mirror of https://github.com/luxfi/corona.git synced 2026-09-24 00:25:54 +00:00

Files

T

zeekay fbe2bc5a88 submission: scaffold NIST MPTC v0.2 submission package mirroring Pulsar template

Adds the NIST MPTC Class N1 + N4 submission package for Corona (R-LWE
threshold signing). Pattern mirrors luxfi/pulsar (M-LWE byte-equal
FIPS 204 path), adapted HONESTLY to Corona's lighter proof tier:

- SUBMISSION.md / NIST-SUBMISSION.md — cover sheet + 1-page exec
  summary. Cite Boschini-Kaviani-Lai-Malavolta-Takahashi-Tibouchi
  ePrint 2024/1113 (IEEE S&P 2025) as the underlying construction.
  Construction-level N1 claim (no FIPS standard target for R-LWE
  threshold — Boschini et al. IS the spec). N4 = (A, bTilde)
  preserved across reshare within a key era.
- SPEC.md — standalone construction specification consolidating
  existing material (papers/lp-073-pulsar/, DESIGN.md). Full
  single-doc spec/corona.tex is roadmap v0.6.0.
- PATENTS.md — royalty-free patent grant + defensive termination.
  Claim scope EXCLUDES the published Boschini et al. construction;
  claims limited to Corona's production lifecycle additions
  (Pedersen DKG over R_q, proactive resharing, activation cert
  circuit-breaker, constant-time Pedersen slot equality, hash-suite
  injection).
- PROOF-CLAIMS.md — HONEST framing. Corona ships NO mechanized
  refinement (no EasyCrypt, no Lean, no Jasmin) — unlike Pulsar.
  Correctness reduces to code review + KAT cross-runtime byte-equality
  + academic construction analysis + per-path constant-time static
  audit. Mechanized refinement is roadmap v0.7.0.
- TRUSTED-COMPUTING-BASE.md — implementation TCB. Structurally
  simpler than Pulsar's; no EC/Lean/Jasmin tools in scope.
- DEPLOYMENT-RUNBOOK.md — operator-facing trust-model disclosure.
- LICENSING.md / CONTRIBUTING.md / SECURITY.md — standard NIST-MPTC
  artifacts.
- docs/mptc/ — submission-package docs subdir (kept separate from
  docs/ Next.js docs site):
  - evaluation.md, ietf-draft-skeleton.md, nist-mptc-category.md,
    patent-claims.md, design-decisions.md, family-architecture.md,
    threat-model.md
- scripts/{build,test,bench,gen_vectors,check-high-assurance,
  cut-submission}.sh — submission gates mirroring Pulsar's
  orchestrator pattern, adapted to Corona's reality (no EC/Lean/
  Jasmin checks because the artifacts do not exist).
- LLM.md + CHANGELOG.md — updated with submission scaffolding
  context and v0.5.0 entry. NO fabricated prior history; CHANGELOG
  v0.5.0 entry covers only the actual submission documentation.

DOES NOT FABRICATE: no CRYPTOGRAPHER-SIGN-OFF (Pulsar has one;
Corona's lighter proof tier does not yet warrant it — roadmap
v0.7.0+v0.8.0). No AXIOM-INVENTORY or FIPS-TRACEABILITY (Corona is
not anchored to a FIPS standard). No proof claims Corona does not
actually have.

Build/test verification: GOWORK=off go build ./... clean; sign/,
primitives/, hash/ unit tests pass; scripts/build.sh + scripts/
check-high-assurance.sh exit 0.

2026-05-18 23:10:13 -07:00

3.6 KiB

Raw Blame History

Security policy

Reporting vulnerabilities

Please report cryptographic or implementation vulnerabilities privately to [email protected] — encrypted with the team key listed at https://lux.network/security/key.asc. Public disclosure happens after a fix lands and downstream consumers have had a 14-day private window.

What is in-scope

Corona is production-hardened reference implementation for Ring-LWE threshold signing in Quasar consensus, and a NIST MPTC submission package. The following are in-scope for responsible disclosure:

Specification ambiguity that leads to an exploitable verifier behaviour.
Threshold-protocol soundness gaps (forgery, key-recovery, share extraction, rogue-key, adaptive-corruption breaks).
Constant-time violations in code paths that touch a secret share, a Gaussian sample, or a Lagrange-aggregation intermediate.
KAT mismatches between the Go reference and the C++ port at ~/work/luxcpp/crypto/corona/ (cross-runtime byte-equality is a load-bearing invariant).
Pedersen DKG (dkg2/) hiding-blind leakage or commitment binding failures.
Reshare-protocol (reshare/) failures to preserve (A, bTilde) across committee rotation.
Activation-cert (reshare/activation.go) bypass or accept-on- failure paths.
Information leaks via logging, panics on secret-correlated paths, or variable-time equality.
Cryptanalysis of the underlying Boschini et al. ePrint 2024/1113 construction or of Corona's specific parameter set (N = 256, q = 0x1000000004A01).

What is NOT in-scope

Performance or implementation efficiency complaints (file an issue).
DoS attacks against the reference implementation that don't affect the threshold-correctness invariants.
Issues exclusively in the M-LWE sibling at luxfi/pulsar — file there. Corona and Pulsar are independent libraries with no shared types.
Issues in lens-specific code (lens/) — Corona's threshold path does not depend on lens.
Issues in the legacy dkg/ (Feldman VSS without blinding) — documented as broken for public broadcast; replaced by dkg2/ (Pedersen DKG with hiding blinds). Production deployments use dkg2/.

CVE assignment

Corona maintainers will request CVEs for any in-scope vulnerability prior to public disclosure. CVE numbers will be embedded in the ePrint changelog and the release tag's commit message.

NIST MPTC submission disclosures

Findings discovered after the 2026-Nov-16 MPTC package submission deadline will be added to the submission's "known limitations" appendix and disclosed publicly per NIST's MPTC public-analysis process (no embargo window for findings against actively-submitted MPTC packages).

Coordinated disclosure with Pulsar

Corona and Pulsar are independent submissions but share Lux as a common author and overlap in some operational mitigations (e.g., aggregator-host hardening, mlock pinning). A vulnerability that affects both packages will be disclosed to both [email protected] mailing lists simultaneously to enable coordinated patching.

Disclosure timeline (default)

T+0: Private report received at [email protected].
T+5 days: Acknowledgement + initial triage; CVE requested if in-scope.
T+30 days: Fix landed in main; tagged patch release; private disclosure to downstream consumers (Quasar consensus, etc.).
T+44 days: Public disclosure (advisory + CVE published).

Faster disclosure timelines apply for critical findings (immediate exploitability with no mitigation). Slower timelines apply for research-level findings requiring spec consultation with NIST MPTC reviewers.

3.6 KiB Raw Blame History