luxfi/[email protected], luxfi/[email protected].2, luxfi/[email protected] and
luxfi/[email protected] were force-moved on 2026-07-15 after these files recorded
them, so every build stopped at SECURITY ERROR: checksum mismatch before
reaching a compiler. [email protected] was recorded in go.work.sum rather than
go.sum, which is why the workspace failed even once the module was clean.
The replacement bytes are ours: the go.mod each tag now serves is
byte-identical to the one at our own tag. go.sum held each tag's earlier
content.
Verified on a machine with the native libraries: go build ./... exits 0.
That also needed luxfi/threshold, this workspace's sibling, to carry the same
correction and to be current — protocols/reveal, which pkg/reveal imports,
landed there after this checkout was last updated.
sum.golang.org is append-only and still holds the ORIGINAL bytes, so these
versions can never verify against the public notary again. The durable fix is
to stop moving tags: a version is an address, and the remedy for a bad release
is the next patch, never the same number twice.
luxfi/threshold v1.12.7 added FROST(Ed25519, SHA-512), so Solana and TON finally
have a signable curve. The sessions named "EdDSA" were calling KeygenTaproot —
BIP-340 over secp256k1 — whose key is also 32 bytes, sails through the
len(EDDSAPubKey)==32 gate, and base58-encodes into a real-looking Solana address
the ring can never sign for.
⚠ A LIVE WRONG-ADDRESS BUG went with it: handlers_wallets served
addresses["ton"] = *wallet.SolAddress. A TON address is not a base58 pubkey — it
is workchain plus a hash of the wallet contract's StateInit, base64url with a
CRC16 — so the API was handing out an address that decodes to nothing. Deleted
rather than guessed; TON returns when its encoding is real.
The keygen tests used to call frost.KeygenEd25519 directly, which validated the
LIBRARY and not the daemon: reintroducing KeygenTaproot left every package
green. They now go through the production session, and so does a test that
constructs the real signing session and proves the caller's bytes reach the
protocol unhashed. Both original bugs reintroduced together fail 11 tests.
secp256k1 keygen changes from fail-open to fail-closed, and that is the one
behavioural change to the existing EVM/BTC path. An empty pubkey previously
meant any of nil config, marshal failure, kvstore.Put failure or keyinfo-save
failure — and was returned as SUCCESS, announcing addresses while fewer than
t+1 nodes hold a share. Applying fail-closed to Solana while leaving the
higher-value leg fail-open is incoherent.
Also: the KMS share classifier still keyed off the retired "frost:" prefix; the
CGGMP21 session published its own local failure onto the same first-wins subject
as the ring's verdict, so one node's failure could beat the ring's success; and
one 120s deadline shared across two sequential ceremonies starved the cheap leg.
NOT YET SPENDABLE. ConsensusKeyInfoStore.Save is the only RegisterKey caller and
hardcodes "secp256k1", and TriggerSign reads the curve from that field, so no
product entry point can reach Ed25519 signing. The address is correct; signing
it needs a wire-contract change shared with lux/wallet.
Dep-checksum tail left uncommitted after 5c4d5cb removed bls_keygen_session.go.
- main go.sum: luxfi/zap v0.8.1 + luxfi/age v1.4.0 h1 refresh (upstream same-version
tag re-cut; go mod verify = all modules verified, build green).
- e2e/go.mod + e2e/go.sum: go mod tidy churn (nats.go v1.50.0 -> v1.52.0 within v1,
added indirects) for the e2e test module.
- go.work.sum: workspace checksum sync.
GOWORK=off go build ./... exit 0; go mod verify clean.
Bump e2e submodule's luxfi/threshold pin (v1.5.5 → v1.9.9) to drop the only
remaining corona puller in this workspace. Removes the residual
'github.com/luxfi/corona v0.2.0/go.mod' hash line from go.work.sum.
