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fix: gofmt -s across repo (CI format check)

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This commit is contained in:
zeekay
2026-06-02 11:39:20 -07:00
parent a4d4509978
commit a3d77db033
50 changed files with 392 additions and 392 deletions
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pkg/api/auth.go
+2 -2
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@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func (s *Server) validateJWT(tokenStr string) (*JWTClaims, error) {
if claims.Issuer != "mpc.lux.network" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token issuer")
}
if !slices.Contains([]string(claims.Audience),"mpc-api") {
if !slices.Contains([]string(claims.Audience), "mpc-api") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token audience")
}
return claims, nil
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func (s *Server) validateRefreshToken(tokenStr string) (*JWTClaims, error) {
if claims.Issuer != "mpc.lux.network" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token issuer")
}
if !slices.Contains([]string(claims.Audience),"mpc-refresh") {
if !slices.Contains([]string(claims.Audience), "mpc-refresh") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token audience")
}
return claims, nil
pkg/api/handlers_approval.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ type approvalSession struct {
CreatedAt time.Time
ExpiresAt time.Time
mu sync.Mutex
sigs []approval.ApprovalSignature
completed bool
rejected bool
mu sync.Mutex
sigs []approval.ApprovalSignature
completed bool
rejected bool
rejectReason string
}
@@ -393,9 +393,9 @@ func (s *Server) handleApprovalCast(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
"status": ifElseString(sess.completed, "approved", "pending"),
"collected": len(sess.sigs),
"threshold": sess.Threshold,
"status": ifElseString(sess.completed, "approved", "pending"),
"collected": len(sess.sigs),
"threshold": sess.Threshold,
})
}
pkg/api/handlers_kms.go
+16 -16
View File
@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ import (
// ValidatorKeySet holds MPC wallet references for a validator's BLS and Corona keys.
type ValidatorKeySet struct {
ValidatorID string `json:"validatorId"`
BLSWalletID string `json:"blsWalletId"`
ValidatorID string `json:"validatorId"`
BLSWalletID string `json:"blsWalletId"`
CoronaWalletID string `json:"coronaWalletId"`
BLSPublicKey string `json:"blsPublicKey"`
BLSPublicKey string `json:"blsPublicKey"`
CoronaPublicKey string `json:"coronaPublicKey"`
Threshold int `json:"threshold"`
Parties int `json:"parties"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
Threshold int `json:"threshold"`
Parties int `json:"parties"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
}
type kmsGenerateRequest struct {
@@ -109,16 +109,16 @@ func (s *Server) handleKMSGenerate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
now := time.Now().UTC()
ks := &ValidatorKeySet{
ValidatorID: req.ValidatorID,
BLSWalletID: blsResult.WalletID,
ValidatorID: req.ValidatorID,
BLSWalletID: blsResult.WalletID,
CoronaWalletID: coronaResult.WalletID,
BLSPublicKey: blsResult.ECDSAPubKey,
BLSPublicKey: blsResult.ECDSAPubKey,
CoronaPublicKey: coronaResult.EDDSAPubKey,
Threshold: req.Threshold,
Parties: req.Parties,
Status: "active",
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
Threshold: req.Threshold,
Parties: req.Parties,
Status: "active",
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if s.db != nil {
pkg/api/handlers_mpc.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -629,13 +629,13 @@ func (s *Server) handleBiometricEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
var req struct {
CredentialID string `json:"credentialId"`
SignedResponse string `json:"signedResponse"`
AuthenticatorData string `json:"authenticatorData"`
ClientDataJSON string `json:"clientDataJSON"`
PublicKey string `json:"publicKey"`
Modality string `json:"modality"`
LivenessAttestation string `json:"livenessAttestation"` // base64 envelope
CredentialID string `json:"credentialId"`
SignedResponse string `json:"signedResponse"`
AuthenticatorData string `json:"authenticatorData"`
ClientDataJSON string `json:"clientDataJSON"`
PublicKey string `json:"publicKey"`
Modality string `json:"modality"`
LivenessAttestation string `json:"livenessAttestation"` // base64 envelope
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
pkg/api/handlers_sessions.go
+9 -9
View File
@@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ var errSessionConflict = errors.New("session modified concurrently")
// sessionResponse is the JSON shape specified in mpc.yaml.
