Files
mpc/pkg/approval/provider_gcp_kms.go
zeekay 82bd565201 mpc: deployment-mode flag + audit dispatcher for fund-private clusters
Adds the topology contract that lets a fund run mpcd as its own private
cluster — no Lux primary network registration, no shared M-Chain audit
ledger — using the same code path and the same operator surface.

Mode flag at cmd/mpcd/main.go:
  --network=primary|private              # registration target
  --audit-store=mchain|local-worm|...    # audit log destination
  --registrar-url, --registrar-auth      # primary-mode announcement
  --audit-worm-path, --audit-mchain-url  # backend selectors

pkg/audit:
  - Append-only Merkle hash chain. Tampering with any historical event
    invalidates every subsequent hash. Canonical bytes use fixed-order
    concatenation (json.Marshal map ordering is non-deterministic).
  - WORMDispatcher: NDJSON append, replay-on-start, fsync per Append.
  - MChainDispatcher: batched POST of (batchHash, fromSeq, toSeq) to a
    configurable anchor RPC.
  - compositeDispatcher: fan-out to multiple legs with per-leg sealing.
  - S3 Glacier Vault / Azure Immutable / GCS Object Lock dispatchers
    fail closed — wired into the flag surface but gated behind the
    cloud-audit build tag, no silent fallback.

pkg/identity/bootstrap.go: identity creation + (primary-mode only)
registrar announcement. Same on-disk format as the previous
loadOrGenerateIdentity (which is now removed); private mode is silent.

deployments/k8s-private: fund-only Kustomize overlay. Standalone
namespace, NetworkPolicy that blocks egress to anything outside the
fund's VPC, hardware-WORM PVC for the audit log, KMS-driven secret
template.

deployments/k8s-primary: env-var patch overlay on the existing lux-mpc
base. composite(local-worm,mchain) by default.

deployments/terraform/{aws,gcp,azure}: VPC + audit storage modules.
terraform validate passes; EKS/GKE/AKS + HSM modules are stubbed and
not yet plan-tested.

deployments/onprem/README.md: WORM storage + PKCS#11 HSM checklist.

Tests (14 total, all passing):
  pkg/audit:           6/6  (chain, WORM replay, MChain batching, composite,
                             cloud stubs fail loud, double-seal rejected)
  pkg/identity:        4/4  (private no-call, primary call, primary empty
                             URL no-op, primary registrar 503 surfaces)
  internal/privatemode: 4/4 (no registrar traffic, restart, tamper-detect,
                             cloud stubs fail loud)

Companion runbook in lux/papers/lux-private-mpc-deployment/
(LaTeX, 5 pages, tectonic-clean).
2025-12-28 16:20:40 -08:00

140 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package approval
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
luxhsm "github.com/luxfi/hsm"
)
// GCPKMSProvider produces ECDSA-P256 approval signatures via Google Cloud
// KMS asymmetric keys. Mirrors AWSKMSProvider; key resource name format:
//
// projects/{project}/locations/{location}/keyRings/{keyRing}/cryptoKeys/{key}/cryptoKeyVersions/{version}
type GCPKMSProvider struct {
signer luxhsm.Signer
mu sync.RWMutex
identity map[string]gcpKMSEntry
}
type gcpKMSEntry struct {
KeyResourceName string
PubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
PubKeyDER []byte
}
// NewGCPKMS constructs a GCP-KMS-backed ApprovalProvider. config currently
// has no required fields — credentials are picked up from
// GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS via luxfi/hsm.
func NewGCPKMS(config map[string]string) (ApprovalProvider, error) {
_ = config
signer, err := luxhsm.NewSigner("gcp", nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("approval/gcp-kms: %w", err)
}
return &GCPKMSProvider{
signer: signer,
identity: make(map[string]gcpKMSEntry),
}, nil
}
func (p *GCPKMSProvider) Provider() string { return "gcp-kms" }
// Enroll registers an approver's (key resource name + SPKI DER public key).
// In production, the operator pipeline calls `gcloud kms keys versions
// get-public-key` and feeds the result here.
func (p *GCPKMSProvider) Enroll(approverID, keyResourceName string, pubKeyDER []byte) error {
pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(pubKeyDER)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("approval/gcp-kms: parse public key: %w", err)
}
ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return errors.New("approval/gcp-kms: enrolled key is not ECDSA")
}
if ecPub.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
return fmt.Errorf("approval/gcp-kms: unsupported curve %s (want P-256)", ecPub.Curve.Params().Name)
}
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.identity[approverID] = gcpKMSEntry{
KeyResourceName: keyResourceName,
PubKey: ecPub,
PubKeyDER: pubKeyDER,
}
return nil
}
// EnrollPEM accepts a PEM-encoded SPKI public key.
func (p *GCPKMSProvider) EnrollPEM(approverID, keyResourceName string, pemBytes []byte) error {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
return errors.New("approval/gcp-kms: invalid PEM")
}
return p.Enroll(approverID, keyResourceName, block.Bytes)
}
func (p *GCPKMSProvider) GetPublicIdentity(_ context.Context, approverID string) (PublicIdentity, error) {
p.mu.RLock()
defer p.mu.RUnlock()
entry, ok := p.identity[approverID]
if !ok {
return PublicIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/gcp-kms: approver %q not enrolled", approverID)
}
return PublicIdentity{
ApproverID: approverID,
Provider: p.Provider(),
PublicKey: entry.PubKeyDER,
Algorithm: AlgorithmECDSAP256,
}, nil
}
func (p *GCPKMSProvider) ApproveIntent(ctx context.Context, approverID string, intent CanonicalIntent) (ApprovalSignature, error) {
p.mu.RLock()
entry, ok := p.identity[approverID]
p.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return ApprovalSignature{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/gcp-kms: approver %q not enrolled", approverID)
}
digest := intent.Digest()
sig, err := p.signer.Sign(ctx, entry.KeyResourceName, intent.Bytes())
if err != nil {
return ApprovalSignature{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/gcp-kms: sign: %w", err)
}
return ApprovalSignature{
ApproverID: approverID,
Provider: p.Provider(),
IntentDigest: digest,
Signature: sig,
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
Algorithm: AlgorithmECDSAP256,
}, nil
}
func (p *GCPKMSProvider) VerifyApproval(_ context.Context, intent CanonicalIntent, sig ApprovalSignature) (bool, error) {
if sig.Provider != p.Provider() || sig.Algorithm != AlgorithmECDSAP256 {
return false, nil
}
digest := intent.Digest()
if digest != sig.IntentDigest {
return false, nil
}
p.mu.RLock()
entry, ok := p.identity[sig.ApproverID]
p.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return false, nil
}
h := sha256.Sum256(intent.Bytes())
return ecdsa.VerifyASN1(entry.PubKey, h[:], sig.Signature), nil
}