Align go.work go directive to 1.26.4 to match both workspace siblings
(../threshold and ./e2e). No source code in this repo imported corona;
this was workspace-graph hygiene only. R-LWE threshold primitive is now
referenced exclusively via luxfi/corona upstream.
Per CTO directive: kill any alias, any shim. R-LWE threshold sig is
named Corona across all live code. Forward-only.
Sweep covers Go + TS + Sol + k8s YAML + JSON + LP markdown + skills
+ docs. Skipped: papers/audits/legal/licenses/blog/HISTORY (immutable
historical record).
Canonical S3 SDK across the stack is the Hanzo S3 fork at
github.com/hanzos3/go-sdk (package `s3`). Imports use an explicit
`s3 "github.com/hanzos3/go-sdk"` alias to avoid the `go-sdk` last-path-
segment mismatch with `package s3`.
`pkg/backup/s3.go` swept: `minio.Client` → `s3.Client`, `minio.New` →
`s3.New`, `minio.Options` → `s3.Options`, `minio.MakeBucketOptions` →
`s3.MakeBucketOptions`, `minio.PutObjectOptions` → `s3.PutObjectOptions`.
Field name `s3Client *s3.Client` is fine (no shadow with the package
qualifier).
Dropped stale `luxfi/zapdb v1.0.0` entries in go.work.sum that were
blocking go mod tidy (their hashes no longer match the proxy after
zapdb's own sweep).
No behavioral changes.
* build(mpc): GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2 alongside runtimesecret per SCALE_STANDARD
Per SCALE_STANDARD.md §2 (~/work/hanzo/hips/docs/SCALE_STANDARD.md) —
every Go production Dockerfile that emits JSON to a client builds with
GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2. Verified on hanzoai/zip's json_bench_test.go:
- Edge POST roundtrip: -12% time, -23% allocs
- Marshal-only: -22% time
- Unmarshal-only: -19% time, -25% allocs
GOEXPERIMENT is comma-separated, so jsonv2 composes cleanly with the
pre-existing runtimesecret experiment used by the MPC data plane.
* ci: switch workflows to lux-build (luxfi-scoped ARC pool)
Cross-org runs-on dispatch failure: hanzo-build-linux-amd64 scale set is
registered to github.com/hanzoai and silently rejects luxfi/* jobs.
Switch to lux-build (githubConfigUrl=github.com/luxfi, max 20).
* test/zapauth: deterministic invalid-signature test (was flaky)
TestZapAuthInvalidSignature flipped one base64 char of the signature
segment. ECDSA accepts a wrong sig with probability ≈ 1/2^6 per
single-char flip (alphabet is 64), making the test ~1.5% flake rate
in CI.
Fix: replace the entire signature segment with all-A's. Still
decodable as base64url but cryptographically guaranteed-invalid
bytes — Verify rejection is now deterministic.
Verified: ran -count=10 ./pkg/zapauth/ — all pass.
* deps: bump accel/crypto/corona/threshold/fhe/lens/math to current tags
* api/db: decomplect — KeccakAddress on Wallet / TreasuryWallet / KeygenResult
Wave 5 of the workspace-wide eth* naming purge.
pkg/db/models.go — Wallet + TreasuryWallet:
- New canonical KeccakAddress *string field with json `keccakAddress`
- EthAddress kept with json `ethAddress` as `// Deprecated:` alias
- NormalizeAddresses() method on both structs mirrors the two fields
via the package-private mirrorAddrPtrPair helper
pkg/api/server.go — KeygenResult (backend response):
- New canonical KeccakAddress string field with json `keccak_address`
- EthAddress kept with json `eth_address` as `// Deprecated:` alias
- NormalizeAddresses() method mirrors both fields
pkg/api/handlers_wallets.go, handlers_treasury.go, handlers_bridge.go,
handlers_mpc.go — all sites that constructed wallet rows from MPC
backend results now:
1. Call result.NormalizeAddresses() on the backend response so both
KeccakAddress / EthAddress carry the same value before copy
2. Copy both fields onto the persisted Wallet / TreasuryWallet row
3. Call wal.NormalizeAddresses() to ensure DB row has both
4. Read from the canonical KeccakAddress at response-construction
sites (toWalletResponse, treasury response, bridge response)
The "ethereum"/"lux"/"xrp" labels in addresses map (handleGetWalletAddresses)
are per-chain DISPLAY labels keyed by chain name a client knows;
the values are the Keccak-derived 20-byte address. Map keys NOT
decomplected here — they're per-chain UI labels, not internal naming.
