Files
mpc/pkg/approval/factory_test.go
T
zeekay 82bd565201 mpc: deployment-mode flag + audit dispatcher for fund-private clusters
Adds the topology contract that lets a fund run mpcd as its own private
cluster — no Lux primary network registration, no shared M-Chain audit
ledger — using the same code path and the same operator surface.

Mode flag at cmd/mpcd/main.go:
  --network=primary|private              # registration target
  --audit-store=mchain|local-worm|...    # audit log destination
  --registrar-url, --registrar-auth      # primary-mode announcement
  --audit-worm-path, --audit-mchain-url  # backend selectors

pkg/audit:
  - Append-only Merkle hash chain. Tampering with any historical event
    invalidates every subsequent hash. Canonical bytes use fixed-order
    concatenation (json.Marshal map ordering is non-deterministic).
  - WORMDispatcher: NDJSON append, replay-on-start, fsync per Append.
  - MChainDispatcher: batched POST of (batchHash, fromSeq, toSeq) to a
    configurable anchor RPC.
  - compositeDispatcher: fan-out to multiple legs with per-leg sealing.
  - S3 Glacier Vault / Azure Immutable / GCS Object Lock dispatchers
    fail closed — wired into the flag surface but gated behind the
    cloud-audit build tag, no silent fallback.

pkg/identity/bootstrap.go: identity creation + (primary-mode only)
registrar announcement. Same on-disk format as the previous
loadOrGenerateIdentity (which is now removed); private mode is silent.

deployments/k8s-private: fund-only Kustomize overlay. Standalone
namespace, NetworkPolicy that blocks egress to anything outside the
fund's VPC, hardware-WORM PVC for the audit log, KMS-driven secret
template.

deployments/k8s-primary: env-var patch overlay on the existing lux-mpc
base. composite(local-worm,mchain) by default.

deployments/terraform/{aws,gcp,azure}: VPC + audit storage modules.
terraform validate passes; EKS/GKE/AKS + HSM modules are stubbed and
not yet plan-tested.

deployments/onprem/README.md: WORM storage + PKCS#11 HSM checklist.

Tests (14 total, all passing):
  pkg/audit:           6/6  (chain, WORM replay, MChain batching, composite,
                             cloud stubs fail loud, double-seal rejected)
  pkg/identity:        4/4  (private no-call, primary call, primary empty
                             URL no-op, primary registrar 503 surfaces)
  internal/privatemode: 4/4 (no registrar traffic, restart, tamper-detect,
                             cloud stubs fail loud)

Companion runbook in lux/papers/lux-private-mpc-deployment/
(LaTeX, 5 pages, tectonic-clean).
2025-12-28 16:20:40 -08:00

134 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package approval
import (
"context"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestFactory_AllProviders(t *testing.T) {
prevEnv := os.Getenv("MPC_ENV")
prevFlag := os.Getenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL")
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", prevEnv)
os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", prevFlag)
})
os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", "test")
os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", "true")
cases := []struct {
name string
ptype string
config map[string]string
wantError bool
}{
{"local-dev", "local-dev", nil, false},
{"mldsa", "mldsa", nil, false},
{"safe", "safe-multisig", map[string]string{
"chain_id": "1", "safe_address": "0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678",
}, false},
{"webauthn", "webauthn", map[string]string{
"rpid": "lux.network",
"origins": "https://approvals.lux.network",
}, false},
{"ledger-enterprise", "ledger-enterprise", map[string]string{
"endpoint": "https://vault.example.com", "api_key": "k", "workspace": "w",
}, false},
{"ledger-device", "ledger-device", nil, false},
{"aws-kms", "aws-kms", map[string]string{"region": "us-east-1"}, false},
{"gcp-kms", "gcp-kms", nil, false},
{"azure-keyvault", "azure-keyvault", map[string]string{"vault_url": "https://x.vault.azure.net"}, false},
{"zymbit", "zymbit", map[string]string{"api_addr": "http://localhost:6789"}, false},
// yubihsm is supported in luxfi/hsm head but not yet in v1.1.2 — the
// factory wraps the published version's NewSigner which rejects it.
// Once luxfi/hsm publishes a yubihsm-capable v1.x tag, flip wantError
// back to false and the existing provider code starts working.
{"yubihsm", "yubihsm", map[string]string{}, true},
{"unknown", "fake", nil, true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
p, err := NewProvider(tc.ptype, tc.config)
if tc.wantError {
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("want error, got nil")
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewProvider(%q): %v", tc.ptype, err)
}
if p == nil {
t.Fatal("NewProvider returned nil provider with no error")
}
if p.Provider() == "" {
t.Fatal("provider name is empty")
}
})
}
}
func TestFactory_LocalDevForbiddenInProduction(t *testing.T) {
prevEnv := os.Getenv("MPC_ENV")
t.Cleanup(func() { os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", prevEnv) })
os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", "production")
if _, err := NewProvider("local-dev", nil); err == nil {
t.Fatal("NewProvider(local-dev) in production: want error")
} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "forbidden in production") {
t.Fatalf("error %q does not contain 'forbidden in production'", err)
}
}
func TestCrossProvider_ApprovalDoesNotVerify(t *testing.T) {
prevEnv := os.Getenv("MPC_ENV")
prevFlag := os.Getenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL")
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", prevEnv)
os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", prevFlag)
})
os.Setenv("MPC_ENV", "test")
os.Setenv("MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL", "true")
dev, err := NewLocalDev(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
mldsa, err := NewMLDSA(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
pq := mldsa.(*MLDSAProvider)
if err := pq.Enroll("alice", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Pre-seed local-dev with its own key for alice.
_, sk, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
dev.(*LocalDevProvider).Enroll("alice", sk)
intent := newTestIntent("cross-provider attack")
devSig, err := dev.ApproveIntent(context.Background(), "alice", intent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// dev-signed approval must NOT verify against mldsa provider.
ok, _ := mldsa.VerifyApproval(context.Background(), intent, devSig)
if ok {
t.Fatal("MLDSA verified a local-dev signature — provider boundary leak")
}
// Provider-name spoofing: claim the signature is from mldsa.
spoofed := devSig
spoofed.Provider = "mldsa"
spoofed.Algorithm = AlgorithmMLDSA65
ok, _ = mldsa.VerifyApproval(context.Background(), intent, spoofed)
if ok {
t.Fatal("MLDSA verified a spoofed local-dev signature — algorithm/key not checked")
}
}