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Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.
Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
- Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
- Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
- Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
- NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer
Replaces from upstream:
- Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
- Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
epoch under the persistent group public key.
Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
- KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
- Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
- RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
- Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
under the unchanged GroupKey
Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
- Hc: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
- Hu: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
- TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
- PRF: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
- MAC: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
- Pairwise: KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
- Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
- Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
- All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.
Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
chain_id, network_id, group_id,
key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
threshold_old, threshold_new,
group_public_key_hash,
nebula_root,
hash_suite_id,
implementation_version,
variant.
Packages:
primitives/ Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
sign/ 2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
threshold/ GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
reshare/ VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
(Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
hash/ HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
dkg2/ Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
keyera/ Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
papers/ LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)
DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
- The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
- Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
- Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
- Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
- Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
- No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
- MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
- Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
"hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.
Tests: full suite green
hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
all pass.
Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.
Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
187 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
187 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package reshare
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import (
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"bytes"
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"testing"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
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)
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// TestPartyKeyShareFromShareFullPath — round-trips a Shamir share into
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// a complete PartyKeyShare and confirms every field is populated.
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func TestPartyKeyShareFromShareFullPath(t *testing.T) {
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r := canonicalRing(t)
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const tThr, n = 3, 5
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secret := pickSecret(r, "keyshare-full", testNVec)
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rs := newFakeRand([]byte("keyshare-shamir"))
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oldShares, err := makeStandardShamirShares(r, secret, tThr, n, rs)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Reshare onto a new committee.
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const tNew = 3
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newCommittee := []int{10, 11, 12, 13, 14}
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reshared, err := Reshare(r, oldShares, tThr, newCommittee, tNew,
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newFakeRand([]byte("keyshare-reshare")))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Build pairwise material. In the kernel test we use deterministic
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// fakes; production wires this through AuthenticatedKex (see
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// pairwise.go).
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K := len(newCommittee)
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authKex := make(map[[2]int][]byte, K*K)
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selfSeeds := make(map[int][]byte, K)
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for i := 0; i < K; i++ {
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selfSeeds[i] = []byte{byte(0xA0 + i), 0x11, 0x22, 0x33}
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for j := i + 1; j < K; j++ {
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authKex[[2]int{i, j}] = []byte{byte(i), byte(j), 0xCC, 0xDD}
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}
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}
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chainID := []byte("test")
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groupID := []byte("g0")
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pseudoEpoch := uint64(7)
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pairwiseSeeds, err := DeriveSeeds(K, authKex, selfSeeds, chainID, groupID, 0, pseudoEpoch, nil, 32)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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pairwiseMACs, err := DeriveMACKeys(K, authKex, chainID, groupID, 0, pseudoEpoch, nil, 32)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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groupKey := &PartyGroupKey{}
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// Build the PartyKeyShare for one new party.
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myID := newCommittee[2] // 12
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pks, err := PartyKeyShareFromShare(
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r, reshared[myID], myID, newCommittee,
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pairwiseSeeds, pairwiseMACs, groupKey,
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Sanity checks: every field populated.
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if pks.Index != 2 {
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t.Errorf("Index: got %d, want 2", pks.Index)
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}
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if pks.SkShare == nil || len(pks.SkShare) == 0 {
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t.Error("SkShare empty")
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}
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if pks.GroupKey != groupKey {
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t.Error("GroupKey not propagated as pointer")
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}
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if pks.Lambda.Coeffs == nil {
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t.Error("Lambda not populated")
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}
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// Lambda must be in NTT-Mont form (not all-zero, not equal to a
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// raw scalar — there's no easy invariant to check beyond
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// non-zero-ness without re-running the helper).
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if allZeroPoly(pks.Lambda) {
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t.Error("Lambda is all zero")
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}
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if pks.Seeds == nil {
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t.Fatal("Seeds map empty")
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}
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if len(pks.Seeds) != K {
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t.Errorf("Seeds map size: got %d, want %d", len(pks.Seeds), K)
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}
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for i := 0; i < K; i++ {
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row := pks.Seeds[i]
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if row == nil {
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t.Errorf("Seeds[%d] missing", i)
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continue
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}
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if len(row) != K {
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t.Errorf("Seeds[%d] length: got %d, want %d", i, len(row), K)
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}
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}
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// MACKeys[i] for i != myIdx should be non-nil and match the
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// canonical pairwise derivation.
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for k := 0; k < K; k++ {
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if k == 2 {
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if _, ok := pks.MACKeys[k]; ok {
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t.Errorf("MACKeys[self=%d] should not exist", k)
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}
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continue
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}
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if mk := pks.MACKeys[k]; len(mk) == 0 {
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t.Errorf("MACKeys[%d] missing", k)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestEraseShareZeroes — every coefficient of every poly in the share
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// is zero after EraseShare.
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func TestEraseShareZeroes(t *testing.T) {
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r := canonicalRing(t)
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secret := pickSecret(r, "erase", testNVec)
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rs := newFakeRand([]byte("erase-rs"))
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shares, err := makeStandardShamirShares(r, secret, 3, 5, rs)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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for _, sh := range shares {
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// Check non-trivial before erase (overwhelming probability).
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if allZeroShare(sh) {
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t.Fatal("share is all-zero before erase (test setup broken)")
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}
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EraseShare(sh)
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if !allZeroShare(sh) {
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t.Fatal("EraseShare did not zero all coefficients")
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}
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}
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}
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// TestPartyKeyShareFromShareRejectsMissingParty — a party not in the
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// new committee triggers a clear error.
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func TestPartyKeyShareFromShareRejectsMissingParty(t *testing.T) {
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r := canonicalRing(t)
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secret := pickSecret(r, "missing-party", testNVec)
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rs := newFakeRand([]byte("mp-shamir"))
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old, _ := makeStandardShamirShares(r, secret, 2, 3, rs)
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reshared, _ := Reshare(r, old, 2, []int{10, 11, 12}, 2, newFakeRand([]byte("mp-rng")))
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_, err := PartyKeyShareFromShare(r, reshared[10], 99, []int{10, 11, 12},
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map[[2]int][]byte{}, map[[2]int][]byte{}, nil)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error for missing party")
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}
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if !bytes.Contains([]byte(err.Error()), []byte("not in new committee")) {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func allZeroShare(s Share) bool {
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for _, p := range s {
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for _, level := range p.Coeffs {
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for _, c := range level {
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if c != 0 {
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return false
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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func allZeroPoly(p ring.Poly) bool {
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for _, level := range p.Coeffs {
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for _, c := range level {
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if c != 0 {
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return false
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}
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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