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Adds the topology contract that lets a fund run mpcd as its own private
cluster — no Lux primary network registration, no shared M-Chain audit
ledger — using the same code path and the same operator surface.
Mode flag at cmd/mpcd/main.go:
--network=primary|private # registration target
--audit-store=mchain|local-worm|... # audit log destination
--registrar-url, --registrar-auth # primary-mode announcement
--audit-worm-path, --audit-mchain-url # backend selectors
pkg/audit:
- Append-only Merkle hash chain. Tampering with any historical event
invalidates every subsequent hash. Canonical bytes use fixed-order
concatenation (json.Marshal map ordering is non-deterministic).
- WORMDispatcher: NDJSON append, replay-on-start, fsync per Append.
- MChainDispatcher: batched POST of (batchHash, fromSeq, toSeq) to a
configurable anchor RPC.
- compositeDispatcher: fan-out to multiple legs with per-leg sealing.
- S3 Glacier Vault / Azure Immutable / GCS Object Lock dispatchers
fail closed — wired into the flag surface but gated behind the
cloud-audit build tag, no silent fallback.
pkg/identity/bootstrap.go: identity creation + (primary-mode only)
registrar announcement. Same on-disk format as the previous
loadOrGenerateIdentity (which is now removed); private mode is silent.
deployments/k8s-private: fund-only Kustomize overlay. Standalone
namespace, NetworkPolicy that blocks egress to anything outside the
fund's VPC, hardware-WORM PVC for the audit log, KMS-driven secret
template.
deployments/k8s-primary: env-var patch overlay on the existing lux-mpc
base. composite(local-worm,mchain) by default.
deployments/terraform/{aws,gcp,azure}: VPC + audit storage modules.
terraform validate passes; EKS/GKE/AKS + HSM modules are stubbed and
not yet plan-tested.
deployments/onprem/README.md: WORM storage + PKCS#11 HSM checklist.
Tests (14 total, all passing):
pkg/audit: 6/6 (chain, WORM replay, MChain batching, composite,
cloud stubs fail loud, double-seal rejected)
pkg/identity: 4/4 (private no-call, primary call, primary empty
URL no-op, primary registrar 503 surfaces)
internal/privatemode: 4/4 (no registrar traffic, restart, tamper-detect,
cloud stubs fail loud)
Companion runbook in lux/papers/lux-private-mpc-deployment/
(LaTeX, 5 pages, tectonic-clean).
130 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
130 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
package approval
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/rand"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
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)
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// MLDSAProvider produces ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, NIST level 3) post-quantum
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// approval signatures. Use for long-lived attestations where you need
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// resistance to future quantum attacks (e.g. board-level approvals
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// archived for 10+ years).
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//
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// We hold private keys in process memory, mirroring luxfi/hsm's MLDSASigner.
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// For production HSM-backed PQ approvals, use AWS KMS (which now supports
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// ML-DSA) and prefer the "aws-kms" provider with an ML-DSA configured key —
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// or wait for hardware ML-DSA support in Zymbit/YubiHSM.
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//
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// Configuration: none. Mode is fixed at ML-DSA-65.
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type MLDSAProvider struct {
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mu sync.RWMutex
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identity map[string]mldsaEntry
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}
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type mldsaEntry struct {
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PrivKey *mldsa.PrivateKey
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PubKey *mldsa.PublicKey
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PubBytes []byte
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}
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func NewMLDSA(config map[string]string) (ApprovalProvider, error) {
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_ = config
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return &MLDSAProvider{
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identity: make(map[string]mldsaEntry),
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}, nil
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}
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func (p *MLDSAProvider) Provider() string { return "mldsa" }
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// Enroll either generates a new ML-DSA-65 keypair for approverID (if
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// privBytes is nil) or restores a known key from raw bytes.
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func (p *MLDSAProvider) Enroll(approverID string, privBytes []byte) error {
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p.mu.Lock()
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defer p.mu.Unlock()
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var sk *mldsa.PrivateKey
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if len(privBytes) == 0 {
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generated, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, mldsa.MLDSA65)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("approval/mldsa: keygen for %q: %w", approverID, err)
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}
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sk = generated
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} else {
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restored, err := mldsa.PrivateKeyFromBytes(mldsa.MLDSA65, privBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("approval/mldsa: restore key for %q: %w", approverID, err)
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}
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sk = restored
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}
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p.identity[approverID] = mldsaEntry{
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PrivKey: sk,
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PubKey: sk.PublicKey,
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PubBytes: sk.PublicKey.Bytes(),
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (p *MLDSAProvider) GetPublicIdentity(_ context.Context, approverID string) (PublicIdentity, error) {
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p.mu.RLock()
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defer p.mu.RUnlock()
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entry, ok := p.identity[approverID]
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if !ok {
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return PublicIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/mldsa: approver %q not enrolled", approverID)
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}
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return PublicIdentity{
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ApproverID: approverID,
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Provider: p.Provider(),
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PublicKey: entry.PubBytes,
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Algorithm: AlgorithmMLDSA65,
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}, nil
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}
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func (p *MLDSAProvider) ApproveIntent(_ context.Context, approverID string, intent CanonicalIntent) (ApprovalSignature, error) {
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p.mu.RLock()
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entry, ok := p.identity[approverID]
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p.mu.RUnlock()
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if !ok {
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return ApprovalSignature{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/mldsa: approver %q not enrolled", approverID)
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}
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digest := intent.Digest()
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sig, err := entry.PrivKey.Sign(rand.Reader, intent.Bytes(), crypto.Hash(0))
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if err != nil {
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return ApprovalSignature{}, fmt.Errorf("approval/mldsa: sign: %w", err)
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}
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return ApprovalSignature{
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ApproverID: approverID,
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Provider: p.Provider(),
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IntentDigest: digest,
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Signature: sig,
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Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
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Algorithm: AlgorithmMLDSA65,
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}, nil
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}
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func (p *MLDSAProvider) VerifyApproval(_ context.Context, intent CanonicalIntent, sig ApprovalSignature) (bool, error) {
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if sig.Provider != p.Provider() || sig.Algorithm != AlgorithmMLDSA65 {
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return false, nil
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}
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digest := intent.Digest()
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if digest != sig.IntentDigest {
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return false, nil
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}
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p.mu.RLock()
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entry, ok := p.identity[sig.ApproverID]
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p.mu.RUnlock()
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if !ok {
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return false, nil
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}
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return entry.PubKey.VerifySignature(intent.Bytes(), sig.Signature), nil
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}
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// errMLDSAUnenrolled — kept for callers that want a clean sentinel for the
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// "no such approver" case.
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var errMLDSAUnenrolled = errors.New("approval/mldsa: approver not enrolled")
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