Files
mpc/pkg/approval/provider_yubihsm.go
zeekay 3bb399cbdd mpc: deployment-mode flag + audit dispatcher for fund-private clusters
Adds the topology contract that lets a fund run mpcd as its own private
cluster — no Lux primary network registration, no shared M-Chain audit
ledger — using the same code path and the same operator surface.

Mode flag at cmd/mpcd/main.go:
  --network=primary|private              # registration target
  --audit-store=mchain|local-worm|...    # audit log destination
  --registrar-url, --registrar-auth      # primary-mode announcement
  --audit-worm-path, --audit-mchain-url  # backend selectors

pkg/audit:
  - Append-only Merkle hash chain. Tampering with any historical event
    invalidates every subsequent hash. Canonical bytes use fixed-order
    concatenation (json.Marshal map ordering is non-deterministic).
  - WORMDispatcher: NDJSON append, replay-on-start, fsync per Append.
  - MChainDispatcher: batched POST of (batchHash, fromSeq, toSeq) to a
    configurable anchor RPC.
  - compositeDispatcher: fan-out to multiple legs with per-leg sealing.
  - S3 Glacier Vault / Azure Immutable / GCS Object Lock dispatchers
    fail closed — wired into the flag surface but gated behind the
    cloud-audit build tag, no silent fallback.

pkg/identity/bootstrap.go: identity creation + (primary-mode only)
registrar announcement. Same on-disk format as the previous
loadOrGenerateIdentity (which is now removed); private mode is silent.

deployments/k8s-private: fund-only Kustomize overlay. Standalone
namespace, NetworkPolicy that blocks egress to anything outside the
fund's VPC, hardware-WORM PVC for the audit log, KMS-driven secret
template.

deployments/k8s-primary: env-var patch overlay on the existing lux-mpc
base. composite(local-worm,mchain) by default.

deployments/terraform/{aws,gcp,azure}: VPC + audit storage modules.
terraform validate passes; EKS/GKE/AKS + HSM modules are stubbed and
not yet plan-tested.

deployments/onprem/README.md: WORM storage + PKCS#11 HSM checklist.

Tests (14 total, all passing):
  pkg/audit:           6/6  (chain, WORM replay, MChain batching, composite,
                             cloud stubs fail loud, double-seal rejected)
  pkg/identity:        4/4  (private no-call, primary call, primary empty
                             URL no-op, primary registrar 503 surfaces)
  internal/privatemode: 4/4 (no registrar traffic, restart, tamper-detect,
                             cloud stubs fail loud)

Companion runbook in lux/papers/lux-private-mpc-deployment/
(LaTeX, 5 pages, tectonic-clean).
2025-12-28 16:20:40 -08:00

153 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2020-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package approval
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
luxhsm "github.com/luxfi/hsm"
)
// YubiHSMProvider produces ECDSA-P256 approval signatures via a Yubico
// YubiHSM 2 device. The device is reached over the yubihsm-connector
// daemon (default http://127.0.0.1:12345) using the yubihsm-shell tool.
//
// Configuration:
//
// connector_url — yubihsm-connector address (default "http://127.0.0.1:12345").
// auth_key_id — YubiHSM authentication object ID (decimal).
// password — session password (KMS-supplied).
// algorithm — signing algorithm ("ecdsa-sha256", "ed25519").
//
// Approver enrollment maps approverID -> YubiHSM object ID + cached SPKI
// public key. Object IDs are provisioned out-of-band with `yubihsm-shell
// put-asymmetric-key` (or generate-asymmetric-key for on-device key gen).
type YubiHSMProvider struct {
signer luxhsm.Signer
mu sync.RWMutex
identity map[string]yubihsmEntry
}
type yubihsmEntry struct {
ObjectID string // YubiHSM object ID ("12", "0x000c").
PubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
PubKeyDER []byte
}
// NewYubiHSM constructs a YubiHSMProvider. The underlying luxfi/hsm
// signer handles wire-protocol details (session auth, AES-CMAC, AES-CBC).
func NewYubiHSM(config map[string]string) (ApprovalProvider, error) {
signer, err := luxhsm.NewSigner("yubihsm", config)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("approval/yubihsm: %w", err)
}
return &YubiHSMProvider{
signer: signer,
identity: make(map[string]yubihsmEntry),
}, nil
}
func (p *YubiHSMProvider) Provider() string { return "yubihsm" }
// Enroll registers approverID -> objectID with a pinned PKIX-encoded
// ECDSA P-256 public key. The public key MUST be pulled from the
// YubiHSM at enrollment time (yubihsm-shell get-public-key) so the
// device cannot impersonate a different signer later.
func (p *YubiHSMProvider) Enroll(approverID, objectID string, pubKeyDER []byte) error {
pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(pubKeyDER)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("approval/yubihsm: parse public key: %w", err)
}
ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return errors.New("approval/yubihsm: enrolled key is not ECDSA")
}
if ecPub.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
return fmt.Errorf("approval/yubihsm: unsupported curve %s (want P-256)", ecPub.Curve.Params().Name)
}
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.identity[approverID] = yubihsmEntry{
ObjectID: objectID,
PubKey: ecPub,
PubKeyDER: pubKeyDER,
}
return nil
}
// EnrollPEM accepts a PEM-encoded public key (typical output of
// `yubihsm-shell get-public-key --out-format=PEM`).
func (p *YubiHSMProvider) EnrollPEM(approverID, objectID string, pemBytes []byte) error {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
return errors.New("approval/yubihsm: invalid PEM")
}
return p.Enroll(approverID, objectID, block.Bytes)
}
func (p *YubiHSMProvider) GetPublicIdentity(_ context.Context, approverID string) (PublicIdentity, error) {
p.mu.RLock()
defer p.mu.RUnlock()
entry, ok := p.identity[approverID]
if !ok {
return PublicIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/yubihsm: approver %q not enrolled", approverID)
}
return PublicIdentity{
ApproverID: approverID,
Provider: p.Provider(),
PublicKey: entry.PubKeyDER,
Algorithm: AlgorithmECDSAP256,
}, nil
}
func (p *YubiHSMProvider) ApproveIntent(ctx context.Context, approverID string, intent CanonicalIntent) (ApprovalSignature, error) {
p.mu.RLock()
entry, ok := p.identity[approverID]
p.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return ApprovalSignature{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/yubihsm: approver %q not enrolled", approverID)
}
digest := intent.Digest()
sig, err := p.signer.Sign(ctx, entry.ObjectID, intent.Bytes())
if err != nil {
return ApprovalSignature{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/yubihsm: sign: %w", err)
}
return ApprovalSignature{
ApproverID: approverID,
Provider: p.Provider(),
IntentDigest: digest,
Signature: sig,
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
Algorithm: AlgorithmECDSAP256,
}, nil
}
func (p *YubiHSMProvider) VerifyApproval(_ context.Context, intent CanonicalIntent, sig ApprovalSignature) (bool, error) {
if sig.Provider != p.Provider() || sig.Algorithm != AlgorithmECDSAP256 {
return false, nil
}
digest := intent.Digest()
if digest != sig.IntentDigest {
return false, nil
}
p.mu.RLock()
entry, ok := p.identity[sig.ApproverID]
p.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return false, nil
}
h := sha256.Sum256(intent.Bytes())
return ecdsa.VerifyASN1(entry.PubKey, h[:], sig.Signature), nil
}