mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/precompile.git
synced 2026-09-24 00:26:21 +00:00
zeekay
ada296185c
Under the enable-everything precompile policy these verify-only precompiles are no longer refused under strict-PQ, so any divergence between the luxfi/accel GPU/SIMD path and the pure-CPU path is a LIVE consensus split: GPU-equipped and CPU-only validators would return different verify verdicts on the same input and the chain forks. Several accel paths were also outright wrong-primitive forgery surfaces. LAW applied: the GPU verdict must be byte-identical to the CPU verdict on every input, or the accel path is a consensus hazard and is removed. CPU (pure-Go, CGO_ENABLED=0) is now the single source of truth for every on-chain verdict. None of these GPU kernels can be proven byte-identical here, and several are provably NOT, so every verdict-trusting accel branch is deleted and routed to the canonical CPU verifier. Determinism over speed. Active forgery/wrong-output in the DEFAULT build (accelcrypto CPU fallback leaked non-CPU semantics, err==nil): - sr25519: verified via the accel Ed25519 kernel -> a valid Ed25519 signature was ACCEPTED as a valid sr25519/Schnorrkel signature (wrong-curve forgery). - blake3: accelcrypto.Hash(HashBlake3) returns BLAKE2b, not BLAKE3; the "real blake3" fallback was dead code. OpHash256 + MerkleRoot emitted BLAKE2b. Latent splits (reachable only under -tags accel + a GPU backend): - frost: FROST-Schnorr verified through the SigECDSA kernel (wrong primitive + 32B x-only key mis-framed as a 33B ECDSA key). - cggmp21: SigECDSA kernel truncated the 65B key to 33B and skipped the CPU path's recover-and-compare binding (ignored the v byte). - ed25519: GPU Ed25519 kernel not proven byte-identical to the canonical verifier on cofactor / non-canonical-S / small-order edge cases. - secp256r1: P-256 inputs sent to the fixed-curve secp256k1 ECDSA kernel. - mldsa: GPU verified with EMPTY context; precompile binds the FIPS-204 ctx "lux-evm-precompile-mldsa-v1" -> different mu, different verdict. - bls12381 / zk(groth16): GPU MSM result trusted without re-verification and with no curve binding carried to the kernel. - kzg4844: GPU commitment used the backend's OWN embedded trusted setup (empty SRS) instead of the canonical EIP-4844 SRS -> breaks KZG binding. - ai_mining (BatchVerifyMLDSA/BatchAccumulator): accel batch kernel truncates messages to 32 bytes and is mode-fixed -> diverges from VerifyMLDSA. - fhe: GPU computed BFV arithmetic while CPU computes TFHE (different scheme, incompatible ciphertext, nil relin key) -> corrupt + divergent ciphertext. Cleanups (no split, vestigial): removed dead mlkem encapsulateGPU; removed the hpke GPU pre-warm that discarded its result and returned the CPU output anyway. slhdsa was already CPU-only (prior identical fix). Tests (differential / forgery proofs, all green CGO_ENABLED=0 and CGO -race): - sr25519: a valid Ed25519 sig is now REJECTED; real sr25519 still verifies. - blake3: OpHash256/MerkleRoot output == BLAKE3 and != BLAKE2b. - cggmp21: flipped recovery byte is rejected (recover-compare authoritative). - frost: a valid ECDSA sig is rejected as FROST-Schnorr. - ed25519: verdict matches the canonical ed25519.Verify oracle over 64x4 vectors. - mldsa: empty-ctx sig (the accel framing) rejected; precompileCtx sig accepted. Net -593 LOC. No consensus code touched.
58 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
58 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
|
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
|
|
|
|
package cggmp21
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"encoding/binary"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/luxfi/crypto"
|
|
"github.com/luxfi/geth/common"
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// TestCGGMP21_RecoveryByteIsBound proves the CPU verifier's recover-and-compare
|
|
// binding is authoritative. The deleted accel SigECDSA path verified only the
|
|
// 64-byte r||s (ignoring the recovery byte) and truncated the 65-byte
|
|
// uncompressed key to 33 bytes -- so it could return "valid" for an input the
|
|
// CPU verifier rejects, a CPU/GPU consensus split. A signature with valid r||s
|
|
// but a flipped recovery byte must be rejected, because verifyECDSASignature
|
|
// ecrecovers under that byte and compares against the supplied key.
|
|
func TestCGGMP21_RecoveryByteIsBound(t *testing.T) {
|
|
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(crypto.S256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
pub := crypto.FromECDSAPub(&priv.PublicKey)
|
|
msgHash := crypto.Keccak256([]byte("cggmp21 recovery-byte binding"))
|
|
sig, err := crypto.Sign(msgHash, priv) // 65 bytes: r || s || v, correct v in {0,1}
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
run := func(s []byte) byte {
|
|
input := make([]byte, MinInputSize)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(input[0:4], 3)
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(input[4:8], 5)
|
|
copy(input[8:73], pub)
|
|
copy(input[73:105], msgHash)
|
|
copy(input[105:170], s)
|
|
res, _, err := CGGMP21VerifyPrecompile.Run(
|
|
nil, common.Address{}, ContractCGGMP21VerifyAddress, input, 1_000_000, true,
|
|
)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
return res[31]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Correct signature verifies on the CPU path.
|
|
require.Equal(t, byte(1), run(sig), "correct ECDSA signature must verify")
|
|
|
|
// Same r||s, flipped recovery byte: r||s still satisfies VerifySignature,
|
|
// but ecrecover now yields a different key, so the recover-compare binding
|
|
// rejects it. The deleted accel path (r||s only) would have accepted it.
|
|
bad := make([]byte, 65)
|
|
copy(bad, sig)
|
|
bad[64] ^= 0x01
|
|
require.Equal(t, byte(0), run(bad),
|
|
"flipped recovery byte must be rejected (recover-compare binding is authoritative)")
|
|
}
|