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Adds the topology contract that lets a fund run mpcd as its own private
cluster — no Lux primary network registration, no shared M-Chain audit
ledger — using the same code path and the same operator surface.
Mode flag at cmd/mpcd/main.go:
--network=primary|private # registration target
--audit-store=mchain|local-worm|... # audit log destination
--registrar-url, --registrar-auth # primary-mode announcement
--audit-worm-path, --audit-mchain-url # backend selectors
pkg/audit:
- Append-only Merkle hash chain. Tampering with any historical event
invalidates every subsequent hash. Canonical bytes use fixed-order
concatenation (json.Marshal map ordering is non-deterministic).
- WORMDispatcher: NDJSON append, replay-on-start, fsync per Append.
- MChainDispatcher: batched POST of (batchHash, fromSeq, toSeq) to a
configurable anchor RPC.
- compositeDispatcher: fan-out to multiple legs with per-leg sealing.
- S3 Glacier Vault / Azure Immutable / GCS Object Lock dispatchers
fail closed — wired into the flag surface but gated behind the
cloud-audit build tag, no silent fallback.
pkg/identity/bootstrap.go: identity creation + (primary-mode only)
registrar announcement. Same on-disk format as the previous
loadOrGenerateIdentity (which is now removed); private mode is silent.
deployments/k8s-private: fund-only Kustomize overlay. Standalone
namespace, NetworkPolicy that blocks egress to anything outside the
fund's VPC, hardware-WORM PVC for the audit log, KMS-driven secret
template.
deployments/k8s-primary: env-var patch overlay on the existing lux-mpc
base. composite(local-worm,mchain) by default.
deployments/terraform/{aws,gcp,azure}: VPC + audit storage modules.
terraform validate passes; EKS/GKE/AKS + HSM modules are stubbed and
not yet plan-tested.
deployments/onprem/README.md: WORM storage + PKCS#11 HSM checklist.
Tests (14 total, all passing):
pkg/audit: 6/6 (chain, WORM replay, MChain batching, composite,
cloud stubs fail loud, double-seal rejected)
pkg/identity: 4/4 (private no-call, primary call, primary empty
URL no-op, primary registrar 503 surfaces)
internal/privatemode: 4/4 (no registrar traffic, restart, tamper-detect,
cloud stubs fail loud)
Companion runbook in lux/papers/lux-private-mpc-deployment/
(LaTeX, 5 pages, tectonic-clean).
183 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
183 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
package e2e
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/approval"
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)
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// e2eIntent is the test stand-in for pkg/intent.CanonicalIntent.
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type e2eIntent struct {
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body []byte
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}
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func (i *e2eIntent) Digest() [32]byte { return sha256.Sum256(i.body) }
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func (i *e2eIntent) Bytes() []byte { return i.body }
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func enableLocalDev(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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prevEnv := os.Getenv("MPC_ENV")
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prevFlag := os.Getenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL")
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", prevEnv)
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os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", prevFlag)
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})
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os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", "test")
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os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", "true")
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}
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// TestApproval_E2E_2of3_LocalDev exercises the full collect-and-verify flow
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// with three independent approver keys, all backed by the local-dev
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// software signer. This is the smoke test the CI pipeline runs without
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// any HSM infrastructure.
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func TestApproval_E2E_2of3_LocalDev(t *testing.T) {
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enableLocalDev(t)
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dev, err := approval.NewLocalDev(nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewLocalDev: %v", err)
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}
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o := approval.NewOrchestrator([]approval.ApprovalProvider{dev})
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for _, a := range []string{"[email protected]", "[email protected]", "[email protected]"} {
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if err := o.Bind(approval.ApproverBinding{
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ApproverID: a,
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ProviderName: "local-dev",
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Bind(%s): %v", a, err)
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}
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}
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intent := &e2eIntent{body: []byte("transfer 1000 LUX to grant recipient")}
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bundle, err := o.CollectApprovals(context.Background(), intent,
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[]string{"[email protected]", "[email protected]", "[email protected]"}, 2)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CollectApprovals: %v", err)
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}
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if len(bundle) < 2 {
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t.Fatalf("bundle has %d sigs, want >= 2", len(bundle))
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}
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ok, err := o.VerifyBundle(context.Background(), intent, bundle, 2)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("VerifyBundle: %v", err)
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}
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("VerifyBundle returned false")
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}
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}
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// TestApproval_E2E_MixedProviders binds approvers across TWO distinct
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// providers — local-dev (Ed25519) and MLDSA (post-quantum). This is the
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// configuration a real fund would run: every executive uses a *different*
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// device class so a single supply-chain compromise cannot reach all of them.
