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Under the enable-everything precompile policy these verify-only precompiles are no longer refused under strict-PQ, so any divergence between the luxfi/accel GPU/SIMD path and the pure-CPU path is a LIVE consensus split: GPU-equipped and CPU-only validators would return different verify verdicts on the same input and the chain forks. Several accel paths were also outright wrong-primitive forgery surfaces. LAW applied: the GPU verdict must be byte-identical to the CPU verdict on every input, or the accel path is a consensus hazard and is removed. CPU (pure-Go, CGO_ENABLED=0) is now the single source of truth for every on-chain verdict. None of these GPU kernels can be proven byte-identical here, and several are provably NOT, so every verdict-trusting accel branch is deleted and routed to the canonical CPU verifier. Determinism over speed. Active forgery/wrong-output in the DEFAULT build (accelcrypto CPU fallback leaked non-CPU semantics, err==nil): - sr25519: verified via the accel Ed25519 kernel -> a valid Ed25519 signature was ACCEPTED as a valid sr25519/Schnorrkel signature (wrong-curve forgery). - blake3: accelcrypto.Hash(HashBlake3) returns BLAKE2b, not BLAKE3; the "real blake3" fallback was dead code. OpHash256 + MerkleRoot emitted BLAKE2b. Latent splits (reachable only under -tags accel + a GPU backend): - frost: FROST-Schnorr verified through the SigECDSA kernel (wrong primitive + 32B x-only key mis-framed as a 33B ECDSA key). - cggmp21: SigECDSA kernel truncated the 65B key to 33B and skipped the CPU path's recover-and-compare binding (ignored the v byte). - ed25519: GPU Ed25519 kernel not proven byte-identical to the canonical verifier on cofactor / non-canonical-S / small-order edge cases. - secp256r1: P-256 inputs sent to the fixed-curve secp256k1 ECDSA kernel. - mldsa: GPU verified with EMPTY context; precompile binds the FIPS-204 ctx "lux-evm-precompile-mldsa-v1" -> different mu, different verdict. - bls12381 / zk(groth16): GPU MSM result trusted without re-verification and with no curve binding carried to the kernel. - kzg4844: GPU commitment used the backend's OWN embedded trusted setup (empty SRS) instead of the canonical EIP-4844 SRS -> breaks KZG binding. - ai_mining (BatchVerifyMLDSA/BatchAccumulator): accel batch kernel truncates messages to 32 bytes and is mode-fixed -> diverges from VerifyMLDSA. - fhe: GPU computed BFV arithmetic while CPU computes TFHE (different scheme, incompatible ciphertext, nil relin key) -> corrupt + divergent ciphertext. Cleanups (no split, vestigial): removed dead mlkem encapsulateGPU; removed the hpke GPU pre-warm that discarded its result and returned the CPU output anyway. slhdsa was already CPU-only (prior identical fix). Tests (differential / forgery proofs, all green CGO_ENABLED=0 and CGO -race): - sr25519: a valid Ed25519 sig is now REJECTED; real sr25519 still verifies. - blake3: OpHash256/MerkleRoot output == BLAKE3 and != BLAKE2b. - cggmp21: flipped recovery byte is rejected (recover-compare authoritative). - frost: a valid ECDSA sig is rejected as FROST-Schnorr. - ed25519: verdict matches the canonical ed25519.Verify oracle over 64x4 vectors. - mldsa: empty-ctx sig (the accel framing) rejected; precompileCtx sig accepted. Net -593 LOC. No consensus code touched.
65 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
65 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package ed25519
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"testing"
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"github.com/luxfi/crypto/ed25519"
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"github.com/luxfi/geth/common"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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// TestEd25519_VerdictMatchesCanonicalOracle proves the precompile's verdict is
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// exactly ed25519.Verify (the canonical CPU oracle, now the single source of
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// truth) across valid / tampered / wrong-key / wrong-message vectors. The
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// deleted accel branch trusted a GPU Ed25519 kernel whose edge-case behavior
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// (cofactor handling, non-canonical S, small-order points) was not proven
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// byte-identical to this oracle -- a latent CPU/GPU split on attacker inputs.
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func TestEd25519_VerdictMatchesCanonicalOracle(t *testing.T) {
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precompileVerdict := func(msg, sig, pub []byte) bool {
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input := make([]byte, 0, InputLength)
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input = append(input, msg...)
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input = append(input, sig...)
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input = append(input, pub...)
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res, _, err := Ed25519VerifyPrecompile.Run(
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nil, common.Address{}, ContractAddress, input, testGas, true,
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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return res != nil && len(res) == 32 && res[31] == 1
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}
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for i := 0; i < 64; i++ {
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pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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msg := sha256.Sum256([]byte{byte(i)})
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sig := ed25519.Sign(priv, msg[:])
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// Build the four vector families and assert the precompile verdict
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// equals the canonical oracle's verdict for each.
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otherPub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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wrongMsg := sha256.Sum256([]byte{byte(i), 0xFF})
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tampered := append([]byte(nil), sig...)
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tampered[0] ^= 0x01
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vectors := []struct {
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name string
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msg, sig, pub []byte
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}{
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{"valid", msg[:], sig, pub},
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{"tampered-sig", msg[:], tampered, pub},
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{"wrong-key", msg[:], sig, otherPub},
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{"wrong-msg", wrongMsg[:], sig, pub},
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}
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for _, v := range vectors {
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want := ed25519.Verify(v.pub, v.msg, v.sig)
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got := precompileVerdict(v.msg, v.sig, v.pub)
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require.Equal(t, want, got,
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"verdict must match canonical ed25519.Verify oracle (vector=%s, iter=%d)", v.name, i)
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}
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}
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}
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