type sessionResponse struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
WalletID string `json:"walletId"`
GrantedTo string `json:"grantedTo,omitempty"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes,omitempty"`
ValueLimit *string `json:"valueLimit,omitempty"`
OperationLimit *int `json:"operationLimit,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
WalletID string `json:"walletId"`
GrantedTo string `json:"grantedTo,omitempty"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes,omitempty"`
ValueLimit *string `json:"valueLimit,omitempty"`
OperationLimit *int `json:"operationLimit,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
RevokedAt *time.Time `json:"revokedAt,omitempty"`
}
pkg/api/handlers_settlement.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -272,8 +272,8 @@ func (s *Server) handleCreateWalletBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
}
var req struct {
Threshold int `json:"threshold"`
TotalShards int `json:"total_shards"`
Threshold int `json:"threshold"`
TotalShards int `json:"total_shards"`
Destinations []string `json:"destinations"`
UserWebAuthnPubKey string `json:"user_webauthn_pub_key,omitempty"` // P-256 public key for passkey-encrypted backup
}
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleCreateWalletBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
backup.TotalShards = req.TotalShards
backup.Status = "active"
backup.UserPasskeyFingerprint = userPasskeyPubKey
backup.EncryptedKeyShare = encrypted // AES-256-GCM ciphertext, decryptable ONLY with user's passkey
backup.EncryptedKeyShare = encrypted // AES-256-GCM ciphertext, decryptable ONLY with user's passkey
backup.EphemeralPublicKey = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ephPub.Bytes()) // needed for user-side ECDH
if err := backup.Create(); err != nil {
pkg/api/handlers_treasury.go
+10 -10
View File
@@ -58,16 +58,16 @@ const treasurySignPermission = "mpc.treasury.sign"
// --- Request / response shapes ---
type treasuryWalletResponse struct {
WalletID string `json:"walletId"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Address string `json:"address,omitempty"`
Chain string `json:"chain"`
Signers []treasurySignerView `json:"signers"`
Tiers []db.TreasuryTier `json:"tiers"`
RegulatorShard bool `json:"regulatorShard"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
Outstanding []outstandingOpView `json:"outstanding,omitempty"`
WalletID string `json:"walletId"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Address string `json:"address,omitempty"`
Chain string `json:"chain"`
Signers []treasurySignerView `json:"signers"`
Tiers []db.TreasuryTier `json:"tiers"`
RegulatorShard bool `json:"regulatorShard"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
Outstanding []outstandingOpView `json:"outstanding,omitempty"`
}
type treasurySignerView struct {
pkg/api/handlers_wallet.go
+36 -35
View File
@@ -78,18 +78,18 @@ type tieredWalletCreateRequest struct {
}
type tieredWalletResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
OrgID string `json:"orgId"`
Tier string `json:"tier"`
Chain string `json:"chain"`
Address string `json:"address"`
GroupPubKey string `json:"groupPubKey,omitempty"` // hex
Threshold wallet.ThresholdSpec `json:"threshold"`
Nodes []wallet.NodeBinding `json:"nodes"`
Policy wallet.TierPolicy `json:"policy"`
PolicyID string `json:"policyId,omitempty"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
ID string `json:"id"`
OrgID string `json:"orgId"`
Tier string `json:"tier"`
Chain string `json:"chain"`
Address string `json:"address"`
GroupPubKey string `json:"groupPubKey,omitempty"` // hex
Threshold wallet.ThresholdSpec `json:"threshold"`
Nodes []wallet.NodeBinding `json:"nodes"`
Policy wallet.TierPolicy `json:"policy"`
PolicyID string `json:"policyId,omitempty"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
}
func toTieredWalletResponse(w wallet.Wallet) tieredWalletResponse {
@@ -226,16 +226,17 @@ func (s *Server) handleTieredWalletListByTier(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
// signDecision represents the outcome of the tier-aware sign dispatch.
// Status: "auto_approved" | "approval_required" | "airgapped_queued" |
// "timelocked" | "rejected"
//
// "timelocked" | "rejected"
type signDecision struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
WalletID string `json:"walletId"`
Tier string `json:"tier"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
RequiredApprovals int `json:"requiredApprovals,omitempty"`
TimelockEndsAt *time.Time `json:"timelockEndsAt,omitempty"`
Usage *wallet.UsageView `json:"usage,omitempty"`
NextStep string `json:"nextStep,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status"`
WalletID string `json:"walletId"`
Tier string `json:"tier"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
RequiredApprovals int `json:"requiredApprovals,omitempty"`
TimelockEndsAt *time.Time `json:"timelockEndsAt,omitempty"`
Usage *wallet.UsageView `json:"usage,omitempty"`
NextStep string `json:"nextStep,omitempty"`
}
type tieredSignRequest struct {
@@ -250,20 +251,20 @@ type tieredSignRequest struct {
//
// The decision tree:
//
// 1. Quarantine: ALWAYS reject. No path to a signature.
// 2. Per-tx + daily + velocity limits: enforced first; over-cap rejects.
// 3. Airgapped tiers (cold, DR): caller must drive the airgap flow
// (pkg/airgap/session). Returns "airgapped_queued" with the next
// step. Sibling task #106 finalizes the producer hookup.
// 4. Timelocked tiers (cold 24h, contract_admin 48h, DR 7d, quarantine
// 72h): returns "timelocked" with TimelockEndsAt; the broadcast
// side picks it up after expiry. Sibling task ships the queue.
// 5. AutoApproval tiers (hot/gas/bridge/validator): allowlist check +
// amount under per-tx limit AND not over the large-amount escalation
// threshold → "auto_approved", counters are committed.
// 6. Otherwise: requires HumanApprovalsMin (or HumanApprovalsLarge if
// amount >= LargeAmount). Returns "approval_required". Sibling task
// ships the approval bundle verifier.
// 1. Quarantine: ALWAYS reject. No path to a signature.
// 2. Per-tx + daily + velocity limits: enforced first; over-cap rejects.
// 3. Airgapped tiers (cold, DR): caller must drive the airgap flow
// (pkg/airgap/session). Returns "airgapped_queued" with the next
// step. Sibling task #106 finalizes the producer hookup.
// 4. Timelocked tiers (cold 24h, contract_admin 48h, DR 7d, quarantine
// 72h): returns "timelocked" with TimelockEndsAt; the broadcast
// side picks it up after expiry. Sibling task ships the queue.
// 5. AutoApproval tiers (hot/gas/bridge/validator): allowlist check +
// amount under per-tx limit AND not over the large-amount escalation
// threshold → "auto_approved", counters are committed.
// 6. Otherwise: requires HumanApprovalsMin (or HumanApprovalsLarge if
// amount >= LargeAmount). Returns "approval_required". Sibling task
// ships the approval bundle verifier.
//
// KYT and CanonicalIntent verifier interface are referenced via the
// sibling LocalVerifier task — for now we surface the requirement in the
pkg/api/security_negative_test.go
+2 -3
View File
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ func TestCrossTenant_OrgIDSanitization(t *testing.T) {
input string
contains string // must NOT appear in the scoped key
}{
{"a:b:c", "org:a:b:c:"}, // triple colon injection
{"a:b:c", "org:a:b:c:"}, // triple colon injection
{"../etc/passwd", "org:../etc/passwd"}, // path traversal (colons don't apply but still test)
{"org\x00evil", "org:org\x00evil:"}, // null byte
{"org\x00evil", "org:org\x00evil:"}, // null byte
}
for _, tc := range cases {
@@ -508,4 +508,3 @@ func bytes_repeat(b byte, n int) []byte {
}
return out
}
pkg/api/security_regression_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ func TestBackupShardRequiresPasskey(t *testing.T) {
func TestBackupShardRejectsEmptyPasskey(t *testing.T) {
// Empty or invalid passkey pubkeys must be rejected.
invalidKeys := []string{
"", // empty
"not-base64!@#$", // garbage
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{0x04}), // too short
"", // empty
"not-base64!@#$", // garbage
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{0x04}), // too short
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 65)), // starts with 0x00, not 0x04
}
for _, key := range invalidKeys {
pkg/api/server.go
+10 -10
View File
@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ type HSMProvider interface {
}
type Server struct {
db *db.Database
mpc MPCBackend
hsm HSMProvider // optional: server-side HSM co-signing
tradeApproval *custody.TradeApprovalService
txTracker *txtracker.Tracker
jwtSecret []byte
oidcIssuers []string
webauthnRPID string
db *db.Database
mpc MPCBackend
hsm HSMProvider // optional: server-side HSM co-signing
tradeApproval *custody.TradeApprovalService
txTracker *txtracker.Tracker
jwtSecret []byte
oidcIssuers []string
webauthnRPID string
webauthnOrigins map[string]bool
// PubKey is the Ed25519 verifying key used to validate
// (or any other configured PAD-2 liveness provider) attestations
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ type Server struct {
// intended only for the extended-envelope rollout window.
// Configured via MPC_LIVENESS_BINDING=strict|lax (default strict).
livenessBindingMode webauthn.BindingMode
router chi.Router
replayGuard *replayGuard
router chi.Router
replayGuard *replayGuard
// approval is the executive-approval registry consumed by /v1/approval/*.
// Optional — when nil, those endpoints return 503. Wired via SetApproval.
pkg/api/zap_kms_server_auth_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func TestKMSZAP_Auth_RequiredHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
// Now a sign call should succeed.
respOp, signBody := callOp(t, client, peer, OpKMSSign, kmsZapSignRequest{
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
})
if respOp != OpKMSSign {
t.Fatalf("sign opcode: got 0x%04x want 0x%04x", respOp, OpKMSSign)
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func TestKMSZAP_Auth_RequiredRejectsMissing(t *testing.T) {
defer client.Stop()
op, body := callOp(t, client, peer, OpKMSSign, kmsZapSignRequest{
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
})
if op != OpKMSSign {
t.Fatalf("opcode echo: got 0x%04x want 0x%04x", op, OpKMSSign)
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ func TestKMSZAP_Auth_RequiredRejectsBadToken(t *testing.T) {
}
op, signBody := callOp(t, client, peer, OpKMSSign, kmsZapSignRequest{
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
})
if op != OpKMSSign {
t.Fatalf("opcode echo: got 0x%04x want 0x%04x", op, OpKMSSign)
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ func TestKMSZAP_Auth_AdvisoryAcceptsMissing(t *testing.T) {
defer client.Stop()
op, body := callOp(t, client, peer, OpKMSSign, kmsZapSignRequest{
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
VaultID: "v1", WalletID: "w1", Payload: []byte("x"),
})
if op != OpKMSSign {
t.Fatalf("opcode echo: got 0x%04x want 0x%04x", op, OpKMSSign)