mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/mpc.git
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zeekay
3dece63ca2
Fixes all findings from the Blue Team defensive security review of the → custody architecture transition. HIGH: - S-1: Implement P-256 ECDH + AES-256-GCM encryption of passkey backup shards - W-2: Reject unparseable WebAuthn public keys (was silently skipping verification) - O-1: Add Ed25519 binary signature verification package (pkg/integrity) MEDIUM: - W-1: Validate attestation is a real P-256 curve point, not raw attestation object - W-3: Add origin validation to all WebAuthn flows (register, verify, trade approve) - N-2: Remove plaintext TCP fallback from MPC node transport (TLS mandatory) - K-1: Fail-closed on empty/whitespace orgID (prevents cross-tenant key leakage) - A-1: Make AuditEntry immutable (Update/Delete return error) - A-2: Add MPC-level signing audit log (wallet, message hash, intent, trigger) - O-3: Invalidate backup shards after key reshare (stale shares are useless) - O-2: Reject env/file password providers in production (require cloud HSM) LOW: - T-1: Add error handling + MarkSignFailed to signing goroutine - T-2: Verify caller authorization in handleTradeSubmit - K-2: Secret erasure stub now calls runtime.GC() instead of no-op - N-1: Add VerifyConnection callback to reject peers without TLS certs Tests: 69 unit + 7 fuzz targets, ~900K fuzz executions, 19/19 packages green. Makefile: add -tags json1 for SQLite JSON function support in ORM tests.
63 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
63 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
package integrity
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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)
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func FuzzVerifyFile(f *testing.F) {
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// Generate a real key pair for seeding
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pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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f.Add([]byte("valid binary content"), []byte(hex.EncodeToString(ed25519.Sign(priv, []byte("valid binary content")))))
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f.Add([]byte(""), []byte(""))
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f.Add([]byte("content"), []byte("not-hex"))
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f.Add([]byte("content"), []byte("deadbeef"))
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f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, content []byte, sigBytes []byte) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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binPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test-binary")
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os.WriteFile(binPath, content, 0644)
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os.WriteFile(binPath+".sig", sigBytes, 0644)
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SetTrustedKeys([]string{hex.EncodeToString(pub)})
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// Must not panic regardless of input
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err := VerifyFile(binPath)
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// If verification passes, the signature must actually be valid
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if err == nil {
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// Double-check: manually verify
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sigHex := string(sigBytes)
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sig, decErr := hex.DecodeString(sigHex)
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if decErr != nil || len(sig) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
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t.Fatal("verification passed but signature is malformed")
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}
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}
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})
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}
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func FuzzSetTrustedKeys(f *testing.F) {
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f.Add("deadbeef")
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f.Add("")
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f.Add("not-hex!")
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pub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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f.Add(hex.EncodeToString(pub))
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f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, keyHex string) {
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// Must not panic
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err := SetTrustedKeys([]string{keyHex})
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if err == nil {
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// Valid key: must be exactly 32 bytes
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decoded, _ := hex.DecodeString(keyHex)
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if len(decoded) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
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t.Fatalf("accepted key of length %d (expected %d)", len(decoded), ed25519.PublicKeySize)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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