mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/mpc.git
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Fixes all findings from the Blue Team defensive security review of the → custody architecture transition. HIGH: - S-1: Implement P-256 ECDH + AES-256-GCM encryption of passkey backup shards - W-2: Reject unparseable WebAuthn public keys (was silently skipping verification) - O-1: Add Ed25519 binary signature verification package (pkg/integrity) MEDIUM: - W-1: Validate attestation is a real P-256 curve point, not raw attestation object - W-3: Add origin validation to all WebAuthn flows (register, verify, trade approve) - N-2: Remove plaintext TCP fallback from MPC node transport (TLS mandatory) - K-1: Fail-closed on empty/whitespace orgID (prevents cross-tenant key leakage) - A-1: Make AuditEntry immutable (Update/Delete return error) - A-2: Add MPC-level signing audit log (wallet, message hash, intent, trigger) - O-3: Invalidate backup shards after key reshare (stale shares are useless) - O-2: Reject env/file password providers in production (require cloud HSM) LOW: - T-1: Add error handling + MarkSignFailed to signing goroutine - T-2: Verify caller authorization in handleTradeSubmit - K-2: Secret erasure stub now calls runtime.GC() instead of no-op - N-1: Add VerifyConnection callback to reject peers without TLS certs Tests: 69 unit + 7 fuzz targets, ~900K fuzz executions, 19/19 packages green. Makefile: add -tags json1 for SQLite JSON function support in ORM tests.
196 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
196 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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"github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/db"
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)
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type contextKey string
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const (
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ctxUserID contextKey = "user_id"
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ctxOrgID contextKey = "org_id"
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ctxRole contextKey = "role"
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ctxPermissions contextKey = "permissions"
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)
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func getUserID(ctx context.Context) string {
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v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxUserID).(string)
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return v
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}
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func getOrgID(ctx context.Context) string {
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v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxOrgID).(string)
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return v
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}
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func getRole(ctx context.Context) string {
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v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxRole).(string)
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return v
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}
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func getPermissions(ctx context.Context) []string {
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v, _ := ctx.Value(ctxPermissions).([]string)
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return v
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}
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func hasPermission(ctx context.Context, perm string) bool {
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for _, p := range getPermissions(ctx) {
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if p == perm || p == "*" {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func urlParam(r *http.Request, key string) string {
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return chi.URLParam(r, key)
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}
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func (s *Server) authMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Try JWT from Authorization header
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
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token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
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claims, err := s.validateJWT(token)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid token")
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxUserID, claims.UserID)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxOrgID, claims.OrgID)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxRole, claims.Role)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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return
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}
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// Try API key from X-API-Key header
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apiKeyHeader := r.Header.Get("X-API-Key")
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if apiKeyHeader != "" {
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key, err := s.validateAPIKey(r.Context(), apiKeyHeader)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid api key")
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxOrgID, key.OrgID)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxRole, "api")
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxPermissions, key.Permissions)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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return
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}
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "missing authorization")
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})
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}
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func (s *Server) auditMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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// Fire-and-forget audit log for mutating operations
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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go s.writeAuditLog(r.Context(), r)
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}
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})
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}
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func requireRole(roles ...string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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role := getRole(r.Context())
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for _, allowed := range roles {
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if role == allowed {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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}
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient permissions")
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})
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}
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}
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// requirePermission gates API key requests by checking their permissions slice.
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// JWT-authenticated users (non-"api" role) pass through — role-based checks handle them.
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func requirePermission(perm string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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role := getRole(r.Context())
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// JWT users: check role-based access, not per-permission
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if role != "api" {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// API key users: must have the specific permission
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if !hasPermission(r.Context(), perm) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "api key missing permission: "+perm)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, v interface{}) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(code)
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
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}
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, msg string) {
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writeJSON(w, code, map[string]string{"error": msg})
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}
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func (s *Server) writeAuditLog(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) {
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orgID := getOrgID(ctx)
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userID := getUserID(ctx)
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if orgID == "" {
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return
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}
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action := r.Method + " " + r.URL.Path
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ip := r.RemoteAddr
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if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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ip = strings.Split(xff, ",")[0]
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}
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entry := orm.New[db.AuditEntry](s.db.ORM)
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entry.OrgID = orgID
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entry.UserID = nilIfEmpty(userID)
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entry.Action = action
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entry.IPAddress = nilIfEmpty(ip)
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entry.Create()
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}
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func nilIfEmpty(s string) *string {
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if s == "" {
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return nil
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}
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return &s
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}
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// Dedicated signing audit log — records every MPC signing operation
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// with wallet ID, message hash, intent ID, and trigger source.
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func (s *Server) writeSigningAuditLog(ctx context.Context, orgID, walletID, messageHash, intentID, trigger string) {
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entry := orm.New[db.AuditEntry](s.db.ORM)
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entry.OrgID = orgID
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entry.Action = "mpc.sign"
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resType := "wallet"
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entry.ResourceType = &resType
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entry.ResourceID = &walletID
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details, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
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"wallet_id": walletID,
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"message_hash": messageHash,
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"intent_id": intentID,
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"trigger": trigger,
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})
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entry.Details = details
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entry.Create()
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}
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