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Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.
Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
- Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
- Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
- Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
- NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer
Replaces from upstream:
- Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
- Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
epoch under the persistent group public key.
Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
- KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
- Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
- RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
- Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
under the unchanged GroupKey
Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
- Hc: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
- Hu: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
- TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
- PRF: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
- MAC: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
- Pairwise: KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
- Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
- Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
- All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.
Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
chain_id, network_id, group_id,
key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
threshold_old, threshold_new,
group_public_key_hash,
nebula_root,
hash_suite_id,
implementation_version,
variant.
Packages:
primitives/ Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
sign/ 2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
threshold/ GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
reshare/ VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
(Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
hash/ HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
dkg2/ Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
keyera/ Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
papers/ LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)
DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
- The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
- Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
- Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
- Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
- Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
- No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
- MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
- Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
"hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.
Tests: full suite green
hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
all pass.
Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.
Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
153 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
153 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package reshare
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"errors"
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"testing"
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)
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// TestComplaintSignVerify — round-trip signing and verification of a
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// well-formed complaint.
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func TestComplaintSignVerify(t *testing.T) {
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pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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c := &Complaint{
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TranscriptHash: [32]byte{0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc},
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SenderID: 3,
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ComplainerID: 7,
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Reason: ComplaintBadDelivery,
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Evidence: []byte("test-evidence-blob"),
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}
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c.Sign(priv)
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if !ed25519.Verify(pub, c.Bytes(), c.Signature) {
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t.Fatal("ed25519.Verify against base public key failed")
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}
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if err := c.Verify(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Verify: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// TestComplaintTamperDetected — modifying any field after signing
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// invalidates the signature.
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func TestComplaintTamperDetected(t *testing.T) {
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_, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
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c := &Complaint{
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TranscriptHash: [32]byte{0x01},
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SenderID: 3,
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ComplainerID: 7,
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Reason: ComplaintBadDelivery,
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Evidence: []byte("evidence"),
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}
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c.Sign(priv)
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// Tamper.
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c.Reason = ComplaintEquivocation
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if err := c.Verify(); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Verify accepted tampered complaint")
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}
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}
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// TestDisqualificationThreshold — the canonical formula yields t-1.
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func TestDisqualificationThresholdValues(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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tOld int
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want int
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}{
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{1, 1},
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{2, 1},
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{3, 2},
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{5, 4},
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{11, 10},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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got := DisqualificationThreshold(c.tOld)
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if got != c.want {
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t.Errorf("DisqualificationThreshold(%d) = %d, want %d", c.tOld, got, c.want)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestComputeDisqualifiedSet — basic counting + dedup behaviour.
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func TestComputeDisqualifiedSet(t *testing.T) {
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const tOld = 5 // threshold = 4 distinct complainers required
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mkComplaint := func(sender, complainer int) *Complaint {
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return &Complaint{
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SenderID: sender,
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ComplainerID: complainer,
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Reason: ComplaintBadDelivery,
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}
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}
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// 4 distinct complainers against sender 3 → disqualified.
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// 3 distinct complainers against sender 5 → NOT disqualified.
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// 5 complaints against sender 7 but only from complainers {1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
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// (all by complainer 1, deduped) → only 1 distinct complainer → NOT
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// disqualified.
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complaints := []*Complaint{
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mkComplaint(3, 1), mkComplaint(3, 2), mkComplaint(3, 3), mkComplaint(3, 4),
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mkComplaint(5, 1), mkComplaint(5, 2), mkComplaint(5, 3),
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mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1), mkComplaint(7, 1),
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}
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dq := ComputeDisqualifiedSet(complaints, tOld)
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if _, ok := dq[3]; !ok {
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t.Errorf("sender 3 should be disqualified")
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}
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if _, ok := dq[5]; ok {
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t.Errorf("sender 5 should NOT be disqualified (only 3 complainers)")
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}
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if _, ok := dq[7]; ok {
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t.Errorf("sender 7 should NOT be disqualified (1 distinct complainer)")
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}
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}
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// TestFilterQualifiedQuorum — survivors of disqualification.
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func TestFilterQualifiedQuorum(t *testing.T) {
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originalQuorum := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
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dq := map[int]struct{}{2: {}, 4: {}}
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got, err := FilterQualifiedQuorum(originalQuorum, dq, 3)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("FilterQualifiedQuorum: %v", err)
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}
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want := []int{1, 3, 5}
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if len(got) != len(want) {
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t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", got, want)
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}
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for i := range want {
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if got[i] != want[i] {
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t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", got, want)
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}
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}
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// Disqualifying too many makes the quorum insufficient.
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tooMany := map[int]struct{}{1: {}, 2: {}, 3: {}, 4: {}}
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_, err = FilterQualifiedQuorum(originalQuorum, tooMany, 3)
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if err == nil || !errors.Is(err, ErrInsufficientQuorum) {
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t.Fatalf("expected ErrInsufficientQuorum, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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// TestComplaintHashStable — same complaint → same hash.
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func TestComplaintHashStable(t *testing.T) {
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_, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
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c := &Complaint{
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TranscriptHash: [32]byte{0x42},
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SenderID: 9,
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ComplainerID: 1,
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Reason: ComplaintMissing,
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Evidence: nil,
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}
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c.Sign(priv)
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a := ComplaintHash(c)
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b := ComplaintHash(c)
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if a != b {
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t.Fatal("ComplaintHash non-deterministic")
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}
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}
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