Effect on the wire:
- API consumers reading wallet.ethAddress see the same value as
wallet.keccakAddress
- New consumers can switch to keccakAddress today
- ORM persistence stores both fields (eventually consistent via
NormalizeAddresses calls at handler boundaries)
Tests: pkg/api unit tests pass (1.8s); pkg/db has no test files.
Deprecation alias retention means downstream KMS / dashboards
keep working at every step of the migration.
Per CLAUDE.md x.x.x+1.
* strip KeccakAddress + EthAddress dual-field bridge (no aliases)
Forward-only completion of the workspace strip-aliases cascade. The
canonical JSON field is evmAddress, the Go field is EVMAddress. No
NormalizeAddresses helpers, no mirrorAddrPtrPair, no deprecated
KeccakAddress, no deprecated EthAddress.
Touched:
pkg/api/server.go KeygenResult drops KeccakAddress +
EthAddress + NormalizeAddresses
pkg/db/models.go Wallet drops KeccakAddress + EthAddress
TreasuryWallet drops KeccakAddress +
EthAddress
Drops NormalizeAddresses + mirrorAddrPtrPair
pkg/api/handlers_wallets.go rip mirror calls; only EVMAddress
populated on Wallet rows
pkg/api/handlers_treasury.go rip mirror calls on TreasuryWallet
pkg/api/handlers_mpc.go rip NormalizeAddresses calls; rename
filter("ethAddress=") → ("evmAddress=")
pkg/api/handlers_bridge.go local var keccakAddress → evmAddr
pkg/api/handlers_smart_wallets.go wallet.EthAddress → wallet.EVMAddress
pkg/api/treasury_test.go mock KeygenResult EthAddress → EVMAddress
pkg/api/zap_kms_server_test.go same
cmd/mpcd/main.go pubKeyToEthAddress → pubKeyToEVMAddress,
\"eth_address\" → \"evm_address\",
local var ethAddr → evmAddr, KeygenResult
EthAddress → EVMAddress field
Deps: bump luxfi/metric v1.5.1 → v1.5.7 to pick up ExponentialBuckets
(via transitive luxfi/threshold dep).
The value IS \"EVM-runtime account address\" — that's the data model.
The Keccak256(secp256k1 pubkey) derivation is HOW.
The two MPC files that still carried Corona names:
cmd/mpcd/main.go — comment ref to luxfi/corona
pkg/api/handlers_kms.go — ValidatorKeySet wire schema
handlers_kms.go renames:
ValidatorKeySet.CoronaWalletID → CoronaWalletID
ValidatorKeySet.CoronaPublicKey → CoronaPublicKey
JSON tags coronaWalletId/PubKey → coronaWalletId/PubKey
local `coronaWalletID` and the per-validator suffix
"validator-<id>-corona" → "validator-<id>-corona"
router switch `case "corona":` → `case "corona":`
cmd/mpcd/main.go: comment "luxfi/corona and luxfi/corona" was
collapsed to just "luxfi/corona" — the dispatcher's not-yet-impl
stub now references only the live R-LWE library.
Wire break, no compat layer (forwards-perfection policy):
KMS callers must re-issue requests with the new field names.
Build: go build ./... PASS.
Tests: pkg/api PASS 1.374s.
