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zeekayandHanzo Dev
3ff4b4e9d9
mpcd implements only CGGMP21 (secp256k1 ECDSA), FROST (ed25519/ristretto), and LSS signing sessions — there is no bls12-381 threshold signing session. The KMS validator "bls" slot is secp256k1/CGGMP21; the "corona" slot is ed25519/FROST. Neither is bls12-381 aggregation nor post-quantum. A "post-quantum" claim over classical ed25519 is materially misleading. - deployments/customer-3of5/topology.yaml: the `bls` entry asserted curve=bls12-381, protocol=BLS-Threshold for "Lux consensus (validator signing)". Corrected to secp256k1/CGGMP21 (what is actually custodied) with a note that mpcd cannot threshold-sign bls12-381 and that Lux consensus BLS is a native per-validator key, never custodied here. (Customer manifest — highest priority.) - pkg/api/handlers_kms.go: the ValidatorKeySet doc called the custodied key a "Corona PQ-threshold key" — it is ed25519/FROST, not PQ and not the Corona R-LWE lattice protocol. Corrected. - README.md: added a "Validator key slots vs. engine protocols" note so the secp256k1/ed25519 custody slots are not read as the bls12-381/lattice engine protocols of the same name. Labeling only — no crypto change. The live 2-of-3 mpcd ECDSA is sound. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
140 lines
5.1 KiB
YAML
140 lines
5.1 KiB
YAML
# 3-of-5 Threshold Topology: Customer + Lux
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#
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# Topology:
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# Lux: 3 nodes (lux-0, lux-1, lux-2) -- operated by Lux
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# Customer: 2 nodes (cust-0, cust-1) -- operated by Customer
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# Threshold: 3 (any 3 nodes produce a valid signature)
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#
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# Security properties:
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# - Customer alone (2 nodes) CANNOT sign. Prevents rogue customer transactions.
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# - Lux alone (3 nodes) CAN sign. Required for operational/bridge/emergency use.
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# - Customer + 1 Lux node (3 nodes) CAN sign. Normal DAO governance flow.
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# - Single node compromise: attacker has 1 share, needs 2 more. No risk.
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# - Two node compromise (worst case): attacker needs 1 more. Still safe if
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# compromised nodes are on the same side (customer or lux).
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#
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# Trust model:
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# Lux holds signing majority. This is intentional for bridge/operational keys.
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# For DAO governance keys where customer must co-approve, use Safe multisig
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# on-chain (see safe-integration.md) to enforce customer participation even
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# when Lux holds threshold majority.
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#
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# Network topology:
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# Lux nodes run in lux-k8s cluster (lux-mpc-customer namespace).
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# Customer nodes run in customer's own infrastructure.
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# ZAP transport connects all 5 nodes over TLS (mTLS via Ed25519 identity keys).
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# Customer nodes connect to Lux nodes via public endpoint (mpc-customer.lux.network).
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#
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# Key types generated:
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# - ECDSA (secp256k1): Bitcoin, Ethereum/EVM, Lux C/X/P chains
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# - EdDSA (Ed25519): Solana, TON, Polkadot (via FROST)
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# - FROST (secp256k1): Bitcoin Taproot, Safe on-chain verification
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topology:
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name: "customer-3of5"
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threshold: 3
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total_nodes: 5
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nodes:
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- id: "lux-0"
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operator: "lux"
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p2p_port: 9999
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api_port: 9800
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data_dir: "/data/mpc/lux-0"
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- id: "lux-1"
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operator: "lux"
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p2p_port: 9999
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api_port: 9801
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data_dir: "/data/mpc/lux-1"
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- id: "lux-2"
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operator: "lux"
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p2p_port: 9999
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api_port: 9802
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data_dir: "/data/mpc/lux-2"
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- id: "cust-0"
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operator: "customer"
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p2p_port: 9999
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api_port: 9800
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data_dir: "/data/mpc/cust-0"
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- id: "cust-1"
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operator: "customer"
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p2p_port: 9999
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api_port: 9801
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data_dir: "/data/mpc/cust-1"
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protocols:
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ecdsa:
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curve: "secp256k1"
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protocol: "CGGMP21"
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chains:
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- { network: "BTC", name: "Bitcoin (Legacy/SegWit)" }
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- { network: "ETH", name: "Ethereum + all EVM chains" }
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- { network: "LUX", name: "Lux C/X/P chains" }
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- { network: "XRPL", name: "XRP Ledger" }
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notes: "Also supports LSS protocol for dynamic resharing"
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eddsa:
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curve: "ed25519"
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protocol: "FROST"
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chains:
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- { network: "SOL", name: "Solana" }
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- { network: "TON", name: "TON" }
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notes: "FROST Taproot mode produces BIP-340 compatible signatures"
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sr25519:
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curve: "ristretto255"
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protocol: "FROST"
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chains:
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- { network: "DOT", name: "Polkadot" }
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- { network: "KSM", name: "Kusama" }
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notes: "Schnorrkel/Ristretto255 via generic FROST over ristretto255 group"
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# CORRECTION: mpcd does NOT provide bls12-381 threshold aggregation. There
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# is no BLS signing session (only CGGMP21/FROST/LSS), so this deployment
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# cannot threshold-sign bls12-381. Lux consensus BLS is a NATIVE
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# per-validator bls12-381 key (PoP + aggregation) held by the validator
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# itself, never threshold-custodied by this service. Validator signing that
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# IS custodied here is secp256k1/CGGMP21 threshold ECDSA (see `ecdsa`).
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bls:
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curve: "secp256k1"
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protocol: "CGGMP21"
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chains:
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- { network: "LUX", name: "Lux validator ECDSA (bridge/custody signing — NOT consensus)" }
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notes: "secp256k1 threshold ECDSA. NOT bls12-381 aggregation; consensus BLS is native, not custodied here."
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frost_taproot:
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curve: "secp256k1"
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protocol: "FROST"
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chains:
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- { network: "BTC", name: "Bitcoin Taproot (BIP-340/341)" }
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safe_verifiable: true
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notes: "On-chain FROST.sol verification via ecrecover trick"
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lss:
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curve: "secp256k1"
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protocol: "LSS"
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chains:
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- { network: "BTC", name: "Bitcoin (dynamic resharing)" }
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- { network: "ETH", name: "Ethereum (dynamic resharing)" }
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notes: "Supports t/n changes without key regeneration"
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# DKG generates keys for ALL protocols in a single ceremony.
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# Each wallet gets: ECDSA + EdDSA + SR25519 + BLS key shares.
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# Protocol selection is automatic based on target chain (see GetNetworkKeyType).
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#
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# Chain → Protocol mapping:
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# BTC (legacy/segwit) → CGGMP21 (secp256k1)
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# BTC (taproot) → FROST (secp256k1, BIP-340)
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# ETH / all EVM → CGGMP21 (secp256k1)
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# LUX C/X/P → CGGMP21 (secp256k1)
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# LUX consensus → BLS-Threshold (bls12-381)
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# SOL → FROST (ed25519)
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# TON → FROST (ed25519)
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# XRPL → CGGMP21 (secp256k1)
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# DOT / KSM → FROST (ristretto255/sr25519)
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# Any + resharing → LSS (secp256k1)
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