Files
corona/reshare/complaint_test.go
T
zeekay 261ad9d290 pulsar: lattice threshold kernel with key-era lifecycle + Pulsar-SHA3 + Nebula binding
Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.

Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
  - Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
  - Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
  - Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
  - NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer

Replaces from upstream:
  - Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
    with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
    Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
    under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
  - Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
    rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
    epoch under the persistent group public key.

Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
  - KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
  - Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
  - RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
  - Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
    under the unchanged GroupKey

Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
  - Hc:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
  - Hu:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
  - TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
  - PRF:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
  - MAC:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
  - Pairwise:  KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
  - Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
    non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
  - Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
  - All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
    luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.

Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
    chain_id, network_id, group_id,
    key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
    old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
    old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
    threshold_old, threshold_new,
    group_public_key_hash,
    nebula_root,
    hash_suite_id,
    implementation_version,
    variant.

Packages:
  primitives/   Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
  sign/         2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
  threshold/    GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
  reshare/      VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
                (Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
                transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
  hash/         HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
  dkg2/         Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
  keyera/       Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
  papers/       LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
  cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)

DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
  - The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
  - Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
    Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
  - Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
  - Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
  - Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
  - No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
  - MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
  - Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
    "hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
    the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.

Tests: full suite green
  hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
  dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
  all pass.

Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.

Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
2026-03-03 12:00:00 -08:00

153 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package reshare
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"errors"
"testing"
)
// TestComplaintSignVerify — round-trip signing and verification of a
// well-formed complaint.
func TestComplaintSignVerify(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
c := &Complaint{
TranscriptHash: [32]byte{0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc},
SenderID: 3,
ComplainerID: 7,
Reason: ComplaintBadDelivery,
Evidence: []byte("test-evidence-blob"),
}
c.Sign(priv)
if !ed25519.Verify(pub, c.Bytes(), c.Signature) {
t.Fatal("ed25519.Verify against base public key failed")
}
if err := c.Verify(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Verify: %v", err)
}
}
// TestComplaintTamperDetected — modifying any field after signing
// invalidates the signature.
func TestComplaintTamperDetected(t *testing.T) {
_, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
c := &Complaint{
TranscriptHash: [32]byte{0x01},
SenderID: 3,
ComplainerID: 7,
Reason: ComplaintBadDelivery,
Evidence: []byte("evidence"),
}
c.Sign(priv)
// Tamper.
c.Reason = ComplaintEquivocation
if err := c.Verify(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Verify accepted tampered complaint")
}
}
// TestDisqualificationThreshold — the canonical formula yields t-1.
func TestDisqualificationThresholdValues(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
tOld int
want int
}{
{1, 1},
{2, 1},
{3, 2},
{5, 4},
{11, 10},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got := DisqualificationThreshold(c.tOld)
if got != c.want {
t.Errorf("DisqualificationThreshold(%d) = %d, want %d", c.tOld, got, c.want)
}
}
}
// TestComputeDisqualifiedSet — basic counting + dedup behaviour.
func TestComputeDisqualifiedSet(t *testing.T) {
const tOld = 5 // threshold = 4 distinct complainers required
mkComplaint := func(sender, complainer int) *Complaint {
return &Complaint{
SenderID: sender,
ComplainerID: complainer,
Reason: ComplaintBadDelivery,
}
}
// 4 distinct complainers against sender 3 → disqualified.
// 3 distinct complainers against sender 5 → NOT disqualified.
// 5 complaints against sender 7 but only from complainers {1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
// (all by complainer 1, deduped) → only 1 distinct complainer → NOT
// disqualified.
complaints := []*Complaint{
mkComplaint(3, 1), mkComplaint(3, 2), mkComplaint(3, 3), mkComplaint(3, 4),
mkComplaint(5, 1), mkComplaint(5, 2), mkComplaint(5, 3),
mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1),
}
dq := ComputeDisqualifiedSet(complaints, tOld)
if _, ok := dq[3]; !ok {
t.Errorf("sender 3 should be disqualified")
}
if _, ok := dq[5]; ok {
t.Errorf("sender 5 should NOT be disqualified (only 3 complainers)")
}
if _, ok := dq[7]; ok {
t.Errorf("sender 7 should NOT be disqualified (1 distinct complainer)")
}
}
// TestFilterQualifiedQuorum — survivors of disqualification.
func TestFilterQualifiedQuorum(t *testing.T) {
originalQuorum := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
dq := map[int]struct{}{2: {}, 4: {}}
got, err := FilterQualifiedQuorum(originalQuorum, dq, 3)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("FilterQualifiedQuorum: %v", err)
}
want := []int{1, 3, 5}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", got, want)
}
for i := range want {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", got, want)
}
}
// Disqualifying too many makes the quorum insufficient.
tooMany := map[int]struct{}{1: {}, 2: {}, 3: {}, 4: {}}
_, err = FilterQualifiedQuorum(originalQuorum, tooMany, 3)
if err == nil || !errors.Is(err, ErrInsufficientQuorum) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrInsufficientQuorum, got %v", err)
}
}
// TestComplaintHashStable — same complaint → same hash.
func TestComplaintHashStable(t *testing.T) {
_, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
c := &Complaint{
TranscriptHash: [32]byte{0x42},
SenderID: 9,
ComplainerID: 1,
Reason: ComplaintMissing,
Evidence: nil,
}
c.Sign(priv)
a := ComplaintHash(c)
b := ComplaintHash(c)
if a != b {
t.Fatal("ComplaintHash non-deterministic")
}
}