mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/mpc.git
synced 2026-09-24 00:26:24 +00:00
Solana addresses were correct and receive-only: ConsensusKeyInfoStore.Save was the only RegisterKey caller and hardcoded "secp256k1", and TriggerSign read the curve from that field, so no product entry point could reach Ed25519 signing. The hardcode is not fixed, it is UNREPRESENTABLE. transport.KeyInfo.KeyType is deleted — the record carries one public key per curve and a PublicKeyFor(curve) — and RegisterKey lost its keyType parameter, so there is no longer a place to state a curve wrongly. A scalar KeyType was the wrong shape anyway: one keygen ceremony produces BOTH a secp256k1 and an Ed25519 key, so "what curve is this wallet" has no single answer. The request carries the network instead, and ONE table maps it to a curve, with NO default arm — KeyTypeForNetwork returns ErrUnknownNetwork rather than guessing. That is the point: the old default returned secp256k1 for anything unrecognized, which is how a Solana request would have been signed with the wrong key. /sign's 32-byte clamp becomes the SCHEME's rule rather than the endpoint's: secp256k1 signs a digest and requires exactly 32 bytes, Ed25519 signs the message at any length. /sign no longer accepts key_type at all — two ways to say the curve is the misuse being removed — and Network is bound into the idempotency fingerprint, so the same bytes for SOL and ETH conflict instead of sharing one cached signature from a different key. ⚠ The trap this nearly shipped with: every pre-existing KeyInfo record has EMPTY public keys, because the old Save wrote "", "". A naive "does this wallet have this curve" gate would have refused every existing wallet on every curve. The check is gated on RecordsCurves() — a record naming no curve denies none, and the missing share stays the thing that fails closed. Verified end to end, not by mirroring: a Solana request through ConsensusMPCBackend.TriggerSign with a real 2-of-3 FROST ring produces a signature crypto/ed25519.Verify accepts, over a 63-byte message so any reintroduced clamp or pre-hash fails it; ETH/EVM/BTC/LUX still route to secp256k1 and must RECOVER to the wallet's key. Four mutations tried, all caught. Behavioral risk worth naming: an unrecognized chain string now fails its transaction closed rather than signing with a default. That is correct, and the real fix is validating chain at POST /v1/transactions.
328 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
328 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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"github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/db"
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"github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/types"
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)
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func (s *Server) handleCreateTransaction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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orgID := getOrgID(r.Context())
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userID := getUserID(r.Context())
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var req struct {
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WalletID string `json:"wallet_id"`
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TxType string `json:"tx_type"`
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Chain string `json:"chain"`
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ToAddress string `json:"to_address"`
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Amount string `json:"amount"`
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Token string `json:"token,omitempty"`
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RawTx string `json:"raw_tx,omitempty"`
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RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
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Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
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}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
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return
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}
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if req.WalletID == "" || req.Chain == "" || req.TxType == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "wallet_id, tx_type, and chain are required")
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return
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}
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// Replay protection: require request_id and check freshness
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if reason := s.replayGuard.check(req.RequestID, req.Timestamp); reason != "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, reason)
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return
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}
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// Verify wallet
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wallet, err := orm.Get[db.Wallet](s.db.ORM, req.WalletID)
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if err != nil || wallet.OrgID != orgID {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "wallet not found")
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return
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}
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// Run policy engine
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policies, err := s.loadPolicies(r.Context(), orgID, nil)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load policies")
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return
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}
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decision := evaluateTransaction(req.Amount, req.Chain, req.ToAddress, policies)
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status := "pending_approval"
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if decision.Action == "approve" {
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status = "approved"
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} else if decision.Action == "deny" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "transaction denied by policy: "+decision.Reason)
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return
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}
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var rawTx []byte
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if req.RawTx != "" {
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rawTx, _ = hex.DecodeString(req.RawTx)
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}
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walletID := req.WalletID
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tx := orm.New[db.Transaction](s.db.ORM)
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tx.OrgID = orgID
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tx.WalletID = &walletID
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tx.TxType = req.TxType
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tx.Chain = req.Chain
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tx.ToAddress = nilIfEmpty(req.ToAddress)
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tx.Amount = nilIfEmpty(req.Amount)
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tx.Token = nilIfEmpty(req.Token)
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tx.RawTx = rawTx
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tx.Status = status
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tx.InitiatedBy = nilIfEmpty(userID)
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tx.TargetConfirms = 12 // default
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// Record initial state transition
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now := time.Now()
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actor := userID
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tx.StatusHistory = []db.StatusTransition{{
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From: "", To: status, Timestamp: now,
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Detail: "transaction created", Actor: nilIfEmpty(actor),
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}}
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if err := tx.Create(); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create transaction: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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txID := tx.Id()
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if status == "approved" {
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go s.signAndBroadcast(txID, orgID)
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}
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s.fireWebhook(r.Context(), orgID, "tx.pending", tx)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, tx)
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}
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func (s *Server) handleListTransactions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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orgID := getOrgID(r.Context())
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statusFilter := r.URL.Query().Get("status")
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chain := r.URL.Query().Get("chain")
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q := orm.TypedQuery[db.Transaction](s.db.ORM).
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Filter("orgId=", orgID).
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Order("-createdAt").
