Files
dex/pkg/dchain/redteam_dust_strand_test.go
zeekayandHanzo Dev 4f8df54e87 fix(dex): exact-integer ZAP wire + ledger-in-root — kill cross-arch/restart execRoot forks, silent money desync, and ceil/floor strand
Consensus-correctness fix for the native DEX settlement VM. Root cause of the
launch-blocking forks: order size/price were IEEE-754 float64 on the ZAP wire, so
every validator re-derived the settlement integer via uint64(float)/int64(float*1e8),
whose out-of-range result is implementation-defined per the Go spec and DIFFERS BY
CPU ARCHITECTURE (arm64 saturates to 2^64-1; amd64 wraps to 2^63). Two honest
validators on different archs then derived different reserves/balances/fills from the
SAME ordered block.

F1/F3/F5 — exact-integer size/price end to end:
- pkg/zapwire: Place/Submit/Fill carry price as uint64 fixed-point (×1e8 = PriceInt)
  and size as uint64 atomic base units. No float64 on the wire. Removed PutFloat64/
  Float64. Decode is exact bytes->uint64 (deterministic on every arch).
- pkg/dchain/execute: decode the exact integers, set the authoritative PriceUnits/
  SizeUnits lane; the float Price/Size become derived projections only (never a
  source of a consensus value). Reject price==0/size==0/price>maxPriceUnits.
- pkg/dex/persist: the DEXOrder/DEXTrade row stores the EXACT PriceInt (in
  DEXPrice.Integer) and EXACT base units (Quantity/Remaining); RowToOrder restores
  the integer lane verbatim (identity — no float round-trip) and Filled=Qty-Remaining.
  Removed floatToFixedQty/fixedQtyToFloat/floatToFixedPrice (the non-idempotent
  round(size*1e8)/Q64.64 encoding that clamped at ~1.845e11 and forked on restart).
- pkg/dex matcher: cross and level-key on the exact integer PriceUnits.
- pkg/dchain/settle: orderLock/floorsToZeroLock take exact integers; removed
  sizeToUnits/priceToInt float conversions and the dead restoreIntegerLane.

F2 — commit the custody ledger into the execution root:
- state.ComposeRoot/ExecutionRoot gain a ledgerRoot term (Merkle over balance:/
  locked:/orderasset: rows). Validators can no longer finalize agreeing on the book
  while holding different money.

F4 — release the ceil-lock/floor-charge residual on full fill:
- decrementMakerReserves now closes a fully-filled maker's reserve and returns the
  ceil(size*price)-floor residual to the owner (a filled order can never be
  cancelled), through the same unlock path a cancel uses. No more permanently
  frozen quote.

PROVEN: the two-phase cross-arch harness (arm64 build / amd64 Rosetta verify) now
derives byte-identical execRoots AND byte-identical custody ledgers for the
identical block (uint64(1e20) still differs at the language level — 0xffff.. vs
0x8000.. — but the exact-integer wire freezes the value in the bytes so no
per-validator float->int conversion remains). Red guards flipped to assert the fix;
conservation/byzantine/batch-parity/KAT/e2e all green (go test ./... -count=1),
go vet clean.

OUT OF SCOPE (flagged, NOT fixed here): redteam_unbacked_deposit_test documents a
SEPARATE critical finding (F9) — dex_deposit credits an arbitrary self-signed amount
with no C-side backing proof, exposed on the public RPC. That needs an access-control/
custody-model decision, not a mechanical fix, and is left for a follow-up.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-07-02 09:42:54 -07:00

