mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/precompile.git
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zeekay
ca0bf6b303
slhdsa 97.9 · mlkem 97.4 · mldsa 96.8 · xwing 96.2 · bls12381 97.2 · kzg4844 97.8 · v3 98.7. All build, vet and gofmt clean, all green under -count=1, and preserved here rather than lost to a session limit. v3's lane did report before it died: 78.1% to 98.7%, 70 of 70 mutations caught, four of which survived a first pass and needed tests written. The two that matter are rounding: burn rounding principal UP, and fee growth rounding UP, neither of which any behaviour test could see -- a Q128.128 off-by-one is 2^-128 of a token and floors to zero through every payout path, so it took an exact-value assertion. It also found that a full drain of a pool with overlapping positions REVERTS rather than paying out, because deposits round down once per position while payouts round down once per step over combined liquidity, and floor(a+b) >= floor(a)+floor(b). Custody holds; not one unbacked wei leaves. Liveness, not theft. The other six carry no report -- their lanes were killed mid-run. Build, vet, gofmt and the suite are all I can vouch for.
40 lines
2.7 KiB
JSON
40 lines
2.7 KiB
JSON
{
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"_source": "Deterministic seed-based KAT vectors for FIPS 203 ML-KEM at the precompile EVM-dispatch layer.",
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"_keygen_seed_construction": "64-byte seed 0x00..0x3f (canonical NIST FIPS 203 example pattern; identical to upstream luxfi/crypto/mlkem/kat_test.go and circl ACVP fixtures).",
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"_encap_seed_construction": "32-byte seed 0x40..0x5f (the encapsulation random coin r per FIPS 203 Algorithm 17).",
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"_pk_pinning": "First 32 bytes of MarshalBinary(pk) for cloudflare/circl NewKeyFromSeed(64-byte seed). Cross-verified against upstream luxfi/crypto/mlkem/kat_test.go (katPKPrefixHex for ML-KEM-768).",
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"_assertion": "The mlkem precompile applies a domain-separating sha256(\"MLKEM_ENCAP_v1\" || caller || rawSeed) over the caller-supplied 32-byte seed and uses an iterated-sha256 PRNG, so the precompile output (ciphertext || shared_secret) is NOT the same as raw FIPS 203 KAT output. We instead lock down (a) the input public key derived from the canonical 64-byte seed, and (b) the precompile-level determinism: given identical (caller, seed, pubkey), the precompile MUST produce identical (ciphertext, shared_secret) bytes. This catches both upstream library drift and accidental introduction of entropy into the precompile path.",
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"vectors": [
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{
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"mode": "ML-KEM-512",
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"mode_byte": "0x00",
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"key_seed_hex": "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f",
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"encap_seed_hex": "404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f",
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"expected_public_key_prefix_hex": "3995815e597d104355cf29aa5333c93251869d5bcdbe487124f602b8b6a66c16",
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"public_key_size": 800,
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"ciphertext_size": 768,
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"shared_secret_size": 32
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},
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{
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"mode": "ML-KEM-768",
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"mode_byte": "0x01",
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"key_seed_hex": "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f",
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"encap_seed_hex": "404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f",
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"expected_public_key_prefix_hex": "298aa10d423c8dda069d02bc59e6cdf03a096b8b3da4cab9b80ca4a14907672c",
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"public_key_size": 1184,
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"ciphertext_size": 1088,
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"shared_secret_size": 32
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},
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{
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"mode": "ML-KEM-1024",
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"mode_byte": "0x02",
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"key_seed_hex": "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f",
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"encap_seed_hex": "404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f",
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"expected_public_key_prefix_hex": "4b94c29450111191823b3514c9ac1ea3d9825ccb86393a2dfb04654fa2192d37",
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"public_key_size": 1568,
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"ciphertext_size": 1568,
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"shared_secret_size": 32
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}
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]
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}
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