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func TestApproval_E2E_MixedProviders(t *testing.T) {
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enableLocalDev(t)
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dev, err := approval.NewLocalDev(nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewLocalDev: %v", err)
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}
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pq, err := approval.NewMLDSA(nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewMLDSA: %v", err)
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}
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if err := pq.(*approval.MLDSAProvider).Enroll("[email protected]", nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("MLDSA.Enroll: %v", err)
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}
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o := approval.NewOrchestrator([]approval.ApprovalProvider{dev, pq})
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o.Bind(approval.ApproverBinding{ApproverID: "[email protected]", ProviderName: "local-dev"})
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o.Bind(approval.ApproverBinding{ApproverID: "[email protected]", ProviderName: "mldsa"})
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intent := &e2eIntent{body: []byte("multi-provider approval")}
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bundle, err := o.CollectApprovals(context.Background(), intent, []string{"[email protected]", "[email protected]"}, 2)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CollectApprovals: %v", err)
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}
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if len(bundle) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("bundle has %d, want 2", len(bundle))
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}
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// Confirm they used different providers — provenance check.
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seen := map[string]bool{}
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for _, sig := range bundle {
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seen[sig.Provider] = true
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}
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if !seen["local-dev"] || !seen["mldsa"] {
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t.Fatalf("missing provider in bundle: %+v", seen)
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}
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ok, err := o.VerifyBundle(context.Background(), intent, bundle, 2)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("VerifyBundle: %v", err)
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}
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("VerifyBundle = false")
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}
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}
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// TestApproval_E2E_TamperedIntentRejected confirms re-verifying a bundle
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// against a different intent payload fails — digest binding holds.
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func TestApproval_E2E_TamperedIntentRejected(t *testing.T) {
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enableLocalDev(t)
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dev, err := approval.NewLocalDev(nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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o := approval.NewOrchestrator([]approval.ApprovalProvider{dev})
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o.Bind(approval.ApproverBinding{ApproverID: "alice", ProviderName: "local-dev"})
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original := &e2eIntent{body: []byte("send 10 LUX to alice")}
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bundle, err := o.CollectApprovals(context.Background(), original, []string{"alice"}, 1)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CollectApprovals: %v", err)
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}
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tampered := &e2eIntent{body: []byte("send 1000000 LUX to attacker")}
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ok, _ := o.VerifyBundle(context.Background(), tampered, bundle, 1)
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if ok {
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t.Fatal("VerifyBundle accepted bundle for tampered intent — replay attack")
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}
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}
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// TestApproval_E2E_FactoryRejectsLocalDevInProduction is the production
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// safety guard test. The factory MUST refuse local-dev when MPC_ENV=production.
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func TestApproval_E2E_FactoryRejectsLocalDevInProduction(t *testing.T) {
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prevEnv := os.Getenv("MPC_ENV")
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prevFlag := os.Getenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL")
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", prevEnv)
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os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", prevFlag)
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})
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os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", "production")
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os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", "")
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if _, err := approval.NewProvider("local-dev", nil); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("factory built local-dev in production: production safety guard failed")
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} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "forbidden in production") {
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t.Fatalf("error %q does not mention production", err)
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}
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}
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// TestApproval_E2E_DispatchTimeout asserts CollectApprovals returns
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// promptly when context expires before threshold met.
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func TestApproval_E2E_DispatchTimeout(t *testing.T) {
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enableLocalDev(t)
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dev, _ := approval.NewLocalDev(nil)
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o := approval.NewOrchestrator([]approval.ApprovalProvider{dev})
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o.Bind(approval.ApproverBinding{ApproverID: "alice", ProviderName: "local-dev"})
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
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defer cancel()
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intent := &e2eIntent{body: []byte("deadline test")}
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// local-dev signs immediately so this should succeed even with a tight deadline.
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if _, err := o.CollectApprovals(ctx, intent, []string{"alice"}, 1); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CollectApprovals(short deadline): %v", err)
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}
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}
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