171 lines
7.5 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
//
// redteam_dust_strand_test.go — RED TEAM (adversarial). Attacks the ceil-lock /
// floor-charge asymmetry on a RESTING BUY order.
//
// A resting BUY locks ceil(size*price) quote (settle.go quoteUnitsCeil), but each
// fill charges floor(baseUnits*price) quote (settlement_units.go quoteUnitsFor).
// When the order is CANCELLED while still resting, releaseOrderReserve returns the
// full remaining reserve (ceil-side) — so the over-lock is refunded. But when the
// order FULLY FILLS, decrementMakerReserves only reduces the reserve by the floored
// consumed amount and NEVER releases the ceil-vs-floor residual: the order leaves
// the book (its order: row is deleted) with a non-zero orderasset:/orderuser: pair
// still recording locked quote that is now UNREACHABLE (a filled order cannot be
// cancelled: applyCancel sees GetOrder==nil => Canceled=0 => no release).
//
// Result: quote the maker deposited is PERMANENTLY FROZEN in locked:. It is NOT a
// mint (I = A + L still holds — the residual sits in L), which is exactly why the
// whole-keyspace conservation property (conservation_property_test.go) does NOT
// catch it. It IS a permanent loss/griefing vector, adversarially AMPLIFIED by
// fragmenting the maker's fill (each 1-unit fill strands ~frac(price) more).
package dchain
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// TestRedteam_FullFillStrandsOverlock_Minimal is the minimal repro: a single full
// fill of a resting BUY at a fractional price strands ceil(1*1.5)-floor(1*1.5)=1
// quote unit in the maker's locked, unrecoverable by cancel or withdraw.
func TestRedteam_FullFillStrandsOverlock_Minimal(t *testing.T) {
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(context.Background())
const (
maker = "maker"
taker = "taker"
)
pool := [32]byte{0xd0, 0x57} // "dust"
accts := []string{maker, taker}
// Fund: maker holds quote (LUSD) to bid with, taker holds base (LUX) to sell.
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker, assetLUSD, 10),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUX, 5),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
assertConserved2(t, vm, "after fund", accts, assetLUX, assetLUSD, 5, 10)
// Maker rests BUY 1 LUX @ 1.5 LUSD. Lock = ceil(1 * 1.5) = 2 quote.
placeBlk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, 1.5, 1.0, maker))
makerOrderID := blockDeterministicID(placeBlk.height, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 8, 2) // avail 8, locked 2
// Taker SELL 1 LUX @ 1.0 crosses the 1.5 bid — fills 1 unit at MAKER price 1.5.
// quoteUnits = floor(1 * 1.5) = 1 : the maker is charged 1, not the 2 it locked.
blk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, false, 1.0, 1.0, taker))
if n := len(outcomeForTx(blk, blk.txs[0]).fills); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 fill, got %d", n)
}
// ATTACK ASSERTION: the maker's order fully filled and left the book, yet 1
// quote unit remains LOCKED — the ceil(2) reservation minus the floor(1) charge.
// A correct full-fill would release this residual (as a cancel would); it does
// not, so it is frozen.
availQ, lockedQ, err := vm.Balance(wireUser(t, maker), assetLUSD)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Balance(maker,LUSD): %v", err)
}
t.Logf("after full fill: maker LUSD avail=%d locked=%d (locked SHOULD be 0)", availQ, lockedQ)
// NOT A MINT: at fill time (E=0), conservation I=A+L holds exactly. This is the
// blind spot — the whole-keyspace property suite passes because the residual sits
// in L, yet it is real user funds that can never be moved to A.
assertConserved2(t, vm, "at fill time (no mint)", accts, assetLUX, assetLUSD, 5, 10)
if lockedQ == 0 {
t.Skip("no residual stranded — behavior may have been fixed; nothing to prove")
}
if lockedQ != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected stranded amount: got %d, analysis predicts 1", lockedQ)
}
// UNRECOVERABLE #1 — cancel the now-dead order id: it is gone from the book, so
// applyCancel returns Canceled=0 and releaseOrderReserve is a no-op. The 1 stays.
addBlock(t, vm, cancelPoolTx(t, pool, makerOrderID, maker))
_, lockedAfterCancel, _ := vm.Balance(wireUser(t, maker), assetLUSD)
if lockedAfterCancel != 1 {
t.Fatalf("cancel unexpectedly changed stranded locked: %d (want still 1)", lockedAfterCancel)
}
// UNRECOVERABLE #2 — withdraw ALL quote: withdraw only touches AVAILABLE, so the
// realized amount is the 8 available; the 1 locked is unreachable forever.
_, wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, withdrawTx(t, maker, assetLUSD, 100))
realized := withdrawRealizedOf(wo, TxWithdraw)
_, lockedFinal, _ := vm.Balance(wireUser(t, maker), assetLUSD)
t.Logf("withdraw-all realized=%d, maker LUSD locked FROZEN=%d", realized, lockedFinal)
if lockedFinal != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 quote permanently frozen after withdraw-all, got locked=%d", lockedFinal)
}
t.Errorf("RED FINDING: %d quote unit(s) permanently FROZEN in maker.locked after full fill "+
"(unrecoverable by cancel or withdraw); conservation I=A+L masks it", lockedFinal)
}
// TestRedteam_FragmentationAmplifiesStranding shows an ADVERSARY (the taker) can
// scale the frozen amount by fragmenting the maker's fill: N single-unit sells
// against a BUY N @ 1.5 strand ceil(1.5N)-N = ceil(0.5N) quote in the maker's
// locked. Here N=10 => 15 locked, 10 charged, 5 frozen (33% of the reservation).
func TestRedteam_FragmentationAmplifiesStranding(t *testing.T) {
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(context.Background())
const (
maker = "maker"
taker = "taker"
)
pool := [32]byte{0xd0, 0x58} // "dust2"
accts := []string{maker, taker}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker, assetLUSD, 20),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUX, 20),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// Maker rests BUY 10 LUX @ 1.5 : lock = ceil(10*1.5) = 15 quote, avail 5.
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, 1.5, 10.0, maker))
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 5, 15)
// Adversarial taker fragments the fill into 10 single-unit sells. Each charges
// floor(1*1.5)=1 quote; the maker's 15 reservation is only ever debited by 10.
const N = 10
for i := 0; i < N; i++ {
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, false, 1.0, 1.0, taker))
}
availQ, lockedQ, _ := vm.Balance(wireUser(t, maker), assetLUSD)
t.Logf("after %d fragmented fills: maker LUSD avail=%d locked=%d (locked SHOULD be 0)", N, availQ, lockedQ)
// NOT A MINT: conservation I=A+L holds at fill time (before any withdraw).
assertConserved2(t, vm, "at fill time (no mint)", accts, assetLUX, assetLUSD, 20, 20)
// Maker bought all 10 LUX?
availBase, _, _ := vm.Balance(wireUser(t, maker), assetLUX)
if availBase != 10 {
t.Fatalf("maker did not fully fill: got %d base of 10", availBase)
}
// The frozen residual: ceil(15) - 10 charged = 5.
if lockedQ == 0 {
t.Skip("no residual stranded — behavior may have been fixed")
}
if lockedQ != 5 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected frozen amount: got %d, analysis predicts 5 (ceil(1.5*10)-10)", lockedQ)
}
// Withdraw everything: only the 5 available comes out; 5 stays frozen forever.
_, wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, withdrawTx(t, maker, assetLUSD, 1000))
realized := withdrawRealizedOf(wo, TxWithdraw)
_, lockedFinal, _ := vm.Balance(wireUser(t, maker), assetLUSD)
t.Errorf("RED FINDING (amplified): taker fragmentation FROZE %d/%d quote (%.0f%% of the maker's "+
"reservation) after full fill; withdraw realized only %d; I=A+L masks the loss",
lockedFinal, 15, float64(lockedFinal)/15*100, realized)
}