ + dkg2/ + keyera/ + threshold/
Whitespace-only struct-tag alignment changes. Closes the CI Lint gate
that was failing across multiple recent commits on otherwise-green
build+test runs.
2026-05-10 17:23:40 -07:00
zeekay 4d7b048aa9 pulsar: cross-runtime oracles + sign KAT generator (v0.1.2 follow-on)
cmd/sign_oracle/  — emits the canonical Pulsar sign+verify KAT JSON
(Gen + SignRound1 + SignRound2{Preprocess,} + SignFinalize + Verify) for
(t, n) ∈ {2/3, 3/5, 5/7, 7/11}. The C++ port at
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/cpp/sign/ replays these entries byte-equal.

cmd/cross_runtime_oracle/  — Go writer for the cross-runtime release
gate. Emits a SHA-256 manifest tying together the three canonical
Pulsar KATs (sign, reshare, dkg2). C++ side at
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/cross_runtime_test.cpp replays each KAT and
checks byte-equality (forward direction: 30/30 PASS).

cmd/cross_runtime_verify/  — Go reader for the reverse direction
(C++ writes, Go verifies). Currently 3/3 PASS against the SHA-256s
emitted by luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/cmd/cross_runtime_oracle/.

threshold/testdata/fuzz/FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data/  — corpus seed for
the in-tree fuzz harness; mitigates the second lattice DoS (issue #4)
where Vector[T].ReadFrom calls make([]T, size) with no bound.

23 fuzz harnesses × 30s = 10.9M execs, 0 panics.
2026-05-04 03:32:05 -07:00
zeekay 4cff733804 threshold: validate Vector[Poly] frame before lattigo ReadFrom
FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data found a 9-byte input that crashes the
goroutine with `fatal error: out of memory: cannot allocate
105589698985984-byte block` in `lattice/v7/utils/structs.Vector[T].
ReadFrom`. Recovery cannot catch the fatal OOM — the only safe path
is to reject malformed frames before `make([]T, size)` runs.

This is a SECOND DoS surface in lattice/v7, distinct from the
ReadUintNSlice recursion fixed by luxfi/lattice#3 (still open):
ReadFrom calls `make([]T, size)` with `size` read from the wire
before any bound check. PR #3 fixes the inner slice readers but the
outer Vector wrapper allocation remains exploitable.

Filed upstream as luxfi/lattice#4 with reproduction. The new
validateVectorPolyFrameInline walker mirrors the existing
warp/pulsar.validateVectorPolyFrame: walks the wire frame
end-to-end, asserts every length field is <= MaxLatticeUintSliceLen
(4096), and rejects truncated / over-large frames before the
lattigo decoder runs.

Result: FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data passes 30s with the new walker
in place (28577 execs, 0 panics). Failing input
testdata/fuzz/FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data/a80b8d313b40fa55 is now
rejected cleanly with "vector length 70368955777453 exceeds 4096".

Refs: luxfi/lattice#2 (open), luxfi/lattice#3 (open),
      luxfi/lattice#4 (filed 2026-05-04)
2026-05-04 03:15:49 -07:00
zeekay 261ad9d290 pulsar: lattice threshold kernel with key-era lifecycle + Pulsar-SHA3 + Nebula binding
Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.

Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
  - Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
  - Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
  - Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
  - NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer

Replaces from upstream:
  - Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
    with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
    Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
    under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
  - Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
    rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
    epoch under the persistent group public key.

Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
  - KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
  - Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
  - RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
  - Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
    under the unchanged GroupKey

Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
  - Hc:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
  - Hu:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
  - TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
  - PRF:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
  - MAC:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
  - Pairwise:  KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
  - Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
    non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
  - Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
  - All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
    luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.

Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
    chain_id, network_id, group_id,
    key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
    old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
    old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
    threshold_old, threshold_new,
    group_public_key_hash,
    nebula_root,
    hash_suite_id,
    implementation_version,
    variant.

Packages:
  primitives/   Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
  sign/         2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
  threshold/    GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
  reshare/      VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
                (Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
                transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
  hash/         HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
  dkg2/         Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
  keyera/       Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
  papers/       LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
  cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)

DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
  - The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
  - Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
    Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
  - Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
  - Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
  - Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
  - No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
  - MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
  - Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
    "hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
    the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.

Tests: full suite green
  hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
  dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
  all pass.

Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.

Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
2026-03-03 12:00:00 -08:00