Red round 5 finding B1. The embedded dispatcher on --threshold-listen
was an anonymous local signing oracle:
1. Any process on the host could POST `{"method":"frost.sign",...}`
and obtain signatures with no auth gate (only the API on :9800
enforced MPC_INTERNAL_API_KEY).
2. An operator typo `MPC_THRESHOLD_LISTEN=0.0.0.0:7300` exposed it
cluster-wide.
3. Any SSRF inside mpcd pivoted into the dispatcher.
Fix mirrors the existing internal-API auth pattern (cmd/mpcd/main.go
line ~456):
- Auth token: read MPC_THRESHOLD_AUTH_TOKEN; if unset, derive a
deterministic per-cluster token from the node Ed25519 seed
(SHA-256(seed || "mpc-threshold-rpc") hex). All nodes share the
same key without extra config; log warns when derivation is used.
Server.SetAuthToken installs the gate.
- Loopback bind: refuse non-loopback addr unless
MPC_THRESHOLD_ALLOW_REMOTE=1 — operators must explicitly
acknowledge the exposure. Bare `:port` (= 0.0.0.0) is NOT loopback.
Also picks up luxfi/threshold v1.6.10 which removes the pulsar/corona
in-memory-token surface (Red HIGH B2) — pulsar.*/corona.* now return a
typed "not yet implemented" error.
Tests:
- TestIsThresholdLoopback locks the loopback predicate (8 cases:
127.0.0.1, [::1], localhost OK; 0.0.0.0, :port, RFC1918 refused).
- TestEmbeddedDispatcher_AuthGate proves 401 on missing/wrong token,
200 on valid token through the dispatcher mpcd installs.
4 tests pass in cmd/mpcd (was 2, +2).
mpcd is the production threshold daemon. With this commit it embeds
the JSON-RPC dispatcher from luxfi/threshold/pkg/thresholdd on a new
--threshold-listen flag (default 127.0.0.1:7300, MPC_THRESHOLD_LISTEN
env var). The dispatcher exposes every supported scheme:
cggmp21 (secp256k1 ECDSA, CGGMP21 fork)
frost (secp256k1 Schnorr, RFC 9591)
bls (BLS12-381 Shamir/Lagrange)
sr25519 (Ristretto255, via mpc node's own session — separate path)
pulsar (M-LWE / FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 threshold, via luxfi/corona/threshold)
corona (R-LWE / Corona, via luxfi/corona/threshold)
doerner (reserved; upstream protocol non-functional, returns explicit error)
Wire format matches teleport/mpc/src/signers/rpc.ts byte-for-byte:
POST / {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":N,"method":"<scheme>.<op>","params":{...}}
Methods per scheme: keygen / sign / verify. Public-key handles are
returned by keygen and bound on sign/verify.
Decomplecting note: the dispatcher carries zero policy. Profile
gating, auth, audit, and rate-limiting live on mpcd's existing API
surface (and on the cluster ingress in front of it). The threshold
listener is loopback by default; production exposure happens via the
KMS-facing ZAP server or the gateway.
There is no separate thresholdd daemon to deploy. The luxfi/threshold
repo's cmd/thresholdd remains as a developer / CI binary that imports
the same package — one wire, one implementation, two startup paths.
Tests: TestEmbeddedDispatcher_BLSRoundTrip (full keygen → sign →
verify → forgery rejection) and TestEmbeddedDispatcher_UnknownScheme
(-32601 method-not-found contract) both pass. README updated with the
new protocol table; full surface documented in
luxfi/threshold/LLM.md "thresholdd — unified JSON-RPC dispatcher".