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Limit(100)
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if statusFilter != "" {
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q = q.Filter("status=", statusFilter)
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}
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if chain != "" {
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q = q.Filter("chain=", chain)
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}
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txs, err := q.GetAll(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "database error")
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return
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}
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if txs == nil {
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txs = []*db.Transaction{}
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, txs)
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}
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func (s *Server) handleGetTransaction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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orgID := getOrgID(r.Context())
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txID := urlParam(r, "id")
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tx, err := orm.Get[db.Transaction](s.db.ORM, txID)
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if err != nil || tx.OrgID != orgID {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "transaction not found")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, tx)
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}
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func (s *Server) handleApproveTransaction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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orgID := getOrgID(r.Context())
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userID := getUserID(r.Context())
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role := getRole(r.Context())
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txID := urlParam(r, "id")
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tx, err := orm.Get[db.Transaction](s.db.ORM, txID)
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if err != nil || tx.OrgID != orgID || tx.Status != "pending_approval" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "transaction not found or not pending approval")
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return
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}
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// Deduplicate: don't count the same approver twice
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for _, id := range tx.ApprovedBy {
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if id == userID {
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writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "already approved")
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return
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}
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}
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// Reject self-approval: initiator cannot be the sole approver
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if tx.InitiatedBy != nil && *tx.InitiatedBy == userID && len(tx.ApprovedBy) == 0 {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "initiator cannot self-approve")
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return
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}
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// Enforce approver role requirements from policies
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policies, _ := s.loadPolicies(r.Context(), orgID, nil)
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decision := evaluateTransaction(
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strFromPtr(tx.Amount), tx.Chain, strFromPtr(tx.ToAddress), policies,
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)
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requiredApprovers := decision.RequiredApprovers
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if requiredApprovers < 1 {
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requiredApprovers = 1
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}
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// Check if user's role is allowed to approve for the matching policy
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if len(decision.ApproverRoles) > 0 {
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allowed := false
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for _, r := range decision.ApproverRoles {
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if r == role {
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allowed = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !allowed {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "your role ("+role+") is not authorized to approve this transaction")
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return
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}
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}
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tx.ApprovedBy = append(tx.ApprovedBy, userID)
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if err := tx.Update(); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to approve transaction")
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return
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}
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if len(tx.ApprovedBy) >= requiredApprovers {
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tx.RecordTransition("approved",
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fmt.Sprintf("quorum reached: %d/%d approvals", len(tx.ApprovedBy), requiredApprovers),
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&userID)
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if err := tx.Update(); err == nil {
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go s.signAndBroadcast(txID, orgID)
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}
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}
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s.fireWebhook(r.Context(), orgID, "tx.approved", map[string]string{
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"tx_id": txID,
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"approved_by": userID,
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})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "approved"})
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}
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func (s *Server) handleRejectTransaction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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orgID := getOrgID(r.Context())
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userID := getUserID(r.Context())
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txID := urlParam(r, "id")
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var req struct {
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Reason string `json:"reason"`
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}
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json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req)
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tx, err := orm.Get[db.Transaction](s.db.ORM, txID)
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if err != nil || tx.OrgID != orgID || tx.Status != "pending_approval" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "transaction not found or not pending")
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return
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}
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tx.RecordTransition("rejected", fmt.Sprintf("rejected: %s", req.Reason), &userID)
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tx.RejectedBy = nilIfEmpty(userID)
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tx.RejectionReason = nilIfEmpty(req.Reason)
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if err := tx.Update(); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to reject transaction")
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return
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}
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s.fireWebhook(r.Context(), orgID, "tx.rejected", map[string]string{
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"tx_id": txID,
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"reason": req.Reason,
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})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "rejected"})
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}
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func (s *Server) signAndBroadcast(txID, orgID string) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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tx, err := orm.Get[db.Transaction](s.db.ORM, txID)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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if tx.WalletID == nil {
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return
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}
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wallet, err := orm.Get[db.Wallet](s.db.ORM, *tx.WalletID)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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sys := "system"
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// The transaction's own chain selects the curve. Resolve it BEFORE marking
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// the transaction as signing: a chain nobody recorded a curve for has no
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// determinate signature, and the tx must fail on that rather than be
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// signed with whichever curve happened to be the default.
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network, err := types.ParseNetwork(tx.Chain)
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if err != nil {
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tx.RecordTransition("failed", "signing refused: "+err.Error(), &sys)
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tx.Update()
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s.fireWebhook(ctx, orgID, "tx.failed", map[string]string{"tx_id": txID, "error": err.Error()})
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return
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}
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tx.RecordTransition("signing", "MPC threshold signing initiated", &sys)
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tx.Update()
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result, err := s.mpc.TriggerSign(orgID, wallet.WalletID, network, tx.RawTx)
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if err != nil {
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tx.RecordTransition("failed", "signing failed: "+err.Error(), &sys)
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tx.Update()
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s.fireWebhook(ctx, orgID, "tx.failed", map[string]string{"tx_id": txID, "error": err.Error()})
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return
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}
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now := time.Now()
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tx.SignatureR = nilIfEmpty(result.R)
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tx.SignatureS = nilIfEmpty(result.S)
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tx.SignatureEdDSA = nilIfEmpty(result.Signature)
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tx.SignedAt = &now
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tx.RecordTransition("signed", "threshold signature complete", &sys)
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if tx.TargetConfirms == 0 {
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tx.TargetConfirms = 12 // default confirmation target
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}
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tx.Update()
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s.fireWebhook(ctx, orgID, "tx.signed", map[string]string{"tx_id": txID})
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// If we have a tx hash, start tracking for on-chain confirmation.
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// The tx hash is set by the caller (bridge handler, etc.) after broadcast.
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// For direct MPC-signed txs, the caller should call Track() explicitly.
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if tx.TxHash != nil && *tx.TxHash != "" {
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if err := s.txTracker.Track(txID, orgID, *tx.TxHash, tx.Chain); err != nil {
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s.fireWebhook(ctx, orgID, "tx.track_error", map[string]string{
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"tx_id": txID, "error": err.Error(),
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})
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}
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}
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}
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func strFromPtr(s *string) string {
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if s == nil {
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return ""
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}
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return *s
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}
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