Cancel was documented as "cancels a pending session belonging to the
caller's org" but the contract did not name HOW the implementation
enforces that. A loose implementation could:
- read session, transition state, then check org_id (TOCTOU window)
- distinguish "not yours" from "not found" in the error message
(enumeration oracle leaks the existence of cross-org sessions)
- skip the org predicate when a concurrent legitimate caller also
has the row open (race condition lets the wrong-org call win)
Tightened doc names the three required behaviors:
- orgID derived from ctx Claims, not caller-supplied
- SELECT-FOR-UPDATE + WHERE org_id = ctx.OrgID; mismatch returns
ErrSessionNotFound (same opaque response as unknown id)
- row-level CAS with the org predicate in WHERE, so two callers
cannot race the state transition
- idempotency on already-cancelled scoped to the SAME org
go.work bumped to 1.26.3 to satisfy the per-module go directive.
Adds threshold-signing transport so KMS can use mpcd as MPC backend.
Reuses ML-KEM-768 hybrid handshake from luxfi/kms/pkg/zap (#55) by
vendoring the same construction into mpc/pkg/zap — wire constants
(opcodes 0x00F0/0x00F1, HKDF info "kms/zap/v1/session", direction
tags) stay in lockstep with KMS.
New surface:
- pkg/zap: vendored handshake + session (forward-only convergent)
- pkg/api/zap_kms_server.go: KMS-facing ZAP node (opcodes
0x0001/0x0010/0x0011/0x0012/0x0020) wired onto MPCBackend
- cmd/mpcd: --kms-zap-listen flag (default :9970), enabled out of the
box; default-disable by passing empty string
Existing pkg/api/zap_server.go (dashboard event bus, opcodes 0x0060+)
is unchanged — different consumer, different port.
Closes the secrets-only mode gap on mainnet (#70).
Red Final N1 fix. Release() previously called only Attestation.Verify(nonce)
and ReleasePolicy.Permits() before sealing the session key. Neither step
performs the actual SEV-SNP / TDX / NRAS chain verification — AMD KDS
lookup, ARK→ASK→VCEK chain, NRAS JWT — leaving the #222 go-sev-guest
verifier as dead code on the release path. A worker that fabricates a
CompositeAttestation envelope whose Verify(nonce) returns true and whose
RIM/HW/issuer membership matches policy could harvest a session key
without ever presenting AMD-signed evidence.
Wire-in:
- kms.CompositeAttestation gains VerifyEvidence(ctx, opts...) returning
[]*attest.VerifiedReport. *attestation.CompositeAttestation already
implements this method (composite.go:320 → attest.Dispatch per blob).
- ReleaseRequest gains optional Ctx + AttestOptions for context plumbing
+ per-call policy (e.g. attest.WithExpectedReportData(nonce[:])).
- Release() calls VerifyEvidence between the cheap nonce check and the
policy permit step. Any chain failure → ErrAttestationChain joined
with ErrPolicyRefused via errors.Join. No silent acceptance.
- New sentinel ErrAttestationChain.
Tests (go test -v -short -race -count=1 -timeout 60s ./pkg/kms/...):
- all 14 existing TestRelease_/TestNonce_/TestAAD_ remain green
- NEW TestRelease_RefusesOnChainFailure: Verify(nonce)=true but
VerifyEvidence returns ErrChainInvalid → MUST surface
ErrAttestationChain wrapped under ErrPolicyRefused
- NEW TestRelease_AcceptsOnChainPass: paired happy-path so the
chain-step is the only difference, not a wiring regression
Also pulled in cherry-pick of canonical go-sev-guest sums (c4f1e22) so
cc/attest builds reproducibly outside the dirty local cache.
- Remove pkg/bridge/ (btc_watcher + orchestrator) — bridge/opnet-watcher
is the single source of truth for chain watching per CTO directive
- Add Handler() to API server for mounting on Hanzo Base
- MPC is signing-only; bridge is the control plane
Add HTML landing page at / route for mpc.lux.network showing:
- CGGMP21 and FROST protocol info
- Supported chains (BTC, ETH, LUX, SOL, XRPL, TON, etc.)
- Links to health, bridge dashboard, and API docs
Also update go.work to Go 1.26.1